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THE WORLD TODAY

Volume IX No. 12 December 1953

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Notes of the Month

Saudi Arabia after Ibn Saud

THE death on 9 November of King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud of Arabia raised the question which had been haunting the minds of foreign observers of the Arabian scene for almost thirty years—what would become of the vast kingdom, stretching from Persian Gulf to Red Sea, when its architect was no more? At first sight this question, the answer to which had been delayed so long, and the doubts attending which had to that extent become attenuated, resolves itself. All, for the moment, is well. Ibn Saud's eldest surviving son, now King Saud, has succeeded by acclamation, without a dissentient voice, and his second son, Amir Faisal, has been made Crown Prince. Any idea which might have been entertained that there would be a feud between the sons of Ibn Saud, or that the Hejaz might take the opportunity of Ibn Saud's death to split from the Nejd, is seen to have been baseless, or, even to those who cynically hoped that such a dichotomy might reveal itself, at least premature.

Actually, there is no intrinsic reason why King Saud should not enjoy as untroubled a reign as his distinguished father had and deserved. The new monarch has begun very well, with protestations, the genuineness of which there is no need to suspect, of friendship towards all his father's old friends, and with a guarantee that there will be no change in Saudi Arabia's foreign policy. More than that, King Saud has gone out of his way to express a hope that the now long outstanding, if sole, difference with Great Britain, over the Buraimi oasis (which is in fact the whole problem of Saudi Arabia's eastern frontier), may soon be settled. It is on that question, and particularly in the providing of the right conditions for arbitration, that Britons will look to King Saud for a new lead. So far, there has been no known advance in this problem since Ibn Saud's death; but there will be every readiness to allow

King Saud time to investigate internal affairs before he turns his attention to external matters.

Yet if from a short-term point of view all seems well with Saudi Arabia, there are, from a long-term viewpoint, abundant problems ahead, problems by no means caused by Ibn Saud's death, for they were perceptible during his life-time. These problems concern, fundamentally, what may be called the qualities of the Saudi Arabian nation, or peoples. For the riches induced by the discovery of oil in the Hasa induced also a change of outlook, and in conduct, in some of the more responsible men in Saudi Arabia. The erstwhile religious fervour, containing at least the embers of pristine Wahhabism, was apparently dying; and an open materialism was taking its place. Oil royalties were being spent prodigally, and by but a few of Saudi Arabia's millions. Thousands of pounds were expended on luxuries which in States that knew how to distinguish between genuine democracy and mere egalitarianism would have been spent on schemes for the improvement of the mass of the people. But to this trend Ibn Saud was seemingly unable to call a halt.

There is at least a chance that King Saud will do better in this respect. Unlike his mighty father, King Saud has seen something of the Western world, and though he is unlikely to have been impressed by the wisdom of giving votes to illiterates, he at any rate is aware that if rule is to be either autocratic or oligarchic, it must have a social conscience. He is unlikely to devote as much time as has been devoted in Riyadh and Mecca for the past thirty years to the depreciating of certain other Arabs; and he has the inestimable advantage of possessing first-hand acquaintance with leaders in other Arab lands. On balance, it would seem that the most searching test of Saudi Arabia will arise on the issue, not of its foreign relations, but of its internal development. Something, patently, must be done to arrest the falling-off in religious zeal. The old thriftiness, the old self-sufficiency must be re-invoked, and upon them can be superimposed whatever amenities and developments are possible with the oil wealth at the command of the Government of Saudi Arabia. Fortunately, King Saud has immediately recognized some of the danger symptoms. Just as, in his early days, and even till well on in years, Ibn Saud led his band of faithful followers in prayer, so King Saud has ordered that gangs of workers, particularly in the 'industrialized' regions in the east of his realm, shall be led in prayers by their foremen. This is a

striking adaptation of a very good, time-honoured custom. Whether it will successfully combat the trend of materialism is one of the many questions facing Saudi Arabia that the future alone can reveal.

Great-Power Consultations

THERE is fairly general agreement that the Russian Note of 3 November has finally dashed the hopes of a four-Power conference 'at the highest level' in the near future which have been entertained since Sir Winston Churchill's speech of 11 May. Sir Winston himself, speaking in the debate on the Address just before the delivery of the Russian Note, seemed to have come sadly to that opinion. The time has not yet come to judge whether Sir Winston's initiative in May was ill-timed or whether it was rendered abortive by supervening events (such as the riots in Berlin in June), or whether it has on balance turned out a loss to the Western cause. The immediate question is: what happens next?

The idea of a meeting of chief executives was not a new one—in this country it has played its part in two General Elections—but it was reanimated last March by the death of Stalin, that is to say, by a sudden and portentous event, whose timing was fortuitous. A new situation developed overnight; it was impossible to tell how different this new situation was from the old; but there was more than a chance that it might be turned to good account by a bold turn of policy. The wind blew up a number of straws: the cancellation of the 'doctors' plot' and the amnesty in Russia, General Chuikov's apology for the shooting down of a Lincoln bomber, moves for the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners in Korea, *Pravda*'s pacific commentary on a speech by General Eisenhower. These and other incidents might be signs of a change in the Kremlin's policy. They might equally be no more than a drawing in of horns during a distracting month or two. Sir Winston decided that there was little or nothing to be lost and possibly a lot to be gained by sailing up to the enemy and hailing him. He spoke of a four-Power meeting and threw out hints of a European settlement, including a guarantee of the U.S.S.R. in the manner of Locarno.

In retrospect it is easy enough to see that one result of this initiative was to push the policy hitherto pursued by the West into the background. And the failure of that initiative means likewise that the earlier policy must now be taken out of the cupboard,

dusted, and put back into service. The West, led by Britain, tried to take a short cut which did not get anywhere; the venture was not necessarily blameworthy, but the failure involves a return to the beaten track, to the Acheson Way. Mr Acheson's policy rested upon the avowed fact that the West had dangerously reduced its strength relative to that of the U.S.S.R., and upon the well-grounded hypothesis that no East-West talks would be fruitful until the West had regained some sort of parity with the U.S.S.R. Therefore, said Mr Acheson, the first thing to do was to build up situations of strength. Once strong enough, the West would try to reach a settlement; until then, it could not sensibly hope to do so. In the last two years the current phase of this policy in execution has been the attempt, through E.D.C., to bring Western German arms into the Western scale of the balance. The doubts and difficulties which cluster round E.D.C. are too well known to require recapitulation; what has been less generally acknowledged is that there is no practicable alternative method of achieving the stated object. Therefore E.D.C. has survived and, although put on ice during the Churchill interlude of May-November, it is now re-emerging with an added air of being businesslike, urgent, and inescapable. It may be indeed that the Churchill interlude, by expressing and then confounding hopes of a different kind, has in the end strengthened the case for E.D.C. and so contributed materially to its success; in which case the six months' delay do not have to be written off as time lost.

