Jihadismoa mehatxu handia da mendebaldeko herrialdeentzat, eta are handiagoa berriki Sirian edo Iraken ISIS taldearen aurkako ekintza militarretan parte hartu duten herrialdeentzat. Islamaren interpretazio alderdikoi eta erradikalizatu bat sortu ondoren, jihadismoa, odolaren egarri, gazte askoren egoera prekarioaz eta etsipenaz baliatzen da. Gazte horietako batzuk, gainera, Europan jaioak eta heziak dira. Artikulu hau indarkeriaren, erlijioaren eta politikaren arteko loturari buruzkoa da. Zehazki, honako gai hauek ditu ardatz: totalitarismoa, aniztasunaren desagerraraztea, biktimizazioa legea indarrez inposatzearen zerbitzura, terrorismoaren propaganda eta mehatxu mota berriak, islamaren barruko gatazka eta mendebaldeko herrialdeek erronka jihadistaren aurrean emandako erantzun eskasa.

Giltza-Hitzak: Jihadismoa. Islama. ISIS. Erlijioa. Politika. Terrorismoa.

El yihadismo supone una amenaza para los países occidentales y más aún para aquellos países involucrados recientemente en acciones militares contra el ISIS en Siria o en Irak. Tras crear una interpretación partidista y radicalizada del islam, el yihadismo, sediento de sangre, se aprovecha de la precaria situación y de la desilusión o la decepción de muchas personas jóvenes, algunas de ellas nacidas y educadas en Europa. Este artículo versa sobre la relación entre violencia, religión y política. En concreto, se centra en los siguientes temas: el totalitarismo, la eliminación de la pluralidad, la victimización al servicio de la imposición de la ley por la fuerza, las nuevas formas de propaganda y de amenazas terroristas, el conflicto dentro del islam y la inconsistencia de las respuestas de los países occidentales frente al desafío yihadista.

Palabras Clave: Yihadismo. Islam. ISIS. Religión. Política. Terrorismo.

Le djihadisme constitue une menace pour les pays occidentaux et encore plus pour les pays récemment impliqués dans des actions militaires contre l'État islamique en Syrie ou en Irak. Après avoir créé une interprétation radicale et partisane de l'islam, le djihadisme, assoiffé de sang, profite de la situation précaire et de la désillusion ou déception de nombreux jeunes, certains nés et éduqués en Europe. Cet article traite de la relation entre la violence, la religion et la politique. Plus précisément, il se concentre sur les thèmes suivants : le totalitarisme, l'élimination de la pluralité, la victimisation au service de l'imposition de la loi par la force, les nouvelles formes de propagande et de menaces terroristes, le conflit au sein de l'islam et l'incohérence des réponses des pays occidentaux face au défi djihadiste.

Mots-Clés : Djihadisme. Islam. État islamique. Religion. Politique. Terrorisme.

Religion, Politics and Violence

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Foreword

This article has the following structure: Section 1 deals with the field of politics, oscillating between power and violence. Section 2 analyzes Totalitarian mechanisms. Section 3 examines the processes of social homogenization, taking the paradigmatic persecution of Coptic Christians in Egypt as an example. Section 4 reflects on Secularism and the instrumentalization of islamophobia. Section 5 identifies new forms of terrorist threats. Section 6 describes the "Crusader" imaginary and the different interpretations of the Koran. Section 7 deals with Jihadist propaganda and financing. Section 8 gives an overview of Jihadism in the Basque Country. Section 9 reflects on the struggle for hegemony within Islam and the responsibilities of the West. Section 10, defines politics as the space of liberty, and opposed to violence. Lastly, as a conclusion, I analyze the instrumental character of violence as opposed to politics, taking the latter as the necessary and fundamental defence of freedom in the face of the continuous threat of Totalitarianism.

Introduction

Islamic radicals neglect democracy as a civil way of organizing the common space. The Jihadist attack against the French police at the end of April 2017, on the eve of the French presidential elections, was carried out with a clear destabilizing purpose. The same was the case with the attack on the British Parliament a few weeks earlier.[1] Probably, plurality and division of powers as warrants of individual and col-

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1. Unfortunately, jihadist attacks do not stop. The last one was carried out by a 22-year-old suicide bomber at Ariana Grande's concert in the Manchester Arena. There were 22 deaths and 64 wounded, many of them children and teenagers. ISIS claimed afterwards: "we have killed your children" and "we will terminate the effeminate and nihilistic leisure of the West and its way of life." (*Daily Mail*, 22 May 2017).

lective rights, citizenship and democracy do not matter much in Muslim-majority countries. Turkey, for instance, initiated a process of separation between politics and religion almost a century ago. Now, however, politicians like President Recep Tayyip Erdogan obstinately began –and continue– to undo the path of secularism, consolidating and reinforcing, instead, authoritarian behaviours and institutions. The purges against dissident civil servants, teachers and the military, as well as censorship against the critical media and the Internet are evidences of the drift of Turkish Islamism.

In the face of this, there is a confused Europe, more concerned with short-term solutions, improvising or buying social peace than willing to open a radical and deep debate for the defence of her values and freedom. Today, Europe is only concerned with surviving as a major economic player in the world market, in order to maintain her status as a global political power. In the face of such a historical irresponsibility, we, Europeans, should look back to our recent history; to the appalling misfortunes that we endured just a few decades ago. Here comes to my mind the August 1936 Olympic Games in Nazi Germany, where Hitler spare no effort to show the grandeur and magnificence of his new Germany. In spite of the optimistic disposition of those who sought to come to terms with his regime, others could envision the gloomy future that awaited Europe in the spectacular, militaristic choreography of the athletes' parades at Berlin's Olympic Stadium –an early example of the systematic use of propaganda by Totalitarian regimes–.

1. Politics: between power and violence

Despite the Nazis' criticism of "degenerate" politics, their propaganda employed these very same means. Politics is usually defined as a way to achieve power, and many political theorists consider violence as the most accurate manifestation of power. Max Weber, for example, regards the State as a relationship of domination based on legitimate violence, that is: violence considered as legitimate (1978). Weber quotes Lev Trotsvk's remark in Brest-Litovsk: "every State is based on violence" (2004), adding that "if social structures ignore the medium of violence, the very concept of the State would disappear" (*ibid.*). For Weber, therefore, the State is the only instance entitled to violence. Accordingly, politics is nothing more than the will to gain power, or to influence the distribution of power, at the expenses of other States or social groups within the State (*ibid.*).

