

Carta a Davies, puesta en inglés

Mi querido amigo:

He leído el artículo publicado por T.E.M. McKitterick y Fabian Reviy de Enero. Agradezco mucho el que haya tenido usted la amabilidad de avisarnos. Usted es un buen amigo.

La posición realista del artículo adoptada ante el General Franco y su régimen -"we like it or not, he is there to stay"-, no es muy distinta de la que sirvió de base a Mr. Chamberlain para enjuiciar a Hitler, política que nos llevó a Munich, al Comité de No Intervención y finalmente a la gran guerra.

"There seem to be signs that the character of his regimen is changing", escribe Mr. McKitterick. Le costaría trabajo señalar uno de esos "signs". Ni una sola de las disposiciones en que el Estado franquista se define a sí mismo como totalitario ha sido derogada. La única disposición que yo conozco sobre la cual ha recaído una "llamada" derogación es la Ley de Responsabilidades Políticas. Pero, lo único que esa "derogación" hizo fue acordar no instruir nuevos expedientes -se había agotado ya el material humano idóneo-, ordenando que todos los expedientes instruidos hasta la fecha de la "derogación" -uno de ellos contra mí mismo-, sigan siendo ejecutados, reduciendo a la miseria a todos los enemigos del régimen. Si con la frase antes transcrita pretendió Mr. McKitterick aludir a las amnistías otorgadas por el General Franco, le recomiendo que lea el artículo publicado por el Sr. Prieto sobre ese tema en los periódicos republicanos y socialistas españoles de Francia y de Iberoamérica, en cuyo texto el Sr. Prieto relaciona la suerte que espera a los que se acojen a esas dichas amnistías, con mención de personas y circunstancias. (i) Si el artículo de McKitterick alude al llamado "Fuero de los Españoles", le diré que, tal disposición no ha sido puesta en aplicación aún. Es una ley de bases o un enunciamiento de principios, que no ha sido reducido a texto legal aplicable por los Tribunales y la policía. Hasta ahora no pasa de ser un instrumento de propaganda. La única aplicación del mismo que yo conozco, es la hecha en el Concordato estipulado por el General Franco con la Santa Sede.

"It is -Franco- a dictatorship, but it is not now, if it ever was, a Fascist dictatorship", añade el articulista. En esas palabras pone en duda el carácter de dictadura fascista proclamada para el régimen franco-falangista por la Asamblea de las Naciones Unidas, y antes de ~~haber~~ aquella Resolución, por los líderes laboristas que presididos por Mr. Atlee lo hicieron saber al mundo con toda solemnidad, con su presencia en España durante la guerra y dando su nombre a las unidades combatientes contra el fascismo. Lamento no darme cuenta exacta de lo que Mr. McKitterick entiende por dictadura fascista. Conozco tan solo lo que entendemos los demás. Y lo que aseguro es que, si al régimen franco-falangista se le niega carácter fascista en el pasado y en la actualidad, tampoco puede serles reconocido lógicamente tal carácter a los regímenes instaurados en Italia y Alemania por Mussolini y Hitler.

?Que el número de presos en España es hoy mucho menor que cuando terminó la lucha militar? Ciertamente, aunque aun quedan presos políticos de 1936. ?Que "the elaborate machinery of Fascist control" se haya reducido? No es exacto. Basta con examinar los presupuestos del Estado para que aquel supuesto caiga por su base.

El franco-falangismo es un régimen tan totalitario como lo fueron el fascismo italiano y el nazismo alemán, de los cuales es copia y hechura. Pero España no es Alemania ni Italia, y los efectos de la dictadura totalitaria no son los mismos por ello en los tres países. El hitlerismo era férreo, disciplinado e inexorable, porque así es Alemania, donde pudo decirse con verdad durante la vigencia del régimen nazi: Dura lex, sed lex. En España, la dictadura totalitaria franco-falangista está templada por el arbitrio, o lo que es lo mismo por la inmoralidad y la corrupción. Franco es el Poder total definido por su propia ley, pero esta deja de ser aplicada cuando le parece al caudillo. Lo mismo hacen, dentro del

(1) (Y no cita el Sr. Prieto el caso del Alcalde de Blanes, Sr. Sentrich, refugiado acogido a la amnistía, a quien, después de ponerlo en prisión, le ~~aplicó~~ fue aplicada la ley de fugas).

He leído el artículo publicado por T.E.M. McKitterick y me parece que usted es un gran amigo.

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"It is Franco—a dictatorship, but it is not now, if it ever was, a Fascist dictatorship", añade el articulista. En esas palabras pone en duda el carácter de dictadura fascista proclamada para el régimen franco-alemán por la Asamblea de las Naciones Unidas y antes de nada aquella Resolución por los líderes laboristas que presididos por Mr. Attlee lo hicieron saber al mundo con toda solemnidad, con su presencia en España durante la guerra y dando su nombre a las unidades combatientes contra el fascismo. Lamento no darle crédito exacto de lo que Mr. McKitterick entiende por dictadura fascista. Conozco tan solo lo que entendemos los demás. Y lo que seguro es que, si el régimen franco-alemán se le niega carácter fascista en el pasado y en la actualidad, tampoco puede serles reconocido lógicamente tal carácter a los regímenes instruidos en Italia y Alemania por Mussolini y Hitler.

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marco de su competencia, ministros, gobernadores, capitanes generales, comisarios de policía, jefes locales de Falange o de los Sindicatos, directores de prisiones, etc.etc. Pero esa consideración no autoriza a negar caracter fascista al régimen franco-falangista. El que Mussolini ordenara relativamente pocos asesinatos -cientos de miles menos que Franco y varios millones menos que Hitler-, no le priva de su caracter fascista. Tampoco dejó de ser totalitario el régimen nazi porque Hitler llegara al Poder al través de elecciones democráticas, mientras que Mussolini se impuso por acción directa y Franco fué llevado a la Jefatura del Estado por los generales sublevados, eficazmente asistidos por Hitler y Mussolini. Pienso que todas las dictaduras que mantienen durante largos años una fuerte emigración política, son totalitarias, cualquiera que sea el nombre con el que se presenten a la opinión pública dentro o fuera de su país respectivo.

Las "suggestions" hechas por el régimen franquista "to unite the two Spanish" están solamente -si lo están- en la imaginación benevolente ~~para Franco~~ de Mr. McKitterick. En la realidad, la España franco-falangista se propone, no unir, sino someter a la España democrática. Y eso es hoy lo mismo que el 18 de Julio de 1936. Han variado algunos de los medios aplicados. No truenan los cañones, pero continúa siendo el mismo régimen totalitario fascista. Sólo un régimen fascista es capaz de dictar y de mantener vigentes durante largos años, las disposiciones por las cuales fueron declaradas nulas las actas de inscripción y registro de matrimonios contraídos durante la guerra en la zona leal al Gobierno de la Republica, convirtiendo por Orden Ministerial en barraganas a las esposas y en hijos de manceba a los hijos legítimos.

Con motivo de la reciente conferencia del General Franco con el pretendiente Don Juan de Borbon y de la entrega del hijo primogenito de este al primero para que sea educado en España, no pocas tribunas de prensa de derecha han escrito como lo hace Mr. McKitterick en la Fabian Review. "The Tablet", rectificando a "The Observer", afirma que, los hechos que vienen produciendose en el seno del régimen franco-falangista significan que se ha abierto un nuevo capitulo en la historia de España. Por una vez y merced al artículo de Mr. MacKitterick, The Tablet y the Fabian Review se han hecho correligionarios mirando a ~~La~~ España franquista.

Es el propio General Franco el que ha salido al paso desde las columnas de "Arriba" de tales apreciaciones, a las que denomina "esperanza ilusoria", añadiendo que, esos hechos "sólo implican la continuidad de una política", con la afirmación categorica de que "Todos los declarados y encubiertos enemigos de nuestro ~~regimen~~ resurgimiento añoran un cambio ...en nosotros está el que no haya cambio...Precisamente se trata delo contrario. de asegurar en el tiempo nuestra obra y los dictados de nuestra revolución nacional". Como colofón a sus declaraciones, pregunta el periodista al General Franco: "¿Podremos asegurar a nuestros lectores que la monarquía que en su día pueda instaurarse no alterará en lo más mínimo los principios de nuestra revolución nacional y la obra acometida por el Movimiento con sus Instituciones en estos años?". A lo que el General responde: "De la manera más rotunda. Ya he dicho a fin de año que la sucesión del Movimiento nacional es el propio Movimiento nacional sin mixtificaciones".