The Philippine Elections

THE Presidential Elections held in the Philippines on 10 November were encouraging for two reasons: the quality of the successful candidate and the fairness of the elections. The victor, Mr Ramon Magsaysay, appears to stand out amongst Filipino politicians for his honesty and ability and for his grasp of, and desire to deal with, the real problems of the country. He has an impeccable political record. The local manager of a transport company in Zambales Province before the war, he was commandeered by the American Army after Pearl Harbour along with his lorries and was subsequently commissioned as a captain in the anti-Japanese guerrilla forces in the Zambales area. He was notably successful as a guerrilla leader and during the brief American military occupation of the islands was made military governor of his Province. In 1946 he was elected as a Liberal

Party Congressman for Zambales and in this capacity served with success as chairman of the Committee on National Defence of the House of Representatives. In 1950, at a time when the Hukbalahap revolt was at the height of its success, he accepted office as Secretary for National Defence under President Quirino. His appointment is sometimes said to have been at least partly the result of pressure by the United States.

Mr Magsaysay transformed the fight against the Huks. He reorganized the army and constabulary and weeded out the elderly, the corrupt, and the inefficient. The troops were taken out of their barracks, formed into combat teams, and sent into the jungle and swamps after the Huks. Promotion was made dependent on ability and on the achievement of results. Use was made of rewards for captures and of psychological warfare. A vigorous effort was made to restore public confidence in the armed forces, and to improve conditions of service. And an attempt was made to wean the Huk peasants away from their Communist leaders by offering them more in practice than the Communists could promise them, and by meeting their real grievances with constructive help. For this purpose a body called EDCOR (the Economic Development Corporation) was set up to develop land in Mindanao, the large southern island, on which former Huks, who surrendered and had not personally committed capital crimes, might be settled with their families. The effect of these measures seems to have been immediate and striking. The Huk strength dropped by casualties and surrenders to perhaps a quarter, and where they had terrorized whole provinces they were reduced to scattered bands.

In November 1951 mid-term elections were held in the islands. The elections of November 1949 had been marked by widespread violence and fraud. In 1951 Mr Magsaysay used the armed forces to ensure free and fair elections, and the Liberal Party suffered a very severe defeat. This action, combined with his reiteration of the need for social reform, seems to have set some leading Liberal Party politicians against Mr Magsaysay, and by the end of 1952 it was becoming increasingly clear that differences had developed between him and the President. On 28 February 1953 Mr Magsaysay resigned. In his letter of resignation he said that 'it would be useless for me to continue as Secretary of National Defence with the specific duty of killing Huks as long as the administration continues to foster and tolerate conditions which offer fertile soil for Communism' and 'I have repeatedly and publicly said that

merely killing dissidents will not solve the Communist problem. Its solution lies in the correction of social evils and injustices and in giving people a decent Government free from dishonesty and graft.'

Meanwhile the opposition Nacionalista Party, led by Senator Jose Laurel, casting about for a presidential candidate with sufficient popular appeal to defeat the Liberals in the forthcoming elections, had begun to make approaches to Mr Magsaysay, and on 9 March he left the Liberal Party and joined the Nacionalistas. A change of party of this sort is facilitated in the Philippines by the fact that the major parties differ rather on personalities than on policies. The past nine months have indeed been remarkable for the ease, and in some cases the frequency, with which politicians have changed their party allegiances. On 12 April Mr Magsaysay was nominated by the Nacionalista convention as candidate for the Presidency by 705 votes to 48 and Senator Carlos P. Garcia as candidate for the Vice-Presidency by 598 votes to 149—the defeated aspirants for these nominations subsequently transferred their allegiance to the Liberal Party. In the actual election Mr Magsaysay received 2,890,401 votes, as against 1,292,395 votes for President Quirino, and Senator Garcia 2,504,461 votes as against 1,466,290 votes for the Liberal Vice-Presidential candidate Mr Jose Yulo.

Whether Mr Magsaysay will fulfil his promise as President or not remains to be seen. It has been claimed that he is impatient and brusque, ill-informed on international questions, and at times lacking in respect for the normal safeguards of the law, and many of his supporters in the Nacionalista Party are probably as anxious to savour the fruits of office as were many Liberal politicians. But whatever his failings may turn out to be, his record suggests that he will do something to clear away the stagnation and corruption which have characterized Filipino politics in recent years. The Americans at least appear to believe so, for it was an open secret that the United States hoped to see him elected. Quite apart from any prospects of better administration, however, the fact of Mr Magsaysay's election is in itself encouraging. It is unusual for the party in office to be defeated in a Philippine election, and fears were expressed on this occasion that the election would be rigged. That they were not, and the vigorous activity of such bodies as the National Association for Free Elections and the Committee for Good Government which helped to keep them free and fair, are encouraging signs for the future.

Franco's Foreign Policy

From U.N. Outcast to U.S. Partner

THE recent signature of the U.S.-Spanish agreement and of the Concordat between Spain and the Vatican has not only brought General Franco's Government into the limelight but has crowned with success a policy which has been both carefully planned and skilfully executed. In 1945, when the war ended, the odds were heavily weighted against him. It is said by many in Spain, and they are probably right, that had the Allies sent even a dozen planes over Madrid at that time the Franco regime would have fallen. He had supported the Axis with all aid short of outright participation,[1] and the vicious outpourings of the Spanish press are on record to show that even Goebbels was frequently beaten at his own game. Because of his actions during the war and the nature and origins of his regime, Franco found that his country had become a pariah among nations and a butt of moral indignation. At the San Francisco Conference in 1945 at which the United Nations Charter was drafted, a resolution was passed debarring Spain from membership of the United Nations, a measure that was confirmed by Great Britain, the United States, and Russia at Potsdam.