Whoever is involved in politics strives for power as a means to achieve further goals, either selfish or idealistic; or just to enjoy honors and prestige. This view is widely accepted by Modern Western thought. For its supporters, social and political power is like electricity: a capability that may be employed for a variety of purposes. Individuals resort to power, understood as force, to deal with things and each other. In the latter case, its use implies that the powerful have the right to impose their will upon the weak. Weber's remark is enlightening when he defines power as "the capacity of a man, or a number of men, to fulfil their will, even with the opposition of others" (1978).

Bertrand de Jouvenel stresses that, once it has acquired a social nature, power it is inseparable from selfishness. This is why we should avoid a narrow-minded, negative idea of political selfishness: because what we call selfishness is nothing more than the inclination to exist that is inherent to power. For Bertrand de Jouvenel, the psychological aspect of power becomes clear "when a man feels more like a man; when he imposes himself on other men, turning them into mere means for his own will, which gives him a great pleasure" (1974:142). Power means, in this case, "to give orders and to be obeyed. And without this binomial there is no power. It requires nothing else to exist" (*ibid.*). This view was strongly opposed by the German Jew philosopher Hannah Arendt. In confront of other thinkers' all-out equation between power and violence, she thought that, if the essence of power is the effective capacity to command, then there is no greater power than the power coming out of a gun barrel (1972).

2. The inner-working of totalitarianism

Arendt's *The Origins of Totalitarianism* was first published in 1951, in the wake of World War II, becoming one of the first books about the topic. There, she characterizes propaganda and terror as the main means for Totalitarianism. Her argument is widely known: 20th Century mass movements have caused the dissolution and corruption of all organizations, groups and classes, taking their place in the centre of social life. These mass movements employ terror and propaganda to create a sense of limitless power, and they are able to control, destroy, and corrupt any of these organizations, groups, or classes in civil society.

This is the case with Islamic fundamentalism striving for Jihad and the creation of an Islamic State, putting every means at the service of religion, and turning individuals into masses (see Patrick Cockburn, 2015 and 2016), Its followers are required to surrender their will and independent thinking to the all-powerful political-religious leader. This is what Arendt tells us when she writes on the banal voluntary submission of the self to supra-human forces (1973). Freedom dies in the midst of blind faith, murder, and brutality.

If this is so, there is a clear historical parallelism between the dictatorships of Arendt's times and current Islamism. That is to say: the horrendous crimes committed by Stalin and Hitler are not just historical curiosities, but forms of government likely to return. A new Totalitarianism is being reborn today disguised in religion. If it is not fought and eradicated, it will make Bolshevism and National Socialism unexceptional in history, and not mere perversions of modernity. These were unwanted consequences of 20th Century frenetic industrial development, hyper-technology and bureaucracy. But they are as real today as they were in 1936.

It may be wrong to suppose that lack of memory means that the masses have recovered from Totalitarianism. Most probably, the converse is the case (1973). Arendt warns her current and forthcoming generations that the Totalitarian virus inoculated in the early 20th Century is here to stay. Only the inability to depart from the Middle Ages distinguishes Islamic fundamentalism from Totalitar-

ian Nazism and Bolshevism. Its ideology consists in a self-sufficient, complete and closed-off interpretation of history. What they lack is scientific thinking. However, despite the technological gap, globalization and cyber cafes come in support of the Islamic demagogues.

The inner working of terror can be watched today on CNN, but they can also be found in Arendt's work. The Islamist masses threw themselves into the streets cheering the massacre committed by Mohamed Atta in New York on September 11, promising to burn the Danish *Jyllands-Posten* newspaper and calling for the annihilation of Israel. The demagogues crush the moderates in the mosques, seeking to lead the Arab masses. Everyday, many bin Ladens shape the mass-man to their will elsewhere. They brutalize him and hurl him to the enemy, just as Hitler did. They offer the desperate a chance to become protagonists of history, even if it is a history of destruction making him feel mighty and unstoppable. So violence, power and cruelty become the higher virtues of those human beings who have lost their place in the world (1973).

3. Attacks on copts

The Coptic Christian minority is 10% of the Egyptian population, most of them living in Upper Egypt and the outskirts of Cairo and Alexandria.[2] In February 2017, the Egyptian branch of ISIS broadcasted a video threatening the Copts, and assuring them that "the worst" was yet to come. On April 9, a bomb killed 22 people and wounded 41 in the Mar Guergues church (St. George, in Arabic) in Tanta, 120 kilometres north of Cairo. The attack took place during the celebrations of Palm Sunday, which marks the beginning of the Holy Week.

This is just one of the many acts of violence endured by the Copts after the 2013 military coup against the Islamist President Mohamed Morsi. But violence against Copts has been common currency in Egypt in the last 30 years. This table shows some of the major attacks against them since 1992:

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2. For an overview of the Copts' situation in Egypt see Fernando De Haro, 2015.

DATE	PLACE	DEATHS	WOUNDED	AUTHORSart Cities
March 1992	Sambu, Asiut (Egypt)	15		Islamic terrorists
05/05/1992	Asiut (Egypt)	12		Islamic Fundamentalists
03/11/1994	Kusia (Egypt)	5		Islamic Fundamentalists
02/12/1997	Abu Qorgas (Egypt)	9		Islamic terrorists
02/14/1997	Abu Qorgas (Egypt)	3		Islamic terrorists
01/01/2011	Church of the Two Saints. Alexandria (Egypt)	23		Islamic Fundamentalists
04/06/2013	Al Jusus (Egypt)	4		Combats with Islamic Fundamentalists
04/07/2013	Al Jusus (Egypt)	3		Combats with Islamic Fundamentalists
12/11/2016	Coptic Christian Cathedral. Cairo (Egypt)	29	49	Islamic terrorists
05/26/2017	San Samuel's Monastery in Minia (Egypt)	29	13	ISIS

Most Egyptian Christians are Coptic, although there is also a small Catholic community. According to tradition, the Coptic Orthodox Church was founded by St. Mark in Alexandria during the first century. Christianity became the main religion of Egypt since then until the seventh century, when Muslim invaders from the Arabian Peninsula broke into the country. Centuries of Islamic domination made Christianity gradually recede, with alternating periods of persecution and tolerance, until now. Historically, Egyptians have respected the Copts. But Islamic fundamentalism has unrestrainedly spread in the country since the late 1970s, and violence, sectarianism, and intimidation towards them have gradually increased.