Puede pues aceptarse el régimen franco-falangista con el cinismo con el que lo han hecho nuestros amigos americanos, porque así conviene a sus planes estrategicos. Pero, quien pretenda que el régimen franco-falangista ha ~~sin componeniamiento mandando a cada uno de sus miembros~~ dejado de ser una dictadura fascista, habrá de exponerse a pasar por la opción de no hallarse bien informado o de proceder wishful thinking.

Qué le diré pues del artículo publicado por su amigo Mr. McKitterick, candidato laborista por York, en la Fabian Review? ?Le diré que me parece bien? No puedo decirselo. Por el contrario, encuentro escandaloso que un hombre que siente, piensa y escribe como Mr. McKitterick -y guardo para su persona toda clase de respetos-, pueda ser afiliado al partido laborista, candidato a diputado y colaborador de la Fabian Review.

Muy suyo

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*For the Record*

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Edited by **Kenneth Younger, M.P.**  
for the  
**Fabian International Bureau**

**D**IPLOMATIC activity can rarely have been greater than in the last half of 1954. In multi-lateral conferences and bilateral negotiations, long standing disputes have been settled and new alignments have begun to appear.

Following the cease fire in Indo-China and the agreement on the Suez Canal Base in July, the Persian Oil dispute was settled in August and in the same month, Greece, Yugoslavia and Turkey signed the Balkan Pact. In October the nine-year-old deadlock over Trieste was broken and, in London and Paris, nine Powers signed agreements to replace the EDC (which had been knocked on the head by the French Chamberlain August) and to provide for Western Germany to make a military contribution within a Western European Union, of which Britain would be a full member.

Meanwhile, in the east, the implementation of the Geneva Conference proceeded uneasily but without interruption, eight Powers signed the South East Asia Treaty in Manila, and, on the communist side, high-level Soviet-Chinese negotiations ended in an agreement for closer co-operation, sealed by the return of Port Arthur to China.

In so far as some of these agreements dispose of sterile disputes between countries which should, on sterile grounds, be capable of friendly co-operation, they are to be

**SIXPENCE**

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welcomed, and they reduce the feeling of insecurity which so poisons the international atmosphere. None of them, however, are the fruit of agreement between the contestants in the Cold War. They are rather symptoms of consolidation within each of the rival blocs. In that sense, they should be regarded as the latest, and perhaps the last, developments in the five-year-old policy of building up strength prior to negotiation, rather than the opening of a new phase whose objective is peaceful co-existence.

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Nevertheless the new policies of co-existence have been proceeding simultaneously and have been intensified in recent weeks. Even if they have not, in this period, led to any material concession on either side, there is plenty of evidence that the great powers are now disposed to talk to one another in a changed tone of voice. The clear purpose of this on both sides is to make a start on lowering international tension. The process, however, cannot be carried very far, and it is doubtful if it can last long, on the strength of words alone, and it still remains to be seen what price in terms of real concessions either side is prepared to pay in order to achieve a real detente. In particular, the Western Powers are still wondering whether the softening of the tone of Soviet policy is intended as a prelude to flexible negotiation or merely as a method of breaking up the growing unity of the western powers.

It is worth recalling that when the first hint of the new policy was given by Stalin in his last big article in October 1952, it was the latter purpose that seemed to be in his mind. Since Stalin's death, however, new men and new ideas have begun to break through in the Soviet Union, and even if the disintegration of western unity remains an important objective, it may well be that the desire for a prolonged period of international calm, such as could be bought only by real concessions, has been steadily growing. As we pointed out a year ago, the evidence of a development of this kind should be sought primarily in the field of Soviet economic and domestic policy. The trend towards higher consumption standards, more freedom of expression, and more cultural and scientific contact with the outside world has continued during the last twelve months and is one of the main grounds for believing that we may be entering at last a period in which the great powers can seriously attempt to reach compromise on major problems.

Most of the controversy in western countries has recently centred round the question of how far the proposals for the integration of West German armed forces into Western defence can be fitted into the general picture of a world which is now trying to widen areas of agreement and avoid provocations. This issue has split the socialist movement in Europe and has deeply divided the British Labour Party. There is a rather general consensus of opinion to the effect that if western Germans have to be rearmed at all, the new treaties provide a better framework than EDC for the purpose. But must western Germans be rearmed? Should there not at least be one final attempt to reach agreement with the Soviet Union on Germany before the Paris treaties are ratified?

The implications for Europe of present policies are fully discussed in an article on another page. At the time of writing the expectation is that the Paris treaties will be ratified, and that great power talks will be considered afterwards. The Soviet Union is, of course, asserting that once the Paris Treaties are ratified, discussions on the German problem will be impossible and the division of Germany will become final. This would be more convincing if they had given any indication that even without the Paris Treaties, they contemplate the unification of Germany on terms which the west might accept. In any case the word 'final' is highly suspect among diplomatic practitioners. The arrangements for Germany will certainly be provisional rather than final for several years to come, no matter what language the propagandists may employ.

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On a much smaller scale the South East Asian Defence Treaty signed in Manila has aroused the fear that it may preclude agreement with China. This treaty, however, by contrast with the proposals for Europe, seems likely to have little effect upon the real balance of forces in the area. It does not create solidarity among South East Asian countries, it does not bring in new military forces from elsewhere, and it is doubtful whether it commits the western powers to any obligations which they would not in any case have under the UN Charter or the ANZUS Pact. At most it is a manifesto, warning the Chinese communists against the consequences of rash policies in South East Asia. As such it may have some utility; in any case it is hard to imagine that it could alarm the Chinese sufficiently to impede negotiations if these should otherwise become possible.

The most hopeful Far Eastern event of the period took place in the United States, where the Democratic victory in the mid-term elections has already

begun to remove some of the shackles which have crippled more moderate elements, above all the President.

No longer faced with a Republican majority in Congress, the President seems to have given up the vain struggle to govern with the consent of Senator Knowland and the Republican right. So far as sanity in the Far East is concerned, this is the best news for many a long day.

## Chronology of Events

### GENERAL

**4th August:** Further Soviet Note proposes conference of European states together with China and the United States on European security.

**10th September:** In reply to two Soviet Notes, Western powers state willingness to join in a four-power conference on European security if the Soviet Union will first agree to an Austrian Peace Treaty and Free German elections.

**3rd November:** Mid-term United States elections give Democrats control of both House of Representatives and Senate.

**7th November:** Seven-power resolution at the United Nations calls for establishment of international agency to supervise use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

**22nd November:** M. Mendes-France proposes four-power conference in Paris in May, 1955.

### EUROPE

**9th August:** Twenty-year treaty of alliance and assistance signed between Greece, Yugoslavia and Turkey.

**20th August:** Greece asks that dispute with Britain over Cyprus be placed on United Nations Agenda.

**22nd August:** Poland offers to sign treaty of alliance with France.

**30th August:** French National Assembly refuses to ratify EDC.

**23rd September:** Dismissal of M. Dides, Chief Commissioner of Paris police following leakage of defence secrets.

**28th September:** Labour Party Conference approves resolution for West German contribution to Western defence.

**3rd October:** Nine-power London conference concludes with agreement to end occupation of Western Germany; to permit West German rearmament to the extent of twelve divisions and a tactical air force; to admit Germany and Italy to the Brussels Treaty Organisation; to set up an agency for the control of West European armaments; to recommend Germany's admission to NATO. Britain guarantees to maintain on the Continent a force of equivalent strength to that at present assigned to Supreme Allied Commander.

**5th October:** Agreement initialed for withdrawal of Anglo-American forces from Trieste and handing over of Zone A to Italy.

**23rd October:** Agreements signed in Paris to settle the Franco-German Saar dispute; to end the occupation of West Germany; to admit West Germany to NATO; to create a 'Council of Western European Union' and an agency for the control of armaments.

**13th November:** Soviet Union invites 23 countries to conference on European security in Moscow.

**16th November:** Noel Field released by Hungarian Government after five years of captivity and following earlier release from Poland of Herman Field.

**26th November:** Sir Winston Churchill, in Woodford speech, reveals intention in May, 1945, to rearm German troops to stop Soviet advance if it threatened to continue westward.

### MIDDLE EAST

**5th August:** Agreement announced for settlement of Persian Oil dispute and for £25m. compensation to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.

**12th August:** Frontier incidents between Israel and the Arab States continue.

**27th October:** Muslim Brotherhood dissolved following attempt on life of Colonel Nasser.

**14th November:** General Neguib relieved of office as Egyptian President and succeeded as Head of State by Colonel Nasser.

### ASIA AND THE FAR EAST

**11th August:** Cease-fire comes into effect in Indo-China ending eight years of fighting.

**14th August:** Labour Party delegation led by Mr. Attlee arrives in China.

**3rd September:** Chinese communist bombardment of Quemoy coincides with intensified propaganda against Formosa.

**6th September:** Treaty for collective security in South East Asia signed at the end of eight-power Manila Conference.

**11th October:** High-level Soviet-Chinese negotiations end with "complete unity of views" on co-operation and transfer of Port Arthur to China.