At this time the Allies suffered from the delusion, partly inspired by the wishful thinking of Spanish exiles, that the Franco Government would fall at any moment, and they imagined that it was possible for Franco's opponents inside Spain to overturn the Government. It is probable that this was not in fact at any time possible without some help, however small, from abroad. From this unrealistic Allied appraisal of the situation arose their equally unrealistic actions which were to shape the course of Franco's foreign policy. In March 1946 Great Britain, the United States, and France published a Note condemning the Spanish Government and expressing the hope that the Spanish people would find a peaceful means of changing their Government. This merely served to dishearten Franco's opponents who fervently hoped for Allied action, and to antagonize the Spanish Government. In December 1946 the famous resolution was passed by the United Nations calling upon members to withdraw their diplomatic

[1] The fact that he did not allow German troops to cross Spanish territory can be attributed to his concern for Spanish interests rather than to his love for the Allies.

representatives from Madrid and debarring Spain from all activities or agencies of the United Nations while the Franco Government remained in power. Argentina, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, and Peru voted against the resolution, while Afghanistan, Canada, Colombia, Cuba, Egypt, Greece, Honduras, the Lebanon, the Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, and South Africa abstained. The Argentine, far from withdrawing her Ambassador, appointed a new one amid much publicity.

Franco has said in a recent speech: 'In politics it is necessary to distinguish between what is possible and what is not possible and to know the exact moment in which to act. Every battle needs a plan and a strategy, and an elementary rule of the latter is to give battle only when victory is certain and not when there is a chance of defeat. In this lies the heavy responsibility of the commander.'[1] Although, as has been shown, Franco was by no means friendless even at the nadir in his fortunes in 1946, it seems likely that he proceeded to work out a strategic plan by which to win the active support of many more nations and so to pave the way for an eventual comeback into international society. The keystone of his positive foreign policy had hitherto been friendship with Portugal, with whom a treaty of friendship and non-aggression had been signed in 1939 and subsequently renewed. Portugal has proved a staunch friend, championing Spain's cause on every suitable occasion, and Franco has acknowledged her action by paying Portugal his only state visit abroad. But it now became necessary to cast the net wider. During this period of Spain's weakness and ostracism there was an almost morbid public concentration on her great past. Her Golden Age of the sixteenth century became the subject of innumerable articles in her censored and controlled press, and the days of her great Empire were remembered with pardonable nostalgia. What more natural, then, than that Franco should seek to develop the links (in many cases already close) between Spain and her former colonies, the Latin American States and the Philippines. Delving still further into the past, to the time when the Moors occupied the greater part of Spain, Franco must have decided that much could be built on the perhaps slender foundations of Spain's link with Islam. Such a policy would enable closer ties to be sought with all the countries of the Middle East and with Pakistan. These two groups of States would to-

[1] *Arriba*, 30 October 1953.

gether provide a useful number of votes in the United Nations. Meanwhile other countries with some point of common interest, such as the Irish Republic and South Africa, would not be neglected.

Among the principal instruments used to carry out this policy were the press and radio, which gave prominence to events in the countries which were the target of Franco's attentions, and the organization of visits, in the first place by the heads of States or other prominent persons from these countries to Spain, and later of return visits, principally by the present Spanish Foreign Minister, Martin Artajo. To the onlooker it can be a matter of some entertainment to watch, for example, the fulsome and space-absorbing praise meted out in the Spanish press to Perón and everything pertaining to the Argentine in 1946, in 1947 when Eva Perón visited Spain, and in 1948 when the Franco-Perón Protocol to the Spanish-Argentine trade and payments agreement of 1946 was signed. Then came the gradual diminution of this process as the working of the 1948 Protocol brought a cooling of relations. When Spain failed to fulfil her side of the trade agreement Perón became tough, and at the end of 1949 held up urgently needed supplies of wheat for Spain, thus forcing Franco to buy elsewhere out of Spain's very meagre gold reserves. By 1950 news of the Argentine was no longer to be found on the front pages and, if found at all, as likely as not would not redound to Perón's credit. Since then relations have been slowly improving. The press was also used to support those who might later support Spain; in the war between Arabs and Jews, for example, Spain took the side of the Arabs.

As to the policy of official visits, anyone who has been fortunate enough to enjoy Spanish hospitality will testify to what a heady wine this can prove. Even on a humbler plane than a state visit there is a special quality about Spanish hospitality that cannot fail to leave its mark on the recipient. Small wonder then that this policy should have paid dividends when practised on a long succession of distinguished guests which has included the late King Abdullah of Jordan, the former Regent of Iraq, the former President of the Philippines, the Crown Prince of Japan, the King of Libya, and a host of others. When Artajo paid his much publicized round of visits to the Middle East countries in 1952, the seed-bed of Spanish-Arab friendship had already been well prepared. A statement of Artajo's at this time made it clear that Spain

hoped to be the catalyst in a Middle East Defence Pact. This would have served to forestall the British, whose thoughts had been moving in the same direction; to plug what Franco rightly regards as a vulnerable gap in the world's defences against Russia; and last, but by no means least, to gain prestige for Spain. Nothing came of the project, however, and the results of the visit were confined, apart from the value of personal contacts, to the conclusion of a series of cultural treaties. Hopes had also been entertained in Spain that the visit would open up markets for Spanish goods, but so far little trade has resulted.

On the delegation that Artajo took with him to the Middle East were not only Franco's daughter, but also—and from a psychological point of view of far more importance—a Moor whom Franco has appointed a general in the Spanish Army. Spain's policy towards her colony in Morocco is framed with an eye to impressing the Arab countries. It is true that Spain gets little material benefit from her colony, which is a liability rather than an asset; but despite the much-vaunted recent reforms Franco has shown few signs of allowing any real political independence, probably because of fear that his prestige might suffer if the nationalist hotheads were to demand independence from Spain. The reforms, decreed in 1952, allowed the formation of political parties, with their respective papers, but shortly afterwards the Arab paper *Al Ouman* was suppressed and little has since been heard of the parties.

Yet another instrument for promoting the policy of better relations with the Islamic and Latin American countries has been the development of cultural relations by various means. Centres such as the Islamic Institute and the Institute of Hispanic Culture exist in Madrid and some of the provincial cities, as well as similar centres devoted to a particular country, such as the Egyptian Institute. In addition, there are societies devoted to the various countries, such as the Hispano-Chilean Society, and scholarships are provided for the exchange of students, for example with Pakistan. Conferences devoted to various Hispanic subjects have been organized in Spain; particularly successful have been those for Hispanic international lawyers.

The impetus of Franco's policy of 'hispanidad' has definitely come from Spain and not from the 'daughter' countries, whose interests are clearly not engaged to the same extent. Nevertheless, except for the set-back in regard to Argentina which has already

been mentioned, the policy has on the whole proved very successful. Early this year the present Minister of Education is reported to have said that 'hispanidad' had ceased to be pure rhetoric and had become a concrete reality which was growing each day—a remark perhaps more illuminating than he intended. Artajo has also recently suggested that the Hispanic countries should form an international organization with a special legal status. Spain has, moreover, achieved her object of acting as a link between Latin America and the Middle East; for example, Franco was recently asked by the Arab League to mobilize the Latin American countries in support of its views on Israel, the Suez Canal Zone, and the Sudan. When in November 1950 the General Assembly withdrew the ban on Ambassadors to Spain and gave permission for Spain to join the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, all the Latin American and Middle East countries voted in her favour with the exception of the hard core of Franco's opponents in these areas—Mexico, Uruguay, Guatemala, and Israel. Franco could rightly feel that his strategic plan had yielded rich dividends and that he had won a major battle.