There are about 60 million Copts, living between Egypt (10 percent of the population), Ethiopia (51 million), Eritrea (2 million), and Sudan and Southern Sudan (about 500,000). It is the main creed of Ethiopia and Eritrea and the biggest religious minority in Egypt. Their theological, liturgical, and cultural tradition is a very valuable heritage for Christianity and essential to understand Biblical history. Moreover, Coptic monasteries host a large number of manuscripts of great importance for the whole Christian community. Regarding the Coptic Church, there are three patriarchates and two patriarchs: the Abuna Paulos in Ethiopia and the Abuna Dioscoro in Eritrea. These, and the Patriarchate of Alexandria, form the Coptic Church under Pope Tawadros II.

It is important to make this reference to the Copts, being the largest Christian minority in the Middle East, because ISIS brutally chases and massacres them, as shown in two ISIS videos of Copts executed in Libya (fig. 1). The first one coin-

cided with the 2017 February attacks in Egypt, while the second one, in April, was about Ethiopian Copts. This minority is a nuance for Fundamentalists because they are an example of coexistence between Christians and Muslims in a Muslim-majority country, and their very existence shows that it is possible to live together in a diverse society. Copts are usually poor, and some of them are even poorer. However, they have always been part of the Egyptian national project. They participated in the struggle for independence and contributed to the development of modern Egypt. Nevertheless, since the 1970s, they have seen their rights cut off. Until then, they were more or less respected, even if the late Pope Shenouda III was on house arrest from 1981 to 1985 in the San Bishoy monastery, in the desert of Wadi el Natrun. The situation dramatically changed when President Muhammad Anwar el-Sadat needed to approach the increasingly powerful Islamists. In addition, Egyptian migrant workers returning from the Gulf countries brought back the prejudices they had acquired there, diverting them against the Copts. Then, systematic discrimination began, as well as the attacks against Coptic churches. This situation worsened during the long lasting Hosni Mubarak's office. His first years in power were not especially hard for Coptic Christians, although the government banned them from building or repairing their churches. Mubarak s last period, however, was disastrous for them, because of the government's implicit agreement with the Muslim Brotherhood.[3] Then, the authorities turned a blind eye to violence against Coptic Christians, hoping to divert the attention from the declining economy and the worsening of living conditions in the country. The Muslim Brotherhood, for its part, spared Mubarak from any criticism as long as they were allowed to harass the Copts.

Fig. 1. Still of a n ISIS video with Coptic victims, Abc, 17 February, 2015

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3. For an overview of the Muslim Brotherhood see Javier Martín, 2011

However, for a short time in 2011, during the Arab Spring, Muslims and Christians attended together the massive demonstrations in Tharir Square. Both communities fought side by side against Mubarak's corrupt regime. Nevertheless, as soon as the Muslim Brotherhood took control of the revolution, the attacks against the Copts returned and continued until the Muslim Brotherhood was driven out of power in June 2013 and beyond. President Abdelfattah Al-Sisi is now in power, but Coptic Christians' status has not improved too much.

As I have noted above, the Islamic State and Jihadism cannot tolerate Christians in a land they consider their own. The macabre video of the beheading of 21 Egyptian Copt hostages in Libya, for instance, nonsensically equated them with "Crusaders" and the "hostile religion of the cross in Egypt". This means a falsification of Egyptian history which scandalizes moderate Muslims. This is why the events in Libya led to a resolute military retaliation by the Cairo government, for it was considered, not only an attack on Egyptian citizens, but also an attack on Islam as practiced in Egypt.[4] This does not mean that the protection granted by the State to the Copts is free of charge. Like in other Arab countries, Egyptian Christians pay a heavy price in terms of permanent persecution and marginalization. They may be Egyptians, but they are excluded from the higher ranks of the State administration and the Army. Now, the Muslim Brotherhood blames them for the overthrown of the Islamist President Morsi. This is a widespread opinion and, also, an excuse for terrorist violence. The East Media Research Institute recently reported that a Muslim Brotherhood website called "The Military Republic of Tawadros" (named after the current Coptic Pope),[5] calls the readers to spread the message that the Copts "openly and secretly led the opposition to Islam." After Morsi was evicted from power, the interim President Adly Mansour invited the Muslim Brotherhood to take part in the new political process, but they refused and, instead, they called for massive demonstrations, expecting to regain power by means of political instability.

The homogenization of the people under Islam is also a very important part of their strategy. For Islamists need to make other forms of religiosity disappear from the public arena, despite, for example, the Copts' pedigree as a truly Egyptian community. It turns out that religion is an instrument of the Muslim Brotherhood to obtain power, essential to present themselves before the people as "truly Egyptians", creating a new imaginary that contradicts Egyptian history.

As pressure over the Copts increases, many churches have suspended worship, Sunday schools and catechesis. In the Minya governorate, for example, masses are only broadcasted in the Internet. In other places in Upper Egypt, these finish at 7:00 a.m., and then the churches close and are placed under surveillance for the rest of the day. The Muslim Brotherhood also threatened Tawadros II with death, and he had to leave St. Mark's Cathedral in Cairo for a secret location.

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4. Christians are one in every ten Egyptians, and they have been protected by Islam for many centuries. Muslim law divides the world into three: the House of Peace (dar al-silm), the House of Protection (dar al-sulh), and the House of War (dar al-Harb). Any attack on a protected minority means a provocation to all Egyptians.

5. See also *La Stampa* newspaper, 8 January 2013

As most attacks and threats remain unpunished, the Copts feel unprotected and abandoned by the authorities, causing forced population displacements as fear spreads. In late 2016, a terrorist command beheaded a Copt in his home. As a result, more than 100 Christian families fled from Al Arish, the capital of northern Sinai, to Ismailiya city, 120 kilometres east of Cairo. Some Islamic institutions condemned this murder, but harassment of Copts did not stop. On the contrary ISIS published a video proclaiming them "their favourite prey." The video also praised the young suicide bomber Abu Abdullah al-Masri, the responsible for the death of 29 people at Cairo's Botrosiya church in late 2016.

Religious cleansing often takes the shape of political revenge, and it is in the political-religious realm where it finds its *raison d'être*. This becomes clear in the case of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Deprived of any political power after Morsi's fall, with their leaders in jail, they cannot openly confront the police and the army, but they can encourage violence against the unprotected Copts, aiming at destabilizing the country, free her from "the unfaithful," and prove that the current regime cannot control the situation. If we add up the extreme poverty suffered by many Egyptians (half of the population live on less than $2 a day), soon they would have all the ingredients for their return to power, with a programme to make the Koran and the Sunna –the body of traditional social and legal codes of behaviour– the only source of law for families, individuals, communities, and the State.