**7th November:** United States Super-fortress shot down by Soviet fighters off Japan.

**24th November:** United States Government protest to Communist China at sentence for alleged espionage passed on thirteen Americans.

### COMMONWEALTH

**6th August:** Britain expresses 'anxiety' to India over situation in Goa and Indian attitude to Portuguese settlements.

**24th October:** Constituent Assembly dissolved and State of Emergency declared in Pakistan.

**11th November:** Anglican Church in South Africa protests at Government attempt at suppression.

**13th November:** National Party re-elected in New Zealand.

**30th November:** Mr. Strydom elected leader of Nationalist Party in South Africa in succession to Dr. Malan.

# Franco After Fifteen Years

by T. E. M. McKitterick

Most socialists execrate the name of Franco. But, writes the author of this article, whether we like it or not, he is there to stay.

GENERAL FRANCO has now had fifteen and a half years in charge of the whole of Spain, and there seem to be signs that the character of his regime is changing. It is still a dictatorship, but it is not now (if it ever was) a Fascist dictatorship. The elaborate machinery of Fascist control through mass communications, storm troopers and ubiquitous police is largely missing, and though the Falange is the only permitted political party it pervades the life of Spain far less than did the Nazis or Fascists in pre-war Germany and Italy. The number of political prisoners is less than it was, and suggestions are frequently heard that the time has come to unite the 'two Spains'—that is, to try to reconcile to the regime the industrial workers who could, if organised, constitute the only effective opposition to the tripartite control of Church, Army and Falange.

## Poverty and Progress

It will always remain a matter of speculation whether the international ostracism of Spain after the war, when the ambassadors of members of the United Nations were withdrawn from Madrid, was the real reason why Franco decided in favour of relaxing some of the earlier severity of his system. It may equally well be that this period of ostracism united the people behind him and combined with an improving economic situation to give him a feeling of confidence great enough to justify the relaxation. The question is of more than purely historical importance, because the answer will help to determine the attitude of the western democratic countries to this political anomaly in Western Europe for some time to come.

When one speaks of an improving economic situation, one is speaking in relative terms only; by comparison with any other western country, Spain is still abysmally poor. Some industrial progress has been made, though gravely hampered by shortages of materials, markets (Spanish costs of production are prohibitively high for the export market, and the lack of purchasing power limits the internal one), capital, and above all of fuel and power. In the cities, and especially in Madrid, there is none the less an

air of vigour and prosperity, and a lot of new building is going on; to find the real poverty, one must go out into the countryside, where conditions have changed little for half a century.

There may or may not have been some conscious planning in this. The Falange draws most of its support from the big towns and from the smaller provincial capitals, and tends to be out of sympathy with the rural landowners, who represent, together with the Army and the Church, a more genuinely reactionary force than the curious conglomeration of interests and ideas of which the Falange is composed. Throughout his fifteen years in power Franco has played a skilful game in balancing the three main pillars of his regime one against the other, and if he has completely satisfied none of them, neither has he completely alienated the support of any. A year ago, after the Concordat had been signed with the Vatican, he seemed to be leaning towards the Church, and when the Falange held its first full congress in the autumn of 1953 it received little encouragement from the Caudillo. More recently, however, he seems to have inclined a little towards the Falange; in particular, he has shown signs of favouring the established principle of the left wing of the Falangist movement that the labour syndicates should become a fourth pillar of the regime.

## The Two Spains

That is presumably what the Caudillo had in mind when, at celebrations of the anniversary of the 1936 revolt in July, he referred to the need for reconciliation of the two Spains. The labour syndicates are the special concern of the able Falangist Minister of Labour, Señor Girón, whom many people suspect at present to be the leading candidate for the succession. (There has always been a candidate, selected by the Caudillo himself, even though he is still only 62; the demotion of one and the uplifting of another have usually reflected changes in the internal political balance). To raise the status of the syndicates might have the effect of widening the basis of support for the regime; on the other hand, the non-Falangists argue that they might become centres of left-wing disaffection, and it would probably be very difficult

to carry the more conservative elements along with such a change in emphasis.

Girón or no Girón, Franco himself now seems to be more or less committed to a restoration of the monarchy, not under the 'legitimate' Pretender, Don Juan, but under his son, Don Juan Carlos. This eighteen-year old grandson of Alfonso XIII has been at school in Spain (on Franco's insistence) for the last two years, and his father has now been persuaded to allow him to stay for a further period at the military academy in Madrid—where he will presumably imbibe the traditions of the Spanish Army to supplement what he has already learnt from his previous Catholic teachers. It is typical of Franco's capacity for riding more than one horse at once that the decision to keep Juan Carlos in Spain offended both the important republican wing of the Falange and the more conservative legitimist monarchists. The latter group were actually allowed to sponsor an 'opposition' list at the municipal elections held in Madrid at the end of November—the first time there has been a choice of candidates anywhere in Spain since the civil war—and while the real freedom of the elections is very much in doubt the resounding defeat of these candidates by the official Falange list has strengthened Franco's own position. He is quite content to leave unresolved the question of how he would reconcile the building up of Girón and the labour syndicates with a restored monarchy. Sooner or later an answer will have to be found, however; for while Girón would probably be satisfied with nothing less than full dictatorial powers (perhaps *à la* Nasser rather than *à la* Hitler), the monarchy would almost certainly favour a mildly authoritarian type of more or less constitutional government which would invite comparison with the days of Alfonso XIII and the Marqués de Estella, with another 1931 as the probable consequence.

#### Military Aid

The greatest triumph of Franco's whole career was the American agreement of September, 1953. Under this agreement considerable quantities of economic and military aid are now entering Spain, four large air-bases are being built, and plans have been laid for several naval bases too. The odd thing is that all this has been greeted without any great enthusiasm by the public. Almost everyone expects further inflation as soon as the payments in pesetas start, and there has been a great deal of jealousy over the allocation of contracts, as between Spanish firms and between Spanish and foreign competitors. The whole episode has been a fascinating study in what happens when the methods of an advanced economy like the American are superimposed on a more backward one, as Spain's still is. In spite of the difficulties, however, the flow of aid will probably stimulate the Spanish economy, and it is an open question whether that will make the Franco regime stronger (in so far as he can claim the credit) or weaker (in so far as the inadequacies of the Spanish system are being demonstrated).

Franco himself has ideas beyond the American agreement. In particular, he is showing great interest in the Middle East, where the Foreign Minister went on a not very successful tour eighteen months ago. The concept is apparently that of a Mediterranean bloc, strongly anti-communist but free of commitment to any of the Western Powers, and the nationalist and anti-western claims of any Arab country are sure of a sympathetic hearing in Madrid—hence Spanish support for the Moroccan nationalists against France, and the moral support given to the Egyptian Government over the Suez dispute with Britain. Recently this interest was extended to the northern side of the Mediterranean, when Field Marshal Papagos of Greece was given a warm reception on a state visit (he was, incidentally, apart from the Portuguese Prime Minister, the first head of a European Government to visit Spain since the civil war). Approaches have been made to Turkey, perhaps with a view to establishing a link between Spain and the Balkan Pact; and rumour even has it that informal contact has already been made with Marshal Tito.

#### Policy for the West

The important question is, of course, what attitude should the Western countries adopt towards this conservative dictator in the country which was once democratic and whose affairs provoked so violent an international crisis only eighteen years ago. The day for purely negative positions has gone by, however effective the withdrawal of the ambassadors may have been in its time. Unpleasant though the fact may be to Western liberals and socialists, Franco is there to stay, and will choose the manner of his own going; there is now no opposition capable of providing an alternative government. It is also a fact, however deplorable, that American aid has brought Spain into the Western military system even if not into NATO, and it would require a major change in American policy for this to be undone. The best service that can now be rendered to the Spanish people is to help them in their search for prosperity; only if their poverty can be eased is there much hope that the dictatorship will wither away, and the country return to normal democratic standards.

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# Western Europe's New Shape

by Richard Lowenthal

Two years ago, in the first issue of 'Fabian International Review,' we published a survey of the history of and prospects for West European unity. The authoritative article below brings the story up to date.

THE collapse of the project for a near-federal community of the six Powers of continental Western Europe, and the quick construction, on British initiative, of a looser and broader 'West European Union' to take its place, mark the end of a particular concept of the road to European unity and the beginning of a new approach.