Meanwhile another battle, closely linked with the first, had loomed on the horizon—the fight to secure U.S. aid. In June 1947 General Marshall had given hope to Europe by his offer of U.S. help. The main aim of Franco's foreign policy from now on was to secure a share of the U.S. bounty which was being so generously distributed to other countries of Western Europe and of which Spain stood perhaps more sorely in need than any of them. An indication of the hopes entertained at that time is to be found in a well-known report by one of Spain's principal banks published in the spring of 1948.[1] This report outlined Spain's economic needs based on the assumption that aid would be forthcoming. The U.S. House of Representatives in March 1948 voted to include Spain among the recipients of Marshall aid, but President Truman exerted his influence to secure a reversal of this decision. Stung by this slap in the face, Franco stepped up his policy of 'hispanidad' and hastily concluded the ill-starred Franco-Perón Protocol referred to above. The failure of the Communists to win the Italian elections in 1948 was another blow for Franco, who doubtless calculated that, in the event of a Communist success in Italy, Spain would be regarded by the U.S. as an important bastion against Communism and would consequently become the happy

[1] Report of the Banco Urquijo, Madrid, 1948.

recipient of suitable aid. As he said later, 'If there are eight hungry men on a desert island and a ship arrives bringing food for seven of them, imagine the feelings of the eighth. Well, we in Spain happen to be that eighth man.'[1]

Meanwhile the international wind had started to blow in Franco's favour as Russia's post-war actions dissipated the fund of goodwill earned by her war-time exploits and roused the Western nations to the menace that she presented. As Russia's stock declined it was only logical that that of Franco, who had so consistently opposed her, should rise. The keynote of Franco's regime and of his negative foreign policy has always been opposition to Russia and to Communism. One used frequently to hear it said in Spain that were it not for the menace of Communism the Franco regime would disappear overnight. For these reasons Franco undoubtedly owes Russia a debt he would find it hard to repay! He has suffered from a deep sense of grievance in that having, in his view, been proved entirely right over Russia and having, in his own words, himself won, during the Spanish Civil War, the first round against Communism, the Allies should nevertheless have continued to treat him as an outcast instead of hailing him as the hero of the hour. But as the Russian menace grew, the asset of Spain's strategic geographical situation far overshadowed in importance even the fact that Franco had consistently opposed the Russians. The U.S. Service Departments, in view of the circumstances in the rest of Europe, began to think longingly of bases in Spain. The prevailing view in the State Department, however, was that the Franco regime in its existing form was unacceptable, and in this they had the full support of President Truman. It was, incidentally, a bitter blow to Franco when Truman was re-elected in 1948. The breaking down of this opposition was a long and hard struggle in which, despite many setbacks, Franco was very fortunately favoured by events. It is reported in Spain that, acting on the principle of casting his bread upon the waters, he allowed precious dollars to be spent lavishly but judiciously in the United States in provision of such hospitality as would be likely to bring some return to the Spanish cause. Apart from the Pentagon, support for Spain in the United States was to be found among Roman Catholics and in certain business circles, particularly those connected with the cotton-growing south, and this support was reflected in Congress. Nevertheless,

[1] The *Daily Telegraph*, 1 February 1949.

Franco failed in 1949 to secure an Export-Import Bank loan, and in the same year he suffered a further reverse in the United Nations when a resolution to allow the resumption of diplomatic relations with Spain was defeated.

The year 1950, however, saw a turn in his fortunes. The U.S. was now prepared to support a withdrawal of the ban on Ambassadors to Spain and on Spain's membership of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, and a resolution to this effect was passed later in the year. In August Congress voted Spain a loan despite President Truman's objections. But the most important factor in the improvement of Spanish fortunes was the war in Korea. The entry of Chinese forces on the side of the North Koreans had, by December 1950, produced an atmosphere approaching panic among the Western Powers, particularly the U.S.A. Pressure from the Pentagon, thinking in terms of Spanish man-power and bases, was such that President Truman was forced to give way and appoint an Ambassador to Madrid. At this stage it almost seemed that Franco had allowed his recent successes to dim his usually very acute political sense, for when, early in 1951, approaches came from the U.S. for negotiations for bases in Spain, he imagined that he had only to state his demands for the U.S. to be most happy to satisfy them. The U.S., for their part, appeared to entertain equally unrealistic ideas about the conditions which they would be able to impose, and at that time there was much loose talk of Franco being made to introduce democratic reforms.

A year later these hopes had completely faded. Admiral Sherman had been a keen protagonist of Spain's strategic value and with his death, just after his visit to Madrid in July 1951, and also with the stabilization of the Korean front, the impetus to the negotiations faded. Because the two countries had started so far apart in viewpoint, the negotiations dragged on until 26 September of this year —by which time the negotiators on both sides were probably sadder and wiser men. U.S. military and economic missions had come and gone, while the seemingly tranquil progress of U.S.-Spanish relations was occasionally ruffled by statements such as that of Truman, that he had 'never been very fond of Franco's regime',[1] and of Eisenhower, to the effect that the inclusion of Spain in N.A.T.O. would be no contribution to the moral force in Western Europe.[2] Meanwhile in Spain it was a case of 'hope

[1] *New York Herald Tribune*, 8 February 1952. [2] *ibid.*, 5 February 1952.

deferred maketh the heart sick', and the whole subject of U.S. aid became something of a popular joke, epitomized in the amusing Spanish film 'Welcome Mr Marshall', where, after the most elaborate preparations have been made by a Spanish village to receive a Marshall aid delegation, when the crucial moment of their arrival comes the astonished and disappointed villagers get only a 'that's Shell, that was' view of several huge American cars whizzing through their village. The amount eventually granted ($226 million for the fiscal year 1954, $125 million of which had already been voted in 1951 and 1952 and was carried over by Congress) must have been a disappointment to Franco, but the important point is that U.S. aid has started to flow and there is promise of more to come.