Ultra-conservative Islamic groups equate Christianity and Western culture, thus regarding Copts as foreigners. They think that Egyptian Christians are a bridgehead for a new Western crusade and they intend to homogenize the nation employing religion, turning Muslim countries into Islamic caliphates, and excluding women and non-Muslims from public life. For its part, like in Mubarak's times, the current Al-Sisi government keeps ignoring the harassment and violence unleashed against the Copts, hoping to divert attention from widespread poverty and the continuous economic decline. Meanwhile, the persecution of the Copts distracts many socially disadvantaged Muslims from their daily misfortunes.

In the past couple of years, the building of churches has also provoked numerous incidents. A new law on Christian temples was passed in 2016, which only made discrimination official: "The government has killed the dream. It is telling the Christians: You will not be full citizens in a state that replaces national identity by Salafism" said the Christian MP Emad Gad. Samuel Tadros, a Fellow at the Hudson Institute's Center for Religious Freedom, is probably right when he writes (2013) that the Islamists want to return the Copts to the *dhimmitud* they endured when the Muslims conquered Egypt. That is: a submission to *dhimmah*, the Islamic law applied to the "peoples of the Book" (Jews and Christians) who lived under the "protection" of the Sultan, with "different" rights and roles.

4. In favor of whom does time play?

This phrase is often employed to highlight different options. To illustrate my point, let me first refer to a recent book published in France by David Benichou, Farhad

Khosrokhavar and Philippe Migaux, *Le Jihadisme: le comprendre pour mieux le combattre* (2015), in which they present an overview of the historical origins of Jihadism as the ultimate 20th Century Totalitarianism, Its strategy, differing from conventional terrorism, consists in:

- Presenting Jihadism as a result of the failure of the Secularism;
- Converting Islam into the religion of the oppressed;
- Attracting second, third, or fourth generations of migrants from Muslim countries;
- Entice young middle-class converts, who find an anti-imperialist élan in radical Islam, just like 1970s Leftism.

According to Benichou, Khosrokhavar and Migaux, Jihadism takes different faces and exploits all the resources available to disseminate its Totalitarian programme, becoming the greatest threat to our freedom and security. In these conditions, time does not precisely play in the favour of our plural and democratic societies. On the contrary, this game is being played in Europe and we are forced to take part in it. Petter Nesser (2016), an expert on Jihadist terrorism at the Norwegian Defence Centre (FFI), states that Jihadist's used of cars, trucks, homemade explosives or plain knives in their attacks in London, Paris, Berlin, Stockholm, Nice and Barcelona prove their capability to adapt to anti-terrorist measures. He notes that more people have died in Europe by Jihadist attacks between 2014 and 2016 than ever before, not to mention the thousands of foreign fighters travelling to war scenarios in the Middle East. The threat is not only transnational, but also multinational, for individuals of different nationalities are involved. Beyond the difficulties of preventing attacks carried out by "lonely wolves", self-trained online, on many occasions there is also a previous recruitment process supported by transnational networks originated in war zones or the refugees' European milieus.

The 20th century witnessed the struggle against different kinds of Totalitarianism: Nazism, Fascism, Stalinism, Maoism, the Khmer Rouge, etc. This struggle was thought to be overcome, and, it was believed, Totalitarianism would never flourish again. However, now the threat is back in the disguise of religion and aiming to rule our lives, asking us how to think, enjoy, talk, eat, or dress. It aims to destroy Western society and its values, such as life in freedom, gender equality, tolerance and pluralism.

The terrorists' strategy is simple: to spread fear and Islamophobia. The Roman historian Titus Livius once wrote: "Under the influence of fear, which always leads men to take a pessimistic view of things, they magnified their enemies' resources, and minimized their own." (2002: Book XXVII, sec. 44). Insecurity is an irrational emotion. When there is fear, irrationality controls thought, speech and perception, driving us to anguish and desperate actions. We should not be afraid, and the authorities must fight Totalitarianism by all means (political, judicial and military). However we should be vigilant that the fight against Terrorism is carried out without undermining the fundamental values of our societies. History teaches us that ideological battles are fought with ideas and widespread civism. In short, more than anything, the serenity and dignity shown by the citizenship in those Eu-

ropean cities struck by terror have taught the Totalitarian deathmongers that they will not have it easy.

According to Arendt, fear is a condition to obtain the submission of the people (I prefer to call the latter "citizenship", even though this term is now confused and devaluated by consumerism). Totalitarianism never loses sight of their goals, no matter how far away they seem, or how they contradict reality (1973). They may not conquer the world, but they can relentlessly burn it. But Arendt warns about something else: Totalitarianism appears in the midst of apathy and indifference to politics. The isolated and powerless individual embraces Totalitarianism in the face of the mediocrity, relativism and cynicism of partisan politics and degraded Parliamentarism.

Departing from European well-intentioned political myths, Arendt thinks that the 1930s European mass-man is not characterized by brutality and backwardness, but rather by isolation and lack of normalized social relations (1973). This is an essentially modern feature, likely to repeat itself in the current conditions. In Arendt's view, the Nazis knew that evil acts are fascinating. Likewise, the Bolsheviks made of their immorality the core of Communist propaganda. In both cases, history has shown, once again, that vile propaganda and widespread immorality may denaturalize ethics and legitimate any political finality through fallacious, though pleasant-sounding, arguments and discourses.

Arendt's book is key to ascertain the Nazis' goals and methods, or how Hitler rose to power. For her, Totalitarianism was not based in laws but in the total lack of these, and the elimination of any personal conviction, replaced by pure terror and arbitrariness. It is not just a wrong way of thinking. A supreme leader forces us to play a game where only he knows the rules. In fact, he does not know them, but he rules on the spot, making us confused and unsecure.

Coming back to my point, we must never forget Arendt's characterization of Totalitarianism as irrationality. Neither the dangers we are exposed to. However, I believe, the shock caused by the indiscriminate attacks on us is now over. We already know that Islamic fundamentalism is arbitrary, real and strong. Thus time is no longer on the terrorists' side. An adequate mixture of strength and strategic serenity will place us on the right path.

Together with police and military measures, the political and social defeat of terrorism requires depriving it of all legitimacy before its followers and victims. In this sense, strategic communication and dialectical confrontation to ISIS symbols, behaviours, justifications, and claims is paramount. Above all, ISIS should be delegitimized as a representative of Islam, for they are the opposite as a religion regarded by its followers "the religion of peace and tolerance". They are the sole responsible for their acts, and they should not be allowed to hide behind a community that does not share their tenets and rather endures their actions. It is very important to engage Muslims in the fight against terrorism and violent fundamentalism based on a sectarian and fanatical interpretation of Islam.