The version of the European idea that was defeated when the French National Assembly buried EDC was already far removed from the original vision so eagerly pursued by many leaders of the European resistance, and particularly by many Socialists, during the war and the early post-war period. That first vision was born from the bitter experience of how Hitler swallowed the sovereign states of Europe one by one, and how none of them was capable any more of defending its frontiers with its own national forces alone. It was powerfully reinforced when, after the war the national states proved equally unable to earn their own living and to reconstruct their shattered economic lives with their own resources alone; and when the peoples of Europe began to realise how far not only their nation-states, but their whole old continent had been dwarfed by the rise of the giant powers of the new age—the United States and the Soviet Union. The ideas of creating a common home market for European industry and of planning the joint exploitation of natural resources whose location took no account of national frontiers, became more and more popular. They were frequently linked with the hope of putting Europe back on the map as a 'third force' between the two opposing blocs of the post-war world—an area where democratic socialism would be able to set up its own type of society, equally distinct from traditional free enterprise capitalism and from totalitarian communism, and to act as a peacemaker between their realms.

## Post War Socialist Hopes

The Socialists of Western Europe were the main standard-bearers of this first, idealistic vision of European unity; and they looked to British Labour, as the strongest democratic socialist force in post-war Europe, to give a lead in that direction. To this day, many continental Socialists are inclined to

blame British Labour for failing to give them more active backing in the first fluid post-war years; and the criticism cannot be easily dismissed so long as it is confined to this early period. But the fact remains that the democratic Socialists failed to gain a decisive share of power in any of the major West European countries—France, Italy, Germany—in the aftermath of the war, while in Eastern Europe they rapidly became the object of overwhelming Communist pressure, backed by Russian state power and ending everywhere in compulsory fusion. The decisive factor was the rapid development of the Cold War thanks to the Russian determination to create Communist dictatorships wherever the Soviet armies held sway. By the time the Marshall Plan had been rejected by the East European states and the Cominform been founded in 1947, any idea of a democratic socialist Europe as a Third Force had clearly become an illusion.

## The European Movement

The second version of the European idea, in contrast to the first, was from the beginning linked with the Cold War and based on the partition of Europe as its starting point. The European movement was from the outset a West European movement, however sincerely it might proclaim the eventual reunion with an Eastern Europe reborn to freedom as one of its aims. Its founders believed that the immediate measures taken by the governments of Western Europe, together with those of the United States and Canada, for their economic survival and military defence—the Marshall Plan as embodied in OEEC, and the Atlantic Pact—would not be sufficiently effective without a more far-reaching surrender of sovereignty on the part of the European members; and in particular that the absorption of Western Germany's economic and military potential in the common organisations of the West would not be possible without a rapid advance to near-federal institutions for Western Europe.

The odd thing about this concept of West European federalism was that it tried to achieve 'integration' within a region which, by common consent of the experts, was by now as unable to provide for its own defence as any of the nation states. The

effective unit of West European defence—as in the long run the effective unit for assuring economic stability—is the Atlantic, not the West European community; and while the inter-governmental institutions set up in the Atlantic framework by their permanence and multiplicity of functions, go clearly beyond those of an ordinary alliance, they still fall grievously short of the authority which, still within the limits of the unanimity rule, could turn it into an effective Atlantic Confederacy—that of a Council of permanent delegates with power to bind their governments. Yet instead of concentrating on the next modest, but vital, step for the whole, the European Movement devoted its efforts to the propagation of more far-reaching steps—supra-national institutions with majority rule—for the dependent part. As successive British governments firmly declined to submit to any such institutions—the Conservative government, despite Mr. Churchill's original sponsorship of the idea, no less than the Labour government—the field of application of the idea became in practice still further restricted to the continental six-power community, first formed for the Schumann plan and later intended as a basis for EDC as well as a near-federal political community.

#### **The Status of Germany**

Measured by the yardstick of the original purpose—the functional growth of overall Western unity—this concept was entirely besides the point. It made sense only as a device to solve the very special problem of Franco-German balance, and it was as such that it had in fact been conceived. The Americans had proclaimed the need for eventually restoring Western Germany to free and equal partnership with the Western powers, and the French sponsors of the Schumann-plan and EDC recognised this development as inevitable; but in their anxiety lest an unfettered Germany might once again become the predominant power in continental Western Europe, they sought to prevent a revival of German sovereignty at the price of a far-reaching surrender of their own. They overlooked that, failing major internal reforms to overcome France's economic stagnation and major policy decisions to stop the colonial drain on her manpower, an 'integrated' Germany was just as likely to dominate a supra-national community as a sovereign Germany might dominate an alliance of the same powers; they overlooked also that, given the still existing distrust between the two former enemies, a sudden jump into near-federal intimacy might increase rather than diminish friction, while the very supra-national nature of the project kept out the one natural balancing weight available—Great Britain.

The new six-nation engine was of French devising, but the power that was to drive it was American; during the whole phase here described the United States administration looked at the European problem from a vantage point in Paris and tended to rely on French initiatives, with Britain reduced to

the role of a benevolent onlooker in continental affairs. There was thus in this type of European project no possible implication of strengthening the voice of Europe in the common councils of the West, though this was naively claimed by some of its advocates. While the primary political backers of the first phase of European idealism had been the Socialists and their resistance associates, the primary backers of this second phase were the Christian Democratic parties of the continent and the State Department.

The Socialists were profoundly divided throughout this phase, both between and within the principal national parties, along three different lines.

First there was the division between the benevolent aloofness of the British and Scandinavians, who did not wish to entrust the fate of their national welfare states to the uncertain majority decisions of supra-national organs, and the keen interest of the weaker continental parties with little hope of achieving full power within the national framework and a correspondingly urgent desire for the participation of the stronger brethren (though there were 'European-minded' minorities in the British and Danish parties and a 'national-minded' majority in the German one); then there was the question of German unity, considered a vital objection to the integration of Western Germany by the German Socialists, but by no other party; finally there was the question of German rearmament as such, which divided the French and British parties from top to bottom and to a lesser extent also the Belgian party. Only the Dutch and the tiny Italian Social Democrat party took a solidly 'European' line, joining the French Socialist majority in a federalist enthusiasm which seemed to ignore deliberately the transformation of ideas and realities since the end of the first phase. On the whole the Socialist movement had lost the initiative and was on the defensive throughout this period.

#### **France Contracts-out**

In the end, the project of the continental six-power community failed in the country where it had been conceived and over the issue which had determined its shape—the balance between France and Germany. As German economic strength and self-confidence grew year by year, while the indecision of French policy in Indo-China and North Africa caused the fatal drain on French manpower to continue, a majority of French military leaders became convinced that the integrated European Army structure they had devised to contain the new German forces would in fact fall under predominantly German influence; and concluded that it would be more to the French advantage to retain military sovereignty—even if the sovereignty of a limited German army was the corollary. The change of military opinion swung a sufficient sector of parliamentary opinion to make approval of the integration treaties hopeless; and the final phase of the process coincided

with a general mood of rebellion against a regime which had immobilised France by clinging to ambitions which exceeded her strength and by tying her, for the sake of these ambitions, to an over-rigid American policy both in Europe and Indo-China. After the government of M. Mendès-France, brought in by this mood of revolt, had made a perfunctory attempt to render the treaties acceptable to the National Assembly by revising them out of recognition—an attempt which at that stage was bound to be rejected by France's partners—the Assembly threw out the treaties, the fruit of so much French effort and ingenuity, with a contemptuous gesture without even seriously debating them.

At first this decision was widely misunderstood, both in Moscow and in Washington, as a victory for neutralism or at least a rejection of the principle of West German rearmament, and as a death blow to the movement for West European unity. But the British government's initiative in exploring alternative solutions (which Western statesmen had so long and stubbornly claimed did not exist) soon showed that only the concept of an integrated continental six-power community had been decisively and finally rejected. From the negotiations, conducted with remarkable speed and skill, there emerged the new pattern of a West European Union including Britain and fortified by the guarantee of permanent British presence on the continent—a Union that is to have no joint military machinery separate from that of NATO, but whose Council of Ministers will have power to limit the contributions of all members, including Western Germany, to the NATO forces. Combined with a strengthening of the powers of NATO's European Commander-in-Chief, this proved sufficient to make the principle of a German national force under NATO acceptable to the French Assembly.

### The New Phase

The movement for West European unity, then, is not dead—it has taken on a new form and entered a third phase, based on more realistic assumptions than the previous two; and once again the nature of the main forces backing the movement is changing as well.