The Americans found Franco a tough bargainer, and his hand was greatly strengthened by the good harvests of 1951 and 1952. In the autumn of 1951 it was being rumoured in Madrid that the Army was insisting that there should be no infringement of Spanish territorial sovereignty, and Franco's success in wringing from the U.S. the concession that the Spanish flag should fly over all bases in Spain is of supreme importance to a nation that produced Don Quixote. On the other hand Stalin's death this year and the relaxation of tension that followed at once diminished Franco's bargaining power. Moreover, Spain was once more in the throes of a drought and the harvest was expected to be poor (although fortunately for the country it has turned out to be better than was at one time anticipated). These circumstances may possibly account for some of the terms that have been accepted by Franco, for example, the promise to allow the Americans information regarding Spain's balance of payments position, hitherto a closely guarded secret, if indeed the Spaniards themselves know the exact answer; the exclusion of monopoly organizations from contracts for the bases; and the close powers of supervision accorded to the Americans. It has also clearly been a source of disappointment to Franco that he did not achieve Spain's inclusion in N.A.T.O. and the other organizations of Western Europe. For this Great Britain and France have been jointly blamed, but particularly Britain since her influence with the U.S. is considered to be the greater. There would certainly seem to be some grounds for this blame, for in July 1951, at the time of Admiral Sherman's visit to Madrid, both Britain and France issued protests against Spain's admission to N.A.T.O. or, in the

words of the British protest, 'to any closer association between Spain and any members of the (Atlantic) Pact', and it has been made abundantly clear since then that the attitude of the British Government has not changed.

Franco has not unnaturally fiercely resented Britain's attitude and regards her not only as the principal impediment to his full restoration to international society but also as illogical and hypocritical in her different dealings with Spain and with Yugoslavia. Britain is the constant subject of attack in the press and radio, and a campaign of pin-pricks is carried on. The return of the Conservatives in 1951 was expected to bring an improvement in relations, but such has not been the case. It is tempting to attribute the chronic refusal of licences for the import of British goods to the anti-British campaign, but it may well be that Spain is now finding the same goods on better terms in other markets, principally German.[1] (Incidentally, Spain's political ostracism did not noticeably affect her trading relations with those countries who condemned her,[2] Great Britain being a case in point, and she concluded or renewed a large number of trade agreements while being 'sent to Coventry'). The Spanish cry for Gibraltar is much older than Franco's advent to power. When Britain is thought to be weak Spain seizes the opportunity to raise the question, as during the 1914–18 war. There is little doubt that Franco is very much in earnest on this subject, and his regime, and therefore his prestige, is inevitably linked with the claim. It has always been a plank in the Falange programme and the subject of a great deal of propaganda in literature produced for their youth organizations. After Britain's evacuation of so many territories, Franco no doubt sees no reason why she should balk at Gibraltar. This claim is likely to loom large in his future foreign policy and it would be a mistake to underestimate his determination.

France, less powerful than Great Britain, has been a secondary target for attack. Besides long-standing rivalries in North Africa, France has given hospitality to Spanish exiles and allowed her territory to be used as a base by the Spanish underground movement. In addition, she has opposed Spain in the United Nations more strenuously than Britain. Franco has no doubt derived considerable satisfaction from the fact that his Arab policy has served

[1] Germany seems rapidly to be regaining the rather special position of 'favoured friend' that she held before the war.

[2] France and Norway were the sole exceptions for a short period only.

a dual purpose in promoting his interests and in embarrassing France in her difficulties with her North African territories. Prayers are still being said in Spanish Morocco in the name of the exiled Sultan of French Morocco whom the French removed to Corsica without consulting, as they were legally bound to do, the Spanish authorities. Franco will no doubt continue to fish in France's troubled waters as long as it is safe, as a fellow colonist, to do so.

Franco has long sought a Concordat with the Vatican as another plank in the bridge to his goal of respectability. For years his overtures were repulsed by the Pope who, despite Franco's favourable treatment of the Church, did not wish to associate himself more closely with the Falangist regime. But by 1951 the climate of opinion had changed sufficiently to allow negotiations to begin, and they were successfully concluded on 27 August 1953, just a month before the signature of the U.S.-Spanish agreement.

In so short a space it has only been possible to deal with the more important aspects of Franco's foreign policy and not to detail minor successes such as Spain's readmission to a major share in the administration of Tangier, her election to Unesco and other U.N. organizations, or Artajo's visit to the Philippines, Formosa, Thailand, and Pakistan. Again, it has only been possible to mention a few of the means by which these successes have been obtained, although such apparently minor items as the development of tourism in Spain and the popularity of Spanish dancers abroad have contributed towards the changed attitude towards Spain that exists today. A small illustration of this change even within the last year is the visit of the Lord Mayor of Madrid to New York. In April 1952 the Mayor of New York had to cancel the invitation he had sent because of public reaction. Last month the Mayor of Madrid received a warm welcome in New York.

There is no doubt that Franco's foreign policy, given the poor hand he was originally dealt, has been highly successful. Thanks to forthcoming American aid, his armed strength, the basis of all foreign policy, will be increased, and he is well on the way to achieving his goal of full respectability in international society. Were it not for the Russian veto Spain would probably shortly be elected a member of the United Nations. It is rumoured that even Mexico is thinking of establishing diplomatic relations, which would mean the return of the gold now in the possession of the exiled Republican Government in that country. Franco has

achieved all this, moreover, by pulling Spain up by her own bootstraps, almost without aid and till now without sacrifice of independence. Good fortune has played a large part in his success, but it has principally been due to Franco himself, who directs his own foreign policy. He has shown himself to be astute, skilful, determined, and endowed with an excellent sense of timing. Even his opponents are forced to acknowledge his success, but they add, somewhat cynically, that so far it has been circuses without the bread, since living conditions in Spain, particularly of the working classes, show little signs of improvement.

D. K. M. K.

President Shishekli and the Shaping of Syrian Policy

On 9 October the Syrian electorate, including for the first time women, went to the polls to elect a new Chamber of Deputies. As an election it was much more significant than most such events in the Middle East, for it marked the effort of a man who has been dictating the affairs of Syria for four years to find a form of democracy which would successfully replace a system which had proved itself a conspicuous failure. The affairs of Syria from 1949 to 1953 are intelligible only in the light of the character of Adib Shishekli, a soldier turned reluctant dictator because he could not trust anyone else to run the country.

Adib Shishekli was born of landowing parents of Kurdish origin in the village of Hama in 1909. He was educated at the Hama Secondary School and attended the Salamiya Agricultural College. But farming was too dull a pursuit for a man of his temperament, so in 1929 he entered the Military School at Damascus where in due course he graduated as an officer. He was married and the first of his eight children was born while he was still a cadet.