On the other hand, political forces of every European country must transcend day-to-day politics and unite in the face of this danger. Spain, for example, has achieved a State agreement between all parties to update the Criminal Code in the face of this new threat. Regarding the country's law enforcement agencies,

the counter-terrorist experience gained after decades of struggle against ETA, can be now employed in the fight against Jihadism. In addition, intelligence agencies such as the National Intelligence Centre and the new Intelligence Centre against Terrorism and Organized Crime (dependent on the Ministry of the Interior) must be strengthened, coordinate and adapt to the new Islamist terrorist organizations. Likewise, Spanish prisons have initiated and "Intervention Program for Islamist Inmates", designed to detect individual and collective radicalization. Outside prisons, this is matched with a Strategic National Plan against Violent Radicalization: a multidisciplinary tool to identify and tackle sources of fundamentalism.

5. Nuclear jihadism. The antepenultimate threat

A possibility is not a utopia, and the risk of a nuclear attack is more than evident. ISIS prolific activities, and Al Qaeda's past statements, make us fear of the possibility of a new, more deadly 9/11 employing nuclear power. Western authorities are watching, although scientists have disregarded this possibility so far, claiming that radical Islamists lack the technological capacity to build an atomic bomb. However, the risk is still there. A nuclear holocaust does not require a sophisticated nuclear device. There are many other ways of employing atomic energy for destruction, such as a dirty bomb (a conventional bomb covered with radioactive material), an attack on a nuclear weapons cache, the sabotage of a nuclear fuel depot, a radioactive waste storage facility or a nuclear power plant, etc.

In fact, the terrorist cell that attacked Paris and Brussels was gathering information about nuclear objectives, and they only stopped doing so after Belgium reinforced the security measures in these. The press reported that the Paris attackers had considered targeting a nuclear power plant in Belgium, and Jihadists had followed and recorded in video the chief engineer of an atomic facility.[6] Nuclear terrorism, however, has not yet happened, except for the 1995 Chechen secessionists' failed attempt to detonate a dirty bomb at Ismailovsky Park in Moscow. In the past, however, Al Qaeda attempted to purchase nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union. More recently, ISIS stole about 40 kilograms of low-enriched uranium from the University of Mosul in Iraq. Furthermore, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) estimates that the Syrian ISIS has about 50 tons of natural uranium, which can be processed to produce between three and five atomic bombs.

In a 2015 report to the European Parliament, the NATO Director of the Centre for Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Wolfgang Rudischhauser, reports that ISIS has now the know-how, and some human resources, to use CBRN materials as a weapon. A year later, the IAEA General Director, Yukiya Amano, declared in a Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington that, now, "the terrorists have the means, the knowledge and the information to create a nuclear bomb"; and The White House remarked that "Nuclear and radiological terrorism remains

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6. See, for instance, Steven Mufson, 2016.

one of the greatest challenges to international security, and the threat is increasing."[7] While there is a strong consensus in the international community about the dangers of nuclear terrorist attacks, the scientific community still regards this fears as exaggerated, at least until, it transcended, the director of the Belgian nuclear research and development program had been put under surveillance by terrorists. Paco Castejón, a CIEMAT (Centre for Energy, Environmental and Technological Research) researcher and a representative of Ecologists in Action at the Nuclear Safety Council (CSN), quotes (in Molina, 2016) a report published last March by the Belfer Center of the Harvard Kennedy School stating that the EU and the US are now training nuclear scientists and preventing them from developing terrorist allegiances.

6. Islam as the religion of peace and the threats to "crusader countries"

As I said above, the Muslims must take up an important role in the de-legitimization of ISIS propaganda. Tenets like "the Koran should be the only law for Muslims", or that "the first duty of a good Muslim is to proselytize and combat the infidels," must be condemned and eradicated. The statements criticizing European countries like Germany, France or Britain must also be rejected, even if these take the form of a historical rejection of early 11th Century crusades. The Medieval Religion wars had disastrous consequences for Europe, be these against Muslin or, later, between Catholics and Reformists (1524-1697). But Christian religion wars" and Crusades are a thing of the past. On the contrary, we must condemn any kind of war in the favour of negotiation and coexistence of all creeds."

In connection to this, even the controversial word "Jihadism" should be put under review. Most people think that Jihad means the right and the duty to fight the unfaithful, like in the Koran's *Verse of The Sword*. Many other, in turn, think that taking Jihad as violence contradicts the true spirit of Islam, which is based on "submission", but also on "peace and tolerance." "Holy War" may be interpreted either in terms of spiritual struggle or effective conflict. Moreover, there is also a distinction between "great Jihad" and "small Jihad," the former being similar to Christian asceticism, while the latter refers to Muslims' resistance against an external threat, including preventive war. It is very difficult to establish a single reading for the whole Muslim community, given the lack of a religious hierarchy able to produce canonical interpretations.

Likewise, until now, the Islamic tradition has strongly condemned suicide. Today, however, some religious leaders support its legitimacy if it is for an "Islamic cause", or in defence of a "threatened" Muslim community. Precisely, "self-defence" was t invoked in the attack on the satirical magazine *Charlie Hebdo* in January 2015, after publishing cartoons of Mohammed. Then came the Kosher supermarket, for selling Jewish kosher food according to Jewish laws, the Bataclan

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7. See Carlos Llorente, 2016.

Concert Hall and the Saint-Denis football stadium, during a friendly match between France and Germany.