In the first place, the fiction of a 'European Army' and the underlying attempt to keep a rearmed Western Germany in a kind of ante-room to NATO have been abandoned, and the fact has been clearly recognised that there can be no effective unit of defence, and of its political direction, short of the Atlantic Community. Yet at the same time, European political influence within that community has been strengthened by the accession of Great Britain to the new West European Union; for that Union is not only a more weighty grouping than the continental six-power community could ever have become, but also a more solid one—built as it is, not around the tradition of Franco-German rivalry, but around

that of Anglo-French friendship as its main axis. Certainly the co-operation of Sir Anthony Eden and M. Mendès-France, which helped the new treaties to birth, is more truly representative of the live and enduring forces of Western Europe than was the brief political honeymoon between M. Schumann and Dr. Adenauer; and it is highly desirable that the new organisation should be further broadened by the accession of Norway and Denmark—countries with common traditions and interests who so far seem to have been kept out from an exaggerated fear that their inclusion would make it more difficult to avoid the simultaneous admission also of Greece and Turkey, with their rather different traditions and geographical position. The point of Western Union as a subgrouping within the Atlantic Community is that it represents a common political outlook as well as a common direct concern with the problem of Germany; and by that criterion Norway and Denmark certainly ought to be in it, as Greece and Turkey ought not.

### A Cold-War Settlement ?

In speaking of a common political outlook, I am not only thinking of the common traditions of western democracy, but also of common attitudes to the chances of ending the Cold War by a settlement with Russia. For if the second phase of the efforts for European unity was dominated by the Cold War, the third one has opened in the new situation in which a settlement appears possible at last, and in which attempts to explore its chances dominate the political agenda. There is still no agreement on the possible terms of such a settlement, and no certainty that it can really be reached; and it is generally accepted that the Atlantic alliance will not only have to continue if a settlement proves elusive, but also will form one of its essential bases if it is achieved. But this implies already that in the new phase the constructive political and economic tasks of the Atlantic Community are becoming as important as, and in case of a successful settlement more important than, the purely military tasks; and in initiating the policies and devising the organisational forms for such a transition the West European democracies have clearly a special contribution to make within the common councils of the West.

The most difficult problem for any Cold War settlement in Europe is, of course, the problem of divided Germany. At present all the governments concerned seem inclined to accept, in the absence of better visible solutions, a settlement based on the status quo of German partition, with both the East and West German states incorporated in the rival alliances; and there is certainly no practical alternative to this for the West so long as the Soviet Union remains unwilling to scrap the East German satellite regime in free elections. Yet in the interest of a more far-reaching reduction of military burdens, which could only be achieved by some measure of geographical disengagement of the opposing forces,

it would be wise to leave the door open for a different solution—such as the armed, independent and internationally guaranteed united Germany proposed by the German Socialists—against the day when the Soviets might be willing to consider it. Despite present Soviet threats that the ratification of the Paris treaties would end all chances of restoring German unity, it is in fact one of the merits of these treaties that they do leave that door rather more ajar than did the earlier concept of complete integration, simply by granting sovereignty to a separate West German state. In this, too, they take better account of the abiding realities of the European situation.

### Socialist Opportunity

Instead of the predominantly Catholic continental community, the new treaties create a more balanced Western Europe and one in which the economic and social model of the British welfare state will carry greater weight. Instead of a Europe of American client-states, with Britain on the outer fringe, they create an organ which can make the independent voice of Western Europe heard in the Atlantic Council. Instead of a rigid and final structure based on the assumptions of the Cold War, they create a flexible instrument which may play an equally important role in continued conflict as in constructive action and negotiation. It is not surprising, then, that the transition from the previous to the present phase has been accompanied also by a shift in the balance of internal party forces in Europe: the period of Catholic political predominance on the continent is clearly drawing to a close, while the Socialist parties are beginning to recover from their internal divisions and to emerge from the defensive corners into which they had been driven in recent years.

The bitter rift in the French Socialist party between the enthusiasts of federalism and the last-ditch opponents of German rearmament has almost miraculously disappeared since the arrival of M. Mendès-France and the British commitment to full membership of West European Union. In Britain, its unprecedented commitment has been accepted almost without opposition; and while profound misgivings over German rearmament continue in the ranks of British Labour, they have greatly lost in violence and no longer exert a paralysing influence on the party's capacity to take policy decisions. Within the Socialist international, only the German party continues to oppose the treaties, in part for the sake of German unity, in part in deference to the profound anti-militarism of the German working class which has never seen an army submitted to effective democratic control; but the party's leaders are now committed, once the treaties are ratified, to co-operate constructively in their implementation in the interest of achieving, together with other democratic forces, precisely that democratic control of

the new army. Altogether, the signs are that the opportunities for united, effective socialist action in the affairs of Europe are improving for the first time in years.

Clearly, one possible direction for such action is indicated by the prospects of a Cold War settlement. But parallel to any such efforts, the attempt must be made to develop the new forms of Western unity—both on the West European and the Atlantic level—and to use them increasingly for constructive purposes. With the shelving of continental federalist projects, the time has come to bridge the gap between the aloofness of the successful 'welfare-state socialists' and the ardent inter-nationalism of the parties with lesser achievements, and to seek together ways for the development of common economic policies for the group of co-operating nations.

The fault of the federalist enthusiasts has been that they wanted to create supra-national organs, with power to take majority decisions, before there had been time for nations with different traditions and social structures to develop basic agreement on common policies; in fact, no federation in history has ever arisen without a more or less prolonged period of previous confederal co-operation—co-operation through permanent common organs, empowered to take binding action, but still tied to the unanimity rule. The new treaties have set Western Europe, and potentially also the more important Atlantic Community, on the road which may lead to the development of such confederal forms—forms which transcend the present degree of co-operation but are within the range of what can be achieved in the present stage. All now depends on advancing along this road, carefully linking every step towards closer 'integration' with constructive proposals for common policies.

### Scope for Common Tasks

Despite its present prosperity, the economy of Western Europe is as yet far from adapted to the tremendous changes in the international division of labour brought about by the growth of industry in the underdeveloped countries, and highly vulnerable to any falling off in the level of armament production. There are great tasks here to be performed in common—tasks of converting our industrial structures to the real needs of the 'development areas' of the world and of helping, together with the United States, to finance such development. In such tasks as these are the true opportunities for Socialists, concerned to continue to promote European unity in the new conditions.

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# Austria Between East and West

by W. T. RODGERS

**It is almost ten years since Austria, Hitler's first victim, was liberated by Allied troops. This article discusses how she is managing her affairs while the Occupation still goes on.**

**I**N Austria, the Iron Curtain that cuts across Europe from the Baltic to the Black Sea becomes for a hundred and fifty miles or so no more than a slight inconvenience to travellers. Grey permits, signed by both Soviet and Allied officials, are still required for inter-zonal travel: but one can drive all day without once being asked to show possession. And, for that matter, without seeing more than a hint of the Occupation that still goes on. For Austria has become a no-man's-land between East and West in which the small forces retained by either side peacefully co-exist while the real business of the Cold War continues outside her frontiers. Even Vienna has lost the dramatic glamour of the immediate post-war period. There remains the chance that a man may vanish in the night. But, by and large, the society of the *Cafe Mozart* has dispersed; and in November next the Opera House will open again. Vienna is almost back to normal.

## Why the Russians Remain

It is difficult to know what the Russians hope to gain by continuing to refuse an Austrian peace treaty. The battle for communism in Austria is clearly lost for the time being, and the Soviet Union is hardly likely to earn popularity by holding out against an ending to the Occupation. The economic exploitation of their zone undoubtedly yields a valuable return, particularly in oil. But it is doubtful whether this is a sufficient reason for their intransigence. It is more probable that they fear the psychological impact of a withdrawal from the heart of Europe. Vienna is traditionally an outpost of the Christian West: while they remain, the Russians have a foothold in that part of the old world whose way of life most represents a challenge to their own. But once they leave, Austrian neutrality will be no guarantee against integration, except in purely military terms, with the West. So the Russians stay on, and although Austria was promised freedom and independence as long ago as November, 1943, the prospect of a treaty seems no nearer. Her fate is to be held up as an example of how the German problem might be solved. It is cold comfort for Hitler's first victim to know that at least she is better off than the neighbour who destroyed her in the days of *Anschluss*.

And in the back of many Austrian minds must be the fear that, this being the century of *Realpolitik*, if it came to an issue, the West might sell out in Austria in order to ensure that Western Germany remained an ally of Britain and America.

How genuine this danger is, it is difficult to say: certainly London and Washington would deny that it exists at all. But in 1946 and 1947 a large part of Austrian industry was taken into public ownership for fear that it might be destroyed as German assets. It is run efficiently by the Ministry of Transport and Nationalised Industries, and Austrians are rightly proud of their achievement and anxious to preserve it. But Dr. Adenauer is hardly likely to forget what wartime development owed to the Germans: that, for instance, the great Vöest steel works at Linz, employing over 12,000 workers, was established by Herman Goering himself. Now may not be the time to press a claim. But the fact of previous ownership might one day prove a hostage with which to strike a bargain. It is a natural fear, especially for Socialists who remember the calamitous 'thirties and know that amongst their colleagues in the coalition there are those with secret yearnings for the good old days of Chancellor Schuschnigg.