The only story of his earlier military career, and it may well be apocryphal, concerns a brush with some French officers who were thought to have been discussing 'sales Syriens'. When everything was sorted out it transpired that they had been talking about

'Saint Cyriens'. At all events he emerged at the end of the Mandate with the reputation of a strong Nationalist and the rank of Captain, the highest open to a Syrian at that time. After the departure of the French he was promoted Major in recognition, according to the official biography, of his bravery in the operations which led to the end of the Mandate. Two years later he was released from the regular army to join Fowzi Kawukji's ineffectual volunteer force which entered Palestine shortly before the British withdrawal.

Like many other officers Shishekli felt keenly the blow to Arab pride inflicted by the debacle of their armies in Palestine and blamed the incompetent politicians who had sent these armies untrained and ill-equipped into the fight and sabotaged them by their intrigues during the battle. His subsequent career is marked by a determination that the Syrian Army should never again be the victim of the politicians.

On rejoining the regular forces he played a leading part, along with General Husni Zaim, then Army Chief of Staff, in overthrowing the discredited Quatli regime on 30 March 1949. Promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel and appointed Chief of Police by Zaim's new regime, he carried out with notable efficiency the restoration of public order in a situation which, since the fall of the Mardam Cabinet in the previous December, had been perilously near anarchy. As his ability and ambition were a danger to Zaim he was transferred to Aleppo as Army Commander, and finally, as Zaim's megalomania and ineptitude increased, the two quarrelled. Some days before the end of Zaim's regime he was sent to a political prison.

Sami Hinnawi, who eliminated Zaim on 14 August and succeeded him as Chief of Staff, released Shishekli and reinstated him in the Army. But when his regime repudiated the pro-French and pro-Egyptian policy of its predecessor and turned to plans for union with Iraq, Shishekli reacted sharply. As commander of units near Damascus he was well placed to lead the military event of 19 December 1949 which expelled Hinnawi, put an end to ideas of unity, and led to strained relations with Iraq which have never been entirely relaxed. Having achieved his object he retired behind the scenes, a manoeuvre which was to characterize all his intervention in politics until, in despair of finding anyone of any calibre who would co-operate with him, he was obliged to offer himself as President in July 1953.

During Zaim's regime elections for a Constituent Assembly had

returned a Chamber almost equally divided between the People's Party and the Independents. From December 1949 to October 1951 one group or the other formed a succession of governments, whose undistinguished careers need not be recorded in any detail. The key man in each case, and the only one who mattered, was the Minister of Defence, the Army nominee, who conveyed the wishes of the Supreme Military Council (in other words, of Shishekli) to the Cabinet. In the first Cabinet their nominee was Akram Hourani, whose Arab Socialist Party had plans for land distribution to the peasants and looked as if it might become the Army's popular movement; but he was replaced in all subsequent Cabinets by General Fowzi Selo, and his party in time disintegrated.

During the latter part of 1950 there were indications that a struggle for power was working itself out in the Army. Though nominally only an Assistant Chief of Staff, Shishekli was setting the pace, but he was not getting things entirely his own way. The officer commanding the Air Force was ambushed and shot in the outskirts of Damascus soon after a meeting at which he had opposed further army intervention in politics. An elaborate treason trial, in which a number of well-known public figures were implicated, was staged after an alleged attack on Shishekli's own car. The atmosphere of gangsterdom which accompanied these events had an unfortunate effect on his reputation which he has been unable to live down either in his own country or abroad.

Meanwhile the politicians were occupied in drafting, debating, and enacting a new Constitution which permitted the Constituent Assembly to vote itself into four years of continued existence as a Chamber of Deputies. All the available foreign currency and a good part of the budget voted for other purposes was being devoted to the object of raising the Syrian forces from the deplorable state which they had reached at the time of the Palestine war. The Army began acquiring large quantities of second-hand arms and equipment from France, the only source willing to provide them. As a consequence the French gained much popularity in Syria at a time when British stock was declining rapidly because of continued delays in the delivery of jet fighters which the Syrians had bought.

Having started to put the Army on its feet, Shishekli sent the Prime Minister, Nazim Kudsi, on a tour of the Arab capitals. His assignment was not only to seize for Syria the initiative in the formation of an Arab Collective Security Pact, but also to persuade

members of the Arab League that, in spite of their misgivings over the series of coups, Syria was still stable and strong, and that he, Shishekli, was the obvious leader of the next round against Israel. In April 1951 he became Chief of Staff, a position which brought him one step nearer official responsibility for the policy he was controlling from behind the scenes.

A Cabinet crisis in March 1951 produced an official denial from the Army of the obvious fact that disagreement between the Cabinet and soldiers was reaching serious proportions. But the situation did not reach a climax until October, when Egypt's rejection of the Middle East Defence proposals caused a crisis which had far-reaching internal consequences. Faidi Atassi, the Foreign Minister, supported the Egyptian attitude and denounced what he called the imperialist schemes of the States which had founded Israel. He was repudiated by his Prime Minister, Hassan Hakim, who announced that, in his view, Syria should take advantage of this means of acquiring military and economic assistance with which to check Israeli aggression. The public outcry which this caused led him to offer his resignation, but it was not accepted by the President.

The situation was already tense when the Minister of the Interior offered his resignation on the grounds that his Bill to transfer control of the gendarmerie to his Ministry from the Ministry of Defence, where it had rested for the previous two years, had been vetoed by the Army. On 10 November the Prime Minister succeeded in his determination to resign, but no one acceptable to the Army could be found to take his place. In the end Maaruf Dawalibi, leader of the Muslim Brotherhood and a member of the People's Party, decided that no further compromise was possible and resolved to challenge the Army on three issues: the control of the gendarmerie, the status of the Minister of Defence, and the trial of civilians by Army courts. The names of his Cabinet, which included a supporter of Iraqi Union at the Foreign Office and a victim of the treason trials at the Ministry of Justice, were submitted direct to the President without reference to Shishekli.

Shishekli lost no time in taking up the challenge. By the following morning he had rounded up Dawalibi and his Cabinet, the leaders of the People's Party, and a number of Independents, and had them all in prison. One of the Cabinet's first acts had apparently been to prepare the documents for Shishekli's retirement

from the Army, but he had intercepted them before they reached the President. A communiqué announced that the Army had taken control, and Syria's fourth coup in three years had passed off without bloodshed in an atmosphere of public apathy. From his place of detention Dawalibi submitted his resignation. Hamid Khoja, a Liberal Republican, was asked to form a Government but, according to an official announcement, intrigues of the People's Party not only prevented him from doing so but also brought about the resignation of the President himself, Hashim Atassi. Shishekli, acting through the Supreme Military Council, then dissolved Parliament on the grounds of its failure to discharge the functions of constitutional government and appointed himself to be Chief of State with full powers to govern by decree.