Going beyond this abusive employ of self-defence, these terrorist attacks sought to provoke a social fracture in France, a country regarded as the weakest point of the Western ranks, where Islam is the second largest religion with more than five million practitioners (about 7% of the population), and a disenchanted youth of Muslin background excluded in ghettos. While Jihadism is profiting from exasperation and stigmatization of the French Muslim community, Islamophobia is increasing in the country, spurred on by Le Pen National Front's opportunistic use of the French national and political tradition. But it is also clear that French secular Republicanism is an anathema to radical Islam. For the Terrorists, this country is a symbol of Democratic Europe: the standard-bearer of European equality, fraternity and freedom, the 1789 Revolution and the Enlightenment. This is why the former Socialist minister Jack Lang, the current chair of the Institute of the Arab World in Paris, regarded Terrorist attacks on French soil "an attack on the fundamental values of all countries sharing a faith in democracy, tolerance and human rights. It is an attack to 18th Century Enlightenment as opposed to Totalitarianism." (fig. 2)

In addition, France participates in the international coalition against ISIS and other Terrorist groups in Syria and Iraq. Another reason for being a major Jihadist target is the country's colonial past and its former policy in the Middle East. In 1916, France signed the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which divided the crumbling Ottoman Empire into several artificial countries such as Syria and Iraq. Thus, Paris could be accused of opposing the foundation of an all-Arab caliphate based on the


Fig. 2. Terrorist attack in Nice, *Time*, 15 July 2016

Oumma (community of believers), which ISIS tries to resuscitate from its colonial ruins.[8] In September 2014, Abu Mohamed Al-Adnani, the ISIS spokesman, called his supporters to execute "the Western unfaithful", "especially the dirty and despicable French": "Strike his head with a rock, or kill him with a knife, or run him over with your car, or push him from a high place, or suffocate him, or poison him."

Shortly after the Paris attacks, an ISIS video warned: "Europeans, the Islamic State did not start the war against you, as your governments and the press is making you to believe. You attacked us first. You will pay the price when your children, sent off to fight us, return either with their throats slit, mutilated, in a coffin or with mental disorders. You will pay the price fearing to travel abroad -the image of Air France plane- and you will be scared when you see a Muslim in the street. You will never feel safe at home again. You will pay the price when we crush this crusade and we fight you in your homes, the voice says. "You are the ones who are killing us, the bombers and the murderers"–and then, the voice tells the young French Muslims: Are you not going to do anything? You live with them; you work with them, at the service of the pig François Hollande. […] We have warned you, as you very well know, but you keep striking us. Your bombs have killed many families, children, and innocent people. Things worse than September 11th await you. Allah's victory by our hand is close. Allah promised us this. We are his children and you can do nothing about that."

ISIS has now extended its threats from France to all "crusader" countries without telling which ones. Expectedly, those who participate in the attacks on Syria and Iraq are on the list, assuring them that they "will not live in peace" until the bombardments continue. The United Kingdom, for example, has suffered some of the hardest Jihadist attacks in recent times, such as those on the British Parliament in March 2017, or the Ariana Grande concert at the Manchester Arena. This is probably linked to the new international role taken up by the UK after Brexit. Also Russia has been threatened due to her actions against ISIS. In their communiqués and videos, some of them in Russian, the Jihadists stated that, "very soon", "an ocean of blood will be spill" on the country. Then ISIS claimed responsibility for the crash of a plane covering the route between Sharm el-Sheikh (Egypt) and St. Petersburg in 2015, with 224 deaths. In March 2017, a suicide attack in St. Petersburg's underground killed 14 people and wounded 50. Although Russia is involved in the attacks against ISIS, it does not participate in the US-led coalition. While the latter supports the so-called Syrian moderate opposition, Moscow is an advocate of Bashar al-Assad's Baaz Party government.

Germany does not take part in the bombardments, although the German government provides the Iraqi Kurdish militias fighting ISIS with weapons and training. Jihadist attacks in Germany began in December 2016, when a Lorry broke into a Christmas market in Berlin's Breidscheidplatz, with 12 deaths and 50 wounded. The country is also a site for ISIS cells and the recruitment of "foreign fighters". So far, the German police has carried out more than 200 raids in radical mosques and other places used as indoctrination and recruitment centres for young Muslims.

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8. See Eduardo Martín de Pozuelo, Jordi Bordas and Eduard Yitzhaky, 2015.

Neither Italy takes part in the air attacks against ISIS, although Italian and international media report on the Jihadists' intentions to strike Rome and the Vatican. ISIS has also claimed Al-Andalus (Spain) as part of the historic Islamic territories. As for Belgium, the country is part of the international coalition, but she also provided ISIS with the largest number of European-born fighters. In September 2014, a mass trial was held in Antwerp against 46 members of Sharia4Belgium, a major recruiter and trainer of terrorists. The attack on Brussels' Jewish Museum in in May 2014 was the first warning. The Paris attacks were also planned in Brussels' Molenbeek district, where there is a high rate of Arab and Muslim population. On 22 March 2016, four days after Salah Abdeslam's arrest there, three suicide bombers killed 32 people (o 22 nationalities) and injured 340 in the Zaventem airport and the Maelbeek underground station, in Brussels' European Quarter. Incidentally, these terrorist were part of the same cell that killed 130 people in Paris a year earlier. As a consequence, Belgium has fallen into a security psychosis.

The United States needs separate considerations. Even though they lead the 30-countries International coalition against ISIS, This country had an important role in its establishment in Iraq. The secular Saddam Hussein's regime was corrupt, but it granted stability to the region. When it was overthrow by the Americans, a bloody civil war between Sunni, Shiite Iraqis and Al-Qaeda followed, causing between 150,000 and one million deaths until the withdrawal of US troops in 2011.[9] Then, the Shiite Government, proved itself unable to fight ISIS due to the Sunni's support. The situation worsened after the US' attacks on the Syrian government of Bashar al-Assad and the Americans' support of the al-Nusra Front, an embryo of the Syrian ISIS, and their pressures on Saudi Arabia and Turkey to fund the Syrian Islamic rebel factions. Turkey has also supported or confronted ISIS depending of their interest of the time, always seeking to weaken the Kurds and prevent them to become independent.

As a result, the "Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant" was proclaimed in 2013. On 29 June 2014, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was self-appointed "Caliph Ibrahim" in the Great Mosque of Mosul (Iraq). He decreed the "suppression of all organizations and borders" between Muslim countries. He also changed his name to Abu Bakr al-Siddiq, the first Caliph of Islam, Muhammad's father-in-law and the initiator of the so-called Orthodox caliphs. In a few months, an army composed by Sunnis marginalized by the Iraqi and Syrian governments and foreign fighters took control of one third of Iraq and another third of Syria, instauring a brutal regime that encouraged terrorist attacks all over the world. The US's incoherent policies became evident when the Syrian rebels they had trained against Assad refuse to fight ISIS and even surrendered their American weapons to it. Then, the US support was diverted to the Syrian Kurds operating in the north-east side of the country. This has seriously damaged the Turkish-American relations. In addition, the US has been unable to coordinate with the Syrian government and its Russian and Iranian allies, the only forces capable of defeating the terrorists on the ground.

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9. See Javier Martín, 2015a and 2015b.