## Government by Coalition

The coalition has now lasted almost ten years. Following the collapse of National Socialism in 1945, a Provisional Government was formed under Karl Renner. At the elections, the conservative People's Party (ÖVP) headed the poll with 50 per cent. of the votes while the Socialists (SPO) came second with 45 per cent. The relative positions of the two main parties changed little in 1949, but in 1953 the Socialists polled a majority of the votes although the Conservatives won 74, to their 73, seats. The Communists (KPO), with 5 per cent. of the votes, won 4 seats in 1945 and have retained them: the Neo-Fascist Independent Party (VDU) entered the field in 1949 winning 12 per cent. of the votes and 16 seats, two of which it lost in 1953. But for the moment, neither of these parties seems a serious threat to the position of the Socialists and Conservatives. The coalition has continued simply because, while memories were fresh, there was no alternative to

co-operation if democracy and the Second Republic were to survive. The Socialists are slowly gaining ground—as last autumn's provincial elections showed. But it is too early to contemplate a major Governmental change: and it would seem to be in the ultimate interests of most people that the coalition should survive.

Meanwhile there is no slackening of effort on the part of the Socialists: the Party has a highly organised individual membership of 660,000. In Vienna, where there is a clear Socialist majority on the City Council, there are 277,000 members in 24 district organisations. One of the secretaries of the Vienna Party is the Minister for Transport and Nationalised Industries. This illustrates the close and effective link that is maintained between the Party and its representatives in the coalition. These consult the Party Executive Committee on policy decisions to be reached by the Cabinet. There is no obvious collective Cabinet responsibility in the British sense: its members on either side of the coalition are openly critical of each other. But, once again, it is hard to think of an alternative arrangement if democracy is to be preserved in Austria by co-operation between former supporters of the *Heimwehr* and the Socialists whom they drove underground twenty years ago. The coalition, whatever its faults, has at least worked.

### Politics and Public Service

So, perhaps more surprisingly, has a civil service whose members are openly political. It was impossible to create a tradition of disinterestedness overnight in 1945, as the old guard was so obviously committed and because political opinions were so generally known. But the system has survived and should continue to do so while the coalition lasts. What will happen then is anyone's guess.

Political appointments are also the rule in the top management positions in nationalised industry. If the managing director is a Conservative, his deputy is a Socialist: and vice versa. But jobs for the boys has not resulted in second rate management although the Socialists have sometimes had difficulty in finding the right men for the biggest posts. The spirit in the nationalised industries on the side of both management and workers is generally good. In the early days after the war, the workers helped to rebuild plants that had been destroyed by bombing, or dismantled, in order to create work for themselves. The sense of participation that this gave them seems to have persisted and has been encouraged by legislation compulsorily setting-up works councils. Extensive welfare facilities, including housing and hospitals, have been developed by individual nationalised firms. Employees at the Böhler steel works at Kapfenburg, for instance, who earn the equivalent of £5-£6 a week, pay 10s. for a flat provided by the firm which they may retain if they lose their jobs.

Out of Austria's population of seven millions, 37 per cent. are classified as dependent on trades and industry, and about 20 per cent. of the manpower

engaged in industry is employed in the industries nationalised under the laws of 1946 and 1947. This public sector accounts for 22 per cent. of the total Austrian industrial production and a quarter of her export trade. The mining of copper, lead, zinc and iron ore are virtually State monopolies; 99 per cent. of pig iron and 94 per cent. of raw steel comes from nationalised plants; and 93 per cent. of lignite, 85 per cent. of electrical energy and 70 per cent. of aluminium. The State also owns a number of separate plants in other industries, which are thus in direct competition with the private sector. In addition there is, of course, gas-and-water socialism in the municipalities; and the railways. Production has been rising steadily, over 30 per cent. in lignite since 1950, over 20 per cent. on iron and steel and 50 per cent. in electricity supply. Some of the most impressive development has been in electricity, in particular the great Glockner-Kaprun hydro-electric scheme in the high mountains south of Salzburg. This was begun before the war and is now nearing completion. It will eventually have an annual production of 615 million kilowatt hours.

The nationalisation that has occurred met with comparatively little resistance, and the industries are no longer a subject of political controversy. But it is clear that further nationalisation, favoured by the Socialists, would take place in conditions totally different from those of the immediate post-war years, and would meet with stiff opposition. While the coalition continues there is little prospect of enlarging the public sector of industry.

### The Economics of Recovery

Unemployment in February, 1954, was higher than at any time since 1937, and it would be increased if the Russians were to relinquish control of industries in their zone. It is not surprising then, that although prices seem to have been stabilised, the real income of the working class is not much above pre-war. The Socialists realise that a higher standard of living depends upon rising productivity, and are emphasising the need for more investment in basic industries. The Conservatives prefer to push investment in consumer industries, and this difference of opinion has had its repercussions in the coalition. But it is clear that in the long run the Socialists are right if Austrian prosperity is to be more than transient.

Austria in 1955 is not even a second-class power. She offers neither guns nor butter to East and West, and has no place in the counsels of the nations. For the time being at least her fate lies in other hands than her own. Her recovery in these circumstances is remarkable and a tribute to the courage in adversity of her people. Socialists elsewhere in Europe have a lot to learn from the patience and determination of their Austrian comrades.

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# BRAZIL IN 1954

by Douglas Jay, M.P.

To most of us living in Britain, Brazil is remote and barely known. A recent visitor to the country contributes this picture of her.

**I**F there is any country about which one should not dogmatise after a short visit, it is Brazil. For it is an enormous country; it is remote from Britain; and it is full of complexities and contrasts. Therefore, all I can do, after a two weeks visit on a Parliamentary delegation to one corner of the country in July, is to record a few basic facts, and some very sketchy personal impressions.

Apart from the extraordinary, and indeed fabulous, beauty of much of the country, including Rio the capital, with its famous harbour and Atlantic beaches, I think there are three dominant impressions, which strike the ignorant British visitor. *First:* here is a political democracy, practising personal and civil liberties, erring if anything on the side of anarchy, which is at the same time very pro-British and anxious for friendship and contact with the British public. *Second:* here is a nation of 60 million people, of almost every colour and race in the world, and every mixture of them, with absolutely *no colour bar*, political, economic, social or personal. *Thirdly:* here are vast economic resources, and capacity for production of food and materials, which are almost untapped.

## Friendship for Britain

The friendliness of the Brazilians towards the British—even allowing for their natural courtesy towards visitors from this country—is something which could be made a real influence in the world. Brazilians are highly conscious of the fact that unlike most South Americans, they fought on the British side in both wars, and sent one division to take part in the North African and Italian campaigns in the second war. I fear it cannot be pretended that the British public are as conscious of this as are the Brazilians; and many here have probably forgotten how valuable it was from 1942 to 1945 to have 4,000 miles of Atlantic coastline, with ports and aerodromes, on the Allied side.

Why have the Brazilians thus been consistently pro-British in the present century, whereas German influence is strong, for instance, in Argentina? Partly because they don't want to be too much dominated by the United States. But mainly, it seems, because Brazil, as a colony and child of Portugal, is extremely

conscious of the historic Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, and regards itself as a sort of nephew of the British. Memories of the action of the British fleet in 1808, in rescuing the Portuguese Royal Family and government from Napoleon, and carrying them from Lisbon to Rio, and of Canning's later decision to recognise Brazilian independence, are rather more lively in Brazil than one must admit they are in this country.

Since 1945, Brazil has worked a fully democratic parliamentary constitution, with genuine elections, and genuine freedom of press and criticism. It is on the American, and not the British model, with an elected President, and an elected Senate and Lower House, with similarly elected Governors, and State Legislatures. Nobody could accuse Brazilians of restricting free speech in their electoral controversies. 'I may be a robber, but I get things done'—was the slogan of one prominent candidate displayed on the hoardings in July. The Communist Party is, however, banned, as is perhaps not surprising in a largely Catholic country; but it seems doubtful whether there would be much Communist activity even if it were not.

The dominant political personality over the last thirty years has been Getulio Vargas. As a Presidential candidate in 1930, after alleged irregularities in the election, he seized power, and set up a personal dictatorship rather on the Mussolini model, with simultaneous leanings towards Roosevelt's New Deal. Political and press freedom were suppressed. But trade unions, though they had to be recognised by the Government, were encouraged; and elaborate laws protecting labour conditions, and setting up a thorough-going social insurance system, were introduced. In 1945 Vargas was thrown out in the general reaction against dictatorship, and a full democratic constitution restored.