On the radio he explained how the Army's action was designed to protect the will and interests of the people from exploitation by a group of conspirators against the Constitution. He recapitulated at length the sins of the People's Party. They were 'liars and unscrupulous merchant politicians; they were incompetent, vicious, and corrupt; they had made government impossible by their refusal to co-operate with any other Cabinet; they were fossilized idols at the helm of State'. They were a great many more things besides, and all this had forced the Army to step in to 'interpret the irresistible will of the people'.

After one day in office Shishekli resigned his position as Chief of State and again became Chief of Staff. Colonel Fowzi Selo, the late Minister of Defence, was charged with all legislative and executive powers pending the election of a new Chamber of Deputies. Shishekli pointed to Selo's appointment as proof of his own lack of ambition and his desire to serve his country to the best of his ability as a soldier. He assured the country that elections would be held as soon as arrangements could be put in hand to secure freedom of voting. In his speeches he threw more light on the events of the coup. It had been provoked, not by dissension over Middle East Defence, but by the attempt of the People's Party to destroy the Army. Identifying the people with the Army, he said that he had been compelled against his own wishes to take forceful action to save the people and Syria from destruction. At one moment he had contemplated resigning, but had been horrified by the confusion it would have created in the Army.

Since the Nationalist Party had been eliminated from political life since 1949 and the People's Party and many Independents

had now suffered the same fate through the coup of December 1951, it seemed as if a complete silence had fallen on the country. There was much truth in the accusations levelled at the People's Party by Shishekli, but they applied with equal vigour to the other politicians as well. It was not so much that individual members of the Government had been vicious as that, both individually and collectively, they had been ineffectual and weak. No leader had emerged to impose order among bickering colleagues, and ministerial decisions had too often bowed to the last caller with an axe to grind. Students had demonstrated in the streets at every opportunity, and the Chamber had wasted its time on the emotional views of small men on subjects which they did not understand. Personal interest had obstructed progressive legislation or modified it into complete ineffectiveness. One hundred and fifty draft laws and three hundred other draft measures remained unenacted. It was an atmosphere in which the intriguing intelligentsia of the coffee shops thrived but respect for authority was undermined, and the country was getting nowhere.

The new regime lost no time in making itself felt. Demonstrations were banned and students were forbidden to participate in any political activity; parents and teachers were warned that they would be held responsible for any breach of this order. This move was naturally unpopular, and resentment against Shishekli is probably stronger in the university than anywhere else in the country. Civil servants were also required to give up all party connections. The press was reorganized on the basis of compulsory amalgamation; only seven papers remained in Damascus and a few in the provinces, all under strict control.

On 6 April 1952 all the political parties were dissolved on the grounds that they had been a waste of time and led only to a division of effort. Shishekli explained that he wanted an administration capable of uniting the ranks of the people and directing their disused talents towards prosperity in trade, agriculture, and industry. The way was to be paved for a return to parliamentary life as soon as circumstances permitted, and there were signs in his speeches that Shishekli was sensitive to Western criticism of the absence of democracy in Syria. The first step towards a new democracy was the formation of a single party under Shishekli's own leadership, to be known as the Arab Liberation Movement. By this time all the politicians detained in December 1951 had been released.

Profiting from the legacy of unenacted legislation left over by the last Government, Shishekli set about the promulgation of an avalanche of legislative decrees. By June 1952 over two hundred and fifty had been issued, many of a highly socialistic flavour. The civil service was reorganized and taxation amended to put more emphasis on income tax as a source of revenue; a committee was formed to study a currency law and the establishment of a national bank; foreign companies were required to appoint Syrian partners or agents in order to eliminate some six thousand foreign agencies still in the hands of Lebanese. Large areas of neglected land belonging to the State were to be rehabilitated and leased to small-holders, cotton growing was to be regulated, and wide powers were given to the Ministry of Agriculture for the development and mechanization of agriculture. There was scarcely an aspect of social affairs, education, health, or economics which was not covered by the decrees. Major irrigation and water supply projects which had languished on paper for years were to be given fresh impetus. The Lattquia Port contract was given to a Yugoslav concern.

It was unfortunate that at this moment, when the stage at last seemed to be set for a genuine effort to develop the country's resources, Shishekli was compelled to divert his attention to the consolidation of his own position. Either because he felt the burden was too much for him or, more probably, because he wanted to find a broader basis of political support which might hasten the return of some kind of democracy (and, incidentally, might permit his eventual return to the Army to prepare for the next round in Palestine), he intoduced in June 1952 a Cabinet of leading members of his Arab Liberation Movement. General Selo was Prime Minister and Shishekli himself became Deputy Prime Minister as well as Chief of Staff. But nothing he could say or do could raise any enthusiasm for the movement amongst his carping countrymen, and the Cabinet was eventually made up of men of little standing or ability. Their contribution was almost entirely negative. When the country was most in need of capable men none were prepared to come forward. Shishekli's conception of hard work, sacrifice, and discipline had taken the spice out of office for the established politicians. They were brooding revenge.

Having failed to engage any wide measure of popular support, Shishekli perhaps felt that he was moving too fast for his public, with its persistent anti-Western bias. So Point IV aid was rejected;

an International Bank mission studied various projects but departed without any decision being reached; development, it seemed, was to be done the slow hard way with the aid of a few technicians from United Nations agencies.

Towards the end of the year latent opposition again broke out, and a coup engineered by Akram Hourani, the former Army nominee as Minister of Defence, along with some officers and politicians, was forestalled. Hourani fled to the Lebanon where he announced that the coup had aimed at eliminating Shishekli before he carried out his intention of selling out to the West over Middle East Defence and the Palestinian refugees.

In an interview with foreign journalists Shishekli said that he personally was anxious to come to a close understanding with the West and to co-operate in their defence arrangements, but it would be suicide for him to do so in the present state of Arab opinion. There were three steps which must be taken by the West before any rapprochement could be possible. The refugee question must be settled by the payment of compensation and the implementation of U.N. decisions. A positive approach was required to the Communist danger: up till now nothing had been done but repression. Standards of living in Syria must be raised, and money was needed to do it, but he did not want charity or loans with strings attached; he wanted half the proceeds of the savings effected by the oil companies by piping oil through Syria instead of shipping it through the Suez Canal. Lastly, arms should be made available so that Syria could build up an army capable of participating effectively in Middle East Defence. After that arms should be given on the same basis as to Greece and Turkey.