What is more, the US has been supporting the Israelis' attacks on Syrian, Iranian and Hezbollah forces fighting ISIS in South West Syria around Damascus and the Golan Heights. All this has added much more confusion to an already complicated situation. ISIS's territories in Syria and Iraq are now reduced to a few pockets in the Southern Syria desert and the Euphrates area near the Iraqi border. However, at the height of its power, the group even attempted to start a rebellion in the Philippines and it is still a persisting threat in Afghanistan (fig. 3).

Fig. 3. ISIS' Amaq News Agency, Images of ISIS fighters in Deir Ezzor

7. Isis' cyberwar

Twitter has been one of the main tools for ISIS propaganda. Another question is ISIS' capabilities for cyberwar.[10] On 24 August 2015, the Pentagon announced the killing in Raqqa of Junaid Hussain by a drone. This computer scientist from Birmingham (England) was regarded as the leader of the Cibercaliphate, an ISIS unit devoted to cyberwar. He had hacked the US Central Military Command's Twitter and YouTube accounts and the *Newsweek* magazine's accounts. In 2012, he was imprisoned for half a year for stealing and publishing the house address of the former British Prime Minister Tony Blair. On the night of 8-9 April 2015, the French public TV5 channel lost control over its broadcast and its Twitter and Facebook accounts for three hours, when documents with the identities of Army counter-terrorist personnel operating in Mali and the Middle East were published. Finally,

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10. See Manuel Torres Soriano, 2015.

according to the *Daily Mirror* (15 August 2014), several financial institutions had undergone phishing by computers from Syria and Iraq.

As the expert in digital communication Andrés Ortiz Moyano explains (2015), ISIS has a computer division called Al Hayat, with 12 sections all over the Caliphate territory. Professor Christopher Heffelfinger (2005), a counterterrorism expert from West Point Military Academy, and Ludovic Terren, a researcher from the Center for Security and Strategic European Intelligence, conclude that Jihadist hackers are backward compared to their standards, but they are young and ambitious, and they are improving. The dangers of high-impact cyber-attacks against industrial control systems or financial institutions are very real. Regarding the latter, Terren points out that "it is important to distinguish between hacking for profit and hacking as a terrorist act to destabilize political and financial infrastructures" (in Joaquín Pi Yagüe, 2016). However, Terren considers that the Islamic State is more prone to use computers for propaganda than for any other reason.

The US digital newspaper *Daily Dot* published in July 2014 that ISIS might be collecting bitcoins. However, Professor Loretta Napoleoni (2004 and 2016), and economist and an expert in terrorist financing, does not believe that ISIS can avoid financial monitoring in this way. For her, ISIS is a cash-focused economy, mainly in dollars and Turkish liras, with different sources of income, including kidnapping, smuggling and refugees traffic.

Following Terren's statement, ISIS has proven itself very effective in the use of Twitter and Telegram, where the Hamaq Agency operates. This so-called "news agency" was created in 2013 by Syrian journalist Baraa Kadek and disseminate exclusive news and ISIS updates. In 2015, Amaq even launched a mobile app for its readers, intended to avoid being tracked down by the Western intelligence services. This organization is still operating suffered a serious setback with the killing of Kadek in May 2017 by an American air strike.

8. Some facts about jihadism in the Basque Country

Jihadist threat is a fact in our societies, even in Basque society. In an interview of January 2017 at *El Confidencial* newspaper, the Army Chief of Staff, General Jaime Domínguez, mentioned Spain's geostrategic location as a reason. Since the 2004 Madrid attacks, with 193 casualties, the security forces have arrested 670 people related to Jihadism, of which 142 in the last two years, with 71 police actions. The Basque Country has been on terrorist alert 4 (out of 5) for the past year and a half. Until now, our greatest problem was the French border, but there have been also six police raids between 2012 and 2016, with seven people arrested. More recently, there have been two raids and three arrests, plus another one in Segovia of a former GAL mercenary from Irun converted to Jihadism. Almost 8,000 weapons where recently found in Irun, San Sebastian, and Getxo, causing widespread social alarm, also fuelled by news reporting that some people convicted of Jihadism were receiving Government subsidies which could be used to fund sleeping cells. Is there a new terrorist threat in the Basque Country, now that ETA has been defeated? Spanish Police forces has increased their efforts against radical-

ization in mosques and self-radicalization in websites and social networks, and part of the resources to fight the former ETA are now diverted against the new international terrorism.

There are about 50,000 Muslims, Sunnis and Shiites, in the Basque Country. There, they replicate the same internal divisions as in the whole of the Islamic world, and there is an ongoing silent battle between Moroccan official Islam and outlawed groups linked to Justice and Development. Many Muslims in Eibar and Renteria do not recognize King Mohamed VI as "Amir al-Mu'minin" (Leader of the Faithful). Instead, they have attempted to found a so-called Islamic University of radical allegiances in San Sebastian. There are not many Saudis or Iranians in the Basque Country, but it is known that Saudi Arabia is spending many money in Europe to promote Wahhabism. To a lesser extent, Iran is doing the same with Shiism. Moreover, the overwhelming police pressure in France, after the Paris attacks, has diverted many Muslims into Gipuzkoa to attend religious events.

According to the Palestinian-Jordanian psychologist Hithem Abdulhaleem (2010), from Deusto University, there is an ongoing "re-Islamization" within the Basque Arab community. He argues that Koran has nothing to do with violence and many "prominent people are willing to work towards a new state of mind." "I'm not very optimistic, it doesn't look good, but we have to change it," he concludes. The risks of indoctrination and radicalization must be taken seriously in all its four phases: victimization (Muslim are victims); blame (identification of the responsible); solution (I am a good Muslim, what should I do?), and activism (justification of violence). In October 2016, the ERNE chair, Roberto Seijo (an Ertzaintza-Basque Police- trade union), declared to the *Noticias de Gipuzkoa* newspaper that the different Ertzaintza units would take different responses, for instance, to a single Jihadist attack in a Basque shopping mall: "each of them would react in a different way to armed terrorists." By this, he highlighted the "lack of preventive and reactive guidelines to fight this silent and real threat." He went on: "The Basque Department of Security thinks that we are isolated from Europe, and this is not the case", remarking that the establishment of three SWAT units (one for each Basque provincial capital) "arrives late and it is insufficient." He added that the Ertzaintza is "the only European police force lacking of specific firearms training." The Arkaute's (Police Academy) "operational capacity" is declining, and the Spanish Government should "stop gambling with security."