## President Vargas

So, under this constitution, Vargas reappeared in 1950 as constitutional Presidential candidate, with a social-democratic programme, mainly designed to get the support of the unions and workers generally. He was elected by a large majority, and carried on constitutionally as President. We met Vargas in July, and he showed great interest in, and knowledge of,

British politics, and Churchill in particular. Many responsible Brazilians told me that Vargas had both respected the constitution up to date, and genuinely tried to assist the poorer Brazilians. He appeared to work on the assumption that dictatorship seemed to be in fashion in the 1930's, but that if social democracy had come into vogue after 1945, he was only too glad to meet the people's wishes. A month after we left, following the alleged implication of members of the President's household in an attempt to assassinate an election candidate, Vargas committed suicide, publishing at the same time a manifesto protesting his fidelity to the Brazilian masses. The Government, formed after the crisis was more conservative; but elections later showed a still strong radical vote.

### The Colour Question

The total absence of the colour bar in Brazil is perhaps its most striking political achievement. Of Brazil's 60 million people, about 98 per cent, are of mixed colours. There are scarcely any pure white or pure negro. Every possible blend exists; but most people combine the three main strands—American Indian, Southern European and African Negroes brought in as slaves between 1600 and 1850. The result is a more vigorous and physically attractive type, male and female, than one would easily find in Europe.

The absence of colour prejudice has to be seen to be believed. You hardly observe three people walking or drinking together, in the streets of the great cities of Rio and Sao Paulo, but two of them are of different shades of colour. In a group of five or six, you will see three colours. In the Sao Paulo area, freedom of immigration is extended to Japanese as well as others, and they are coming in rapidly, and inter-marrying with the rest.

How did Brazil achieve this historic miracle? Largely one is told—and I do not pretend to be able to verify it—because 'miscogenation,' as Brazilians call it, between the Portuguese and American Indians was the rule from the very start in the seventeenth century. While the British in North America murdered the native Indians, the Portuguese (so the Brazilians remark) in the south preferred to marry the women and employ the men. At any rate, so it has happened; and both inter-marriage and immigration go on freely to-day.

### Economic Resources

Thirdly, Brazil must surely offer the greatest range of undeveloped economic resources in the world, apart, perhaps, from Asiatic Russia. In area, Brazil is larger than the United States, and comes second only to China and Russia. But its population is only 60 millions, though rising rapidly; and, unlike other great countries, it has practically no deserts, and no areas under ice and snow in the winter. It stretches from north of the equator, right through the tropics;

so that the climate for growing almost every known crop is found somewhere. You can produce in Brazil: wheat, maize, rice, sugar, oranges, bananas, beef, mutton, wool, coffee, cocoa, cotton, rubber, hides, timber, iron ore, gold, diamonds and many other minerals. Neither the United States nor Russia can show such a range. Only oil is so far lacking; but this probably exists under the Amazon jungles, verging on Colombia and Venezuela.

There are vast potentially fertile areas in the country which could bear one or another of these crops. I saw many from the aeroplane, which were larger than England and Wales, and had no houses or roads. I was told that there were in fact districts as large as Western Europe virtually uninhabited. Why? Because the population is too small, and because there are almost no roads or railways except near the coast.

The Vargas Government has some development efforts greatly to its credit. We saw at Volta Redonda an entirely new steel and tin-plate works, on the scale of Margam, and a new town for 100,000 people, built in the last eleven years in a virgin valley, five miles or so across. Here, in great tropical beauty as well as modern comfort, were homes, schools, hospitals, swimming pools, cinemas, etc., for 100,000 workers and their families, built by a government-owned company on a central plan, and all entirely made possible, of course, by American dollar loans of about £200 millions.

### Country of Contrasts

Unhappily, however—and Brazil is full of contrasts—much of the country's national income has been swallowed by a wild orgy of sky-scraper building in Rio and Sao Paulo in the last ten years. Both these cities claim to be now larger than Paris, and growing fast. On all sides buildings of twenty, thirty and forty storeys rise in every state of completion, and in a riot of modern architecture, very good, bad and indifferent. As economic planning, this building boom is stark madness. As a burst of human energy and vitality, it is astonishing. But while one admires the unbelievable spectacle, one is told that many of the sky-scrapers have no water supply, some of them no electric light, and that a great number of the upper storeys are unfinished (with the building workers sleeping in them) because finance has run out.

To the cold-blooded economist—and any such is out of place in Rio—it is no doubt shocking that the Brazil public, with perhaps the largest undeveloped country in the world at their disposal, are rushing in these two huge cities. But this is what they apparently like. As a result, the cost of living rises 20 per cent. a year, and inflation goes on merrily. Since there are almost no unemployed, this is not as serious as some might think.

But where, the Englishman asks, are the old people? They are supposed to have a State pension, though a small one. One never seems

to see the old; and Brazilians say that, despite their good health and physique, they die younger than North Americans. However, this may be, there certainly exists, despite so much liberty and fraternity, great inequality in Brazil. Half a million people in Rio live in shacks with no water or sanitation.

### Social Inequalities

The main reason for the acute inequality is the complete failure of any Brazil Government to enforce proper progressive taxation. A fine progressive income tax exists on paper, but the Government's contribution to national insurance has not been paid for twenty years! And the rich live luxuriously on the profits of inflation. Brazil's Federal Budget is less than a fifth as large as Britain's, though our population is smaller.

To the visiting British socialist, it seems that an income tax and petrol tax, at even a fraction of British rates, would solve Brazil's economic problems, give reasonable equality, and launch a road and rail building campaign from which so much else would follow. As it is, though Brazil sells the United States 1,000 millions a year of coffee alone (70 per cent. of Brazil's exports of all kinds everywhere), she has been in chronic balance of payments crisis for several years. So prices rise, the exchange value of the currency falls, and Anglo-Brazilians trade is near a standstill. This latter situation seems to us absurd; but if Brazilians want to have it that way—or as long as they do—who are we to say that they are wrong?

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**DOUGLAS JAY**, who was *Financial Secretary to the Treasury in the last Labour Government, recently visited Brazil as a member of a Parliamentary delegation.*

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## Recent Books

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### Realities of American Foreign Policy

By George F. Kennan. (O.U.P. 10s. 6d.)

**C**RITICISM of the foreign policy of the United States of America is for many of us a comforting pastime. It is, however, most uncomfortable to be a foreign guest at four lectures which make up this book during the course of which Mr. Kennan analyses the 'schizophrenia' by which the 'political thought' of his own country 'came to be affected in the post-war era.'

In the short space of these lectures we are given a picture of the descent from the high moral tone of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to the grim realities of the post-war period where 'we find ourselves living in two different worlds: one a sane and rational one in which we feel comfortable . . . the other world a nightmarish one where we are like hunted beasts oblivious of everything but survival.'

Isolationism was at first a defence from interference by the Old World; it later became the manifestation of a superiority complex. To-day the 'American way of life' seems to the citizens of the United States the most desirable way for everyone else to live. This moral approach to international affairs has however become tainted with the necessity again to find security—but this time in a world from which isolation is impossible.

It is almost with pained surprise that Mr. Kennan in his lecture on the non-Soviet world admonishes his audience, 'Let us not assume that our moral values, based as they are on specifics of our national tradition . . . necessarily have validity for people everywhere. In particular let us not assume that the purposes of States, as distinct from the methods, are fit subjects for measurement in moral terms.' The economic and military strength of the United States is based upon the raw materials which can be produced by the non-Soviet world. Therefore on the economic level the United States should be careful to make long-term agreements for the supply of raw materials. The United States must so conduct her foreign trade as to permit the free flow of goods both outwards and inwards and she must modify her attitude of moral superiority towards those with whom she wishes to co-operate.

It is almost shocking to read Mr. Kennan confess in his lecture on the problem of Soviet power that the North American community constitutes only one centre of military industrial strength and that the four others are England and Japan off the shores of the Eurasian land mass; Germany and the industrial regions immediately contiguous to Germany; and the Soviet Union proper. The United States, he says, can be sure of the manner in which fate has bound Britain ('the nucleus of a great political and economic system') to the United States.

How far 'morality' has given way to 'power politics' is disclosed by his hope that the United States and Japan will be equally close. Thus there is only the relationship between Germany and Russia left at the heart of their security problem—and still unanswered.

The subject of Soviet power may, as Mr. Kennan admits, be too vast a subject for any comprehensive and reasoned analysis in a single evening. But this does not

excuse him from making a false assessment of the power and reason for the existence of Communist parties in France and Italy. He claims that in those countries only to a very minor degree is Communism the reflection of any success of Communist ideas *per se* and underestimates the strength and discipline of the Communist party in Italy. He suggests, however, that Moscow would not at this stage care to see these Communist parties seize power because there is a danger that they might not be amenable to the control of Moscow.