9. War between muslims, jihadist ideology and the responsibilities of the west

Jihadist terrorism is a danger to Muslims, especially Shiites. Tens of thousands have died In the Iraqi and Syrian wars. These are, in fact, civil wars started after the US invasion of Iraq. The overthrow of Saddam Hussein intended to reshape the political geography of the Middle East, and not to end a dictatorship. This was a great historical mistake, comparable to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan or Hitler's attack on the USSR. It only strengthened Iran, by driving her Shiite allies to power in Baghdad and spreading paranoia among the Sunnis. The Saudis' campaign in

Yemen is, in part, another example of the ongoing confrontation between Iran and Saudi Arabia in the Middle East. In any case, when confronting Jihadism, we should not forget the responsibility hold by the West after:

- The invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq;
- The use of drones in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia;
- The overthrown of Gaddafi in Libya;
- The tolerance with the Saudi invasion of Yemen and the selling of Western weapons to Riyadh;
- The transformation of the Iraqi Army into a corrupt and mediocre mob;
- The backing of the Syrian insurgency, turning a blind eye to the Saudi and Turkish support of the most dangerous groups;
- Turning the indiscriminate aerial bombardments on ISIS a profitable trade, with a daily cost of 11 million dollars;
- And so on.

Among the Muslims, all these facts are setting the ground for resentment and hostility towards the West. On the other Europeans' side, the harsh consequences of Jihadist terrorism are spreading the idea that we are at war, and all Muslims are suspects, to the advantage of far-right politicians like Marine Le Pen and the Jihadists themselves. For ISIS, this is a war of civilizations on the Western "Crusaders", in which they try to recruit Muslims by convincing them that Islam means permanent war against the unfaithful. This is been going on since September 11th, with a sector of the European press warning, in turn, that Al Qaeda intends to Islamize Europe and retake Al-Andalus, criticizing European pusillanimity in the face of this final war.

Nevertheless, nothing of this happened. There is no Jihad for Al-Andalus. French, British and Spanish Muslims have not rebelled against their pagan masters. Bin Laden ended up hiding in a cottage watching videotapes. He was eventually killed in cold blood and his body thrown to the sea. Its organization in Iraq was annihilated, although it resurrected as ISIS, thanks to the Iraqi and Syrian war.

This does not mean neglecting the dangers of Jihadism. On the contrary, it is very important to clarify its ideological basis, one of which is racist and xenophobic Wahhabism, the current ultraconservative official religion of Saudi Arabia and the Islamic State. Ignoring that Jihad means the believers' internal struggle to find God, Wahhabism promotes violence and regards the governments of most Muslim countries as impious and potential targets of Jihad. Meanwhile, its clergy spread "the fear of God" among young Muslims, shaping a complexed generation who take the ancient martyrs of the Koran as a model, because the reward for martyrdom in Islam is absolution.

Here we should note that Europe has a serious social integration problem. Each country is different, but some models have clearly failed. France is the most notorious case. In French big cities, the children and grandchildren of the Arab immigrants grew up hating the state, for they only interact with the police. *Égalité* and *fraternité* are, for them, nothing but bombastic political slogans. They feel mar-

ginalized by public institutions, and alienated from the values of the State. The authorities make empty promises of improvement to the *banlieues*, but nothing has changed twelve years after the 2005 riots. Most of these youngsters respond to injustice with low-intensity violence, but many others go further, and the authorities are beginning to fear that they are too many to control them. Let s hope that the Jihadists do not displace their battleground to Europe, in the face of the appalling defeat of ISIS in Syria and Iraq. If so, they will cause so much pain, even if they have no chances to win.

Fig. 4. French Muslims demonstrating against terrorism, *The Independent*, 17 November 2015

10. Violence versus Politics: the foundations of liberty

Getting back to Arendt, her study on the theoretical basis of violence concludes that it is the clearest expression of power. This is an important tenet in Western political thought, harking back to the Judeo-Christian tradition and its hierarchic idea of law. Nevertheless, Arendt claims the Athenian isonomy in the city-state and the Roman *Civitas* as no less illustrious traditions which consider power and law as something more than command-and-obey. They are the basis of the 18th Century Republicanism, based on the people's sovereignty and the rule of law, aiming to overcome politics as the mere dominion of some humans over other humans (1972).

That is why Arendt says that politics starts where violence ends. She concedes that there is some violence in radical political changes when freedom is es-

tablished, like in the French and the American Revolutions. For Arendt, however, "Revolution is just the instauration of liberty" (2006), that is: the suppression of violence. The French Revolution took justice as the defence of the humiliated and the poor. Here, sentiment comes before reason. The problem arises when virtue goes in hand with politics, like in Robespierre's case, who justified his inhuman actions in the name of the suffering people: *par pitié, par amour, pour l'humanité, soyez inhumains* (2006). The American Revolution, for its part, was not originated in a social problem, but in the attempt to restore a political tradition of participation and popular association, paradoxically guaranteed by the metropolis.

Arendt distinguishes between liberation and freedom, the latter being a pre-political act. Freedom is based on free deliberation and participation in the public realm. It is part of the human nature. It only becomes political through dialog, mutual respect, persuasion and reasoning, taking the shape of laws, compromises and agreement as the basis of a constitution and the separation and balance of powers. Therefore, for Arendt, political power means free participation.

11. Conclusions: the instrumental character of violence and the realm of power

Nowadays, societies supposedly established in the name of freedom suffocate individuals instead, chaining them to bureaucracy, poor thinking and unbridled and paralyzing hedonism, causing in some people an active resentment against the status quo. This is the psychological basis of Totalitarianism.

Violence is a means of Totalitarianism. Although it is not possible to conceive a government based exclusively on violence. Even the most ruthless leader needs other means of domination, such as intelligence services. This is why power is the core of every government and violence is not. The latter is instrumental by nature, a mere means to achieve a given goal. But power is something else. It is rather an ability to reach agreements without coercion. Furthermore, it is never hold by an individual. It belongs to the group and exists as long as the group stays together. In this sense, power is equated to authority. Its strength depends of its free recognition by the others.

Although violence and power may appear together, they are not the same. This misunderstanding is cleared when those opposing violence with plain power discover that they don't confront persons, but instruments made by persons, inhuman by nature. In fact, violence and power confront each other. The most effective political commandments came out of the barrel of a gun. Weapons, however produce perfect submission, but not power. This is why violent Totalitarianism can only be defeated by a powerful Democratic spirit, and not by more violence. In the face of Islamic radicalism and the challenges ahead of us, we must vindicate politics as a democratic framework for free participation as the basis of consent, from which legitimate power emanates.

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