In his final lecture Mr. Kennan attempts to cure the schizophrenia. The past attempts of the United States to rely upon high-sounding agreements between the Powers and resolutions of the United Nations are not sufficient. Her security being at stake, it is necessary for her to take up a more compromising attitude towards the non-Soviet world. 'We will not,' he says, 'find the unity of foreign policy for which we are concerned if we seek it only in the fashioning of relationship external to our national life; we will find it only in the recognition of the full solemnity of our obligations as Americans of the twentieth century . . . the obligations of all of us . . . to our own national ideals and through those ideals to the wider human community of which we are in ever-increasing measure a part.' This sounds perilously like a quotation from a lecture on Socialist Foreign Policy.

Both those who favour our alliance with the United States and those who condemn it will find comfort in these lectures, which in short compass give a clear picture of the present tendencies of American foreign policy.

*Eric Wolff.*

#### **Vorkuta**

By Joseph Scholmer. (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 15s.)

#### **Betrayal of an Ideal**

By G. A. Tokaev. (Harvill Press, 21s.)

#### **The Century of Total War**

By Raymond Aron. (Verschoyle, 25s.)

**I**N these days of political, religious and cultural delegations to the Soviet Union, we cannot be reminded too often of the basic facts of Soviet life which the delegations do not see. One of these is the forced labour camp, and *Vorkuta* is welcome as one of the latest first-hand descriptions. The author is a German doctor with a long record of Communist activity and of imprisonment by the Gestapo. He was arrested by the Communists in Berlin in 1949 when working for the East German Government. After a course of physical and mental ill-treatment in a Berlin prison, he 'confessed' to having been an agent of the Gestapo, the British and the Americans! He was sentenced to twenty-five years in a labour camp but was released in March, 1954, with other innocent Germans.

Dr. Scholmer's book is valuable for the general account it gives of life and conditions at one of the largest groups

of camps, at Vorkuta in the Arctic Circle. His book complements other accounts on such details as the overcrowding, the appalling conditions of work, and the lack of food. As a doctor, he gives expert evidence on medical facilities. He found Soviet doctors badly trained and ignorant by Western standards. Weak hearts were not recognised—men simply worked till they dropped dead—and nine out of ten deaths were caused by apoplexy due to heart strain and high blood pressure. There were no specialists, so that eye or ear injuries were usually disastrous. Surgery was better, though Dr. Scholmer gives a gruesome description of an operation for hernia, conducted virtually without anaesthetics because the surgeon drank the small amount of available ether. On the second day after an operation prisoners were forced to walk to the lavatory and on the fourth day to sweep the floors.

Dr. Scholmer also gives details of the resistance groups within the camp and of the now-famous strike after the death of Stalin. There was widespread rejoicing in the camp at the death of Stalin and hopes of freedom were aroused. There was bitter disappointment that the West did nothing to exploit the situation, and there was disgust at Churchill's decision to wait and see. From the point of view of the prisoners, this was merely giving Malenkov and his gang time to settle in. They thought the insecurity of the regime was proved by its hesitant reaction to the East German strikes and riots and to their own 'strike.' Among some of the more politically conscious prisoners there was surprise that the British Labour Party did not identify itself more closely with the oppressed workers of East Germany.

Many of the guards at the camp were as anti-Soviet as the prisoners. When alone a guard would say to a prisoner, 'You won't have to stick this much longer. The whole system will be breaking up soon.' And they would promise support in the event of a revolt. In general, the Russian resistance groups in the camp wanted land for the peasants, factories for the workers, autonomy for the separate races of the Soviet Union and free democratic elections. In other words they wanted the things the Soviet regime promised but tragically failed to provide.

Colonel Tokaev's story (the first volume of his memoirs) is of his gradual discovery of this breach between Soviet ideals and Soviet practice. The son of an agricultural labourer, he grew up in the Caucasus in the early years of the Soviet regime. He became an enthusiastic and loyal Bolshevik, a champion tractor driver, a member of the Consomol. His ability caused him to be selected for university training in Leningrad. Why then did he become an opponent of the system? For years he was indulgent to it, accepting isolated instances of bureaucratic inhumanity as exceptions to the Soviet rule. He repressed his criticisms for fear of harming the Revolution, in which he still believed. It was forced collectivisation that opened Colonel Tokaev's eyes to the suffering that Stalinist dogma was imposing on a resentful peasantry. On a visit to his native Caucasus he found starvation and poverty, and hatred for the rulers that caused them. Returning to Leningrad and Moscow, Colonel Tokaev found callous indifference to the fate of the peasants. Reluctantly, he eventually joined

an underground group of 'revolutionary democrats' who believed in some idealistic form of Communism but also believed that men should not be sacrificed to dogma.

Colonel Tokaev is typical of his generation in his early enthusiasm for a Communist ideal, and in his later disillusionment. Some are now cynical wielders of power; others, like Tokaev, remain idealists at heart and oppose the Soviet regime, either passively from within or by propaganda from outside. He is typical, too, in placing too much of the blame for the betrayal of his ideal on Stalin. The rot was present from the beginning. It is true, as Tokaev says, that in the late 'twenties discussion of policy within the Party was possible while later any criticism of Stalin's rule was condemned. We do well to remember that comparative freedom within the Soviet Communist Party existed in the past and led, not to democracy, but to tyranny. This freedom of discussion was always limited to the Party—it was Lenin who dissolved the Constituent Assembly in 1918 because it did not have a Bolshevik majority. In the elections for the Assembly, which took place *after* the October Revolution, the Bolsheviks received only 25 per cent. of the votes compared with the Social Revolutionaries 58 per cent. Indeed, as M. Aron points out, the October Revolution itself resembled a putsch rather than a popular seizure of power.

M. Aron's book is primarily a review of the contemporary world situation in the light of the Soviet threat and the invention of nuclear weapons. He regards continuation of the Cold War, with all its dangers and difficulties, as the best we can hope for at the moment. Total war would be a far greater disaster. In the long run, he places some hope in the possibility that the new Soviet bourgeoisie will be increasingly concerned with its own status and comfort and less with international revolution. But, as he says, it is impossible to predict whether this will happen or how long it will take. Of one thing we can be certain: while the Soviet slave-labour camps continue, while Soviet civil servants can be arbitrarily transferred to farm work in Siberia, while travel to, and especially from, the Soviet Union is dependent on the caprices of the Soviet Government, while Communist Parties all over the globe try to undermine free governments but internal criticism of the Soviet regime is not permitted, while the Red Army continues to occupy or control half Europe, including Germany and Austria—while all these things continue, 'co-existence' will never really be very peaceful.

*Leonard Bailey.*

## READ **VENTURE** — THE

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## SHORTER NOTES

The past four months have been singularly bare of really useful books. The only one of general interest that can be thoroughly recommended is Adlai Stevenson's **Call to Greatness**, published in England by Rupert Hart-Davies at 9s. 6d.; its real value is as an expression of the individual philosophy of a man whose knowledge of the world has widened greatly in a very few years.

D. W. Brogan's **Introduction to American Politics** (Hamish Hamilton, 21s.) is typically workmanlike and readable. **Britain and the U.S.A. in the Caribbean**, by M. Proudfoot (Faber, 42s.) is a survey of an area of co-operation and conflict. Still on the western hemisphere, there are also Ernest Watkin's rather superficial **Prospect of Canada** (Secker and Warburg, 21s.) and a rather odd study by James Bruce, **Those Perplexing Argentines** (Eyre and Spottiswoode, 30s.).

Africa is well dealt with in **The Heart of Africa**, by Alexander Campbell (Longmans, 21s.) and the Union in Robert St. John's hostile **Through Malan's Africa** (Gollancz, 13s. 6d.). On Asia there are several, ranging from Chester Bowles's account of his own experience as United States Ambassador to India and Nepal, **Ambassador's Report** (Gollancz, 18s.), to Vernon Bartlett's admirable **Report from Malaya** (Verschoyle, 10s. 6d.). For the more serious student, Sir Ivor Jennings's **The Constitution of Ceylon** is a readable guide by the chief framer of the constitution he describes.

The most important book of the small European collection is **Germany's Comeback in the World Market** (Allen and Unwin, 21s.), a survey with a historical touch by the West German Minister of Finance, Dr. Ludwig Erhard. For those who like reading Raymond Aron, there is his new historical sketch, **The Century of Total War** (Verschoyle, 25s.).

Finally, let me recommend Philip Mason's little Chatham House study, **An Essay on Racial Tension** (8s. 6d.). It is necessarily inconclusive, but Mr. Mason deserves credit for at least asking some of the questions which other people are too apt to ignore.

*T. E. M. McKitterick.*

*All books mentioned in these pages may be obtained from THE FABIAN BOOK-SHOP, 11 Dartmouth Street, London, S.W.1, Telephone: WHItchall 3077.*