As it was now clear that no progress was possible in any direction until some form of political arrangement had been reached, affairs were allowed to drift while Shishekli and his advisers prepared a new Constitution. They argued that the system of a Prime Minister and a Cabinet drawn from, and entirely responsible to, an elected Assembly had proved a failure: the executive must be freed from the daily interference of a hundred or more influence traffickers intriguing to further their own interest in a so-called Chamber of Deputies. The Constitution which they evolved provided for a President elected for a four-year term by popular suffrage, with powers to select his Cabinet from outside the Chamber of Deputies; and for a legislative body and supreme court on the lines of those in the United States.

A draft was published and constructive criticism invited, but little was offered. The rusticated politicians carped over its legality to little effect, for it was approved by the electorate on 10 July 1953, and two days later Shishekli was elected by a larger vote against no opposition to be the first President. A new Cabinet not restricted to members of the Arab Liberation Movement, and containing considerably more talent than its predecessor, was appointed on 20 July. A General Election was promised within three months and duly took place on 9 October. In a Chamber reduced to 82 seats, 72 members of Shishekli's Movement, one member of the Parti Populaire Syrien, and 9 Independents were returned.

Little has been said of the character of the man who now embarks on the dual task of governing Syria for the next four years and making the new experiment in Arab democracy work. Election posters give him a hard face and a scowl. But socially and round the conference table he has a soft voice and a ready smile, and possesses a large degree of personal charm. Until he became President he lived with a family of eight children in a modest flat in a middle-class district of Damascus. He has worked himself to the limit for what he considers best for his country and only with great reluctance and from force of circumstances accepted any honour or publicity for himself. He is primarily a soldier who will stand no nonsense from the politicians, and his ambition seems to be to create the conditions in which he could return to pure soldiering with the assurance that the politicians would not let the Army down. As this seems unlikely of fulfilment he is resigned to doing the job himself.

P. M. G.

The Doukhobors

Canada's Intractable Minority

THE Doukhobórs in Canada present an interesting example of the refusal on purely religious grounds of part of the population of a Western country to be controlled in certain matters by its Government. These peculiar people are first heard of in the first quarter of

the eighteenth century, some seventy years after the appearance of the great Russian schism, the Raskol. The word is short for Doukhobórtsy, 'spirit-wrestlers' (Aylmer Maude's translation), a name originally given to them by the Orthodox Church signifying 'fighters against the spirit', and adopted by themselves (as so many pejorative nicknames have been by minorities) as meaning 'fighters for (or with) the spirit'. They first appear widely, though thinly, scattered about Russia, and they ascribe the origin of their sect to a legendary retired Prussian non-commissioned officer, or to a Quaker.

It is most difficult to set down their religious beliefs, for, first, they have always been secretive about communicating them in entirety (it is quite possible that they do not all themselves understand them), and, secondly, not all of them have believed the same things all the time: there has been on the one hand backsliding and on the other increase of austerity in their tenets and behaviour. They have no written scriptures—they do not consider the Bible to be divinely inspired, though they quote it freely to justify themselves; but they talk of a 'Book of Life', monitions handed down orally and used in conjunction with the prompting of each man's conscience. Their most important article of faith is that the spirit of God is in every human being, and that therefore no man has the right to give orders to another, still less to enforce them by violence. It is not clear how they reconcile this belief with the apparently unquestioning obedience which they accord to their theocratic leader, who would appear to be credited with, as it were, a double portion of the spirit; or with the fact that one of them, Peter Petróvich Verígin, who came over to Canada from Russia in 1927 to be their leader after the mysterious death in 1924 of his father Peter Vassílyevich Verígin, was always ready to use his fists, and was fined £10 in 1930 for chasing some of his followers with a club (violence, when used by them, is nearly always directed against their own people, and has seldom resulted in death). Nor is it known how their leader is chosen: heredity has a good deal to do with it, but not everything. Some people were said to have looked on Peter Vassílyevich as the Apostles looked on Christ; some thought him a God-man, some only a prophet, and others an ordinary man: but there is no doubt of the influence he had as a public leader.

They believe that each man can, and therefore must be allowed to, decide for himself what he should do; and that therefore the

hierarchy of government and church are unnecessary and even evil. Their belief in abstention from violence has been refined until some of them will not kill animals, some not even use them, or eat flesh. Many of them do not smoke or drink strong liquor. Some of them have gone so far as to refuse to use things made of metal (for this would encourage people being made to work in the mines, which had a very bad name in Russia), or to 'wound the earth by tilling it' (although on the whole they are extremely good farmers and market gardeners), or even to wear clothes. This last belief did not persist, and now they are apt to take their clothes off in public only when they wish to make a protest. They do not build churches or use ikons, but meet in each other's houses, the only symbols displayed being bread, salt, and water, and greet each other with a *nízky poklón*, a bow down to the ground expressive of respect for the spirit of God immanent in everyone.

In the first quarter of the nineteenth century they were allowed by Alexander I to settle near the Sea of Azov. Nothing is heard at this time of their actually refusing military service, though it is known that they were opposed to it; but the hiring of substitutes was then legal. In this settlement the thirty elders and twelve 'apostles', ruling in the name of the leader of the time, a weak man who had taken to drink, established a reign of terror of the utmost cruelty; and after a five-year investigation they were all—more than 4,000 of them—transported to the Caucasus in 1841–4, in the hope that they would be wiped out by the wild Mohammedan hill-men, or forced to learn to defend themselves. But their behaviour excited admiration in the hill-men, and the Doukhobórtsy succeeded in prospering in spite of the severe climate. In 1886 Peter Vassílyevich Verígin, in some way not easily to be understood, but not without scandal, succeeded the then leader, a woman, who had died. There were objectors to his succeeding; the sect split, most of them following him; and in 1887 he was banished to the north of Russia, without trial, as a disturber of the peace. He was kept well supplied with money, and was frequently in communication with his followers in the south. Among the orders he sent them—he called them recommendations, and they obeyed them while he was in banishment and after his release—was one that they were not to perform military service, 'since war offends God'. They decided to have a ceremonial burning of all weapons on 29 June, o.s., 1895. This was represented to the authorities as the beginnings of an armed rebellion, and they were

attacked by Cossacks and driven from their homes, to be settled among the Georgians and other tribes.

Attention was drawn to their plight in the press of the world, and, largely through the help of the followers of Tolstoy and of the Quakers, who looked upon them as harmless primitive Christian anarchists, about 8,000 of them were enabled in 1899 to migrate to Canada, some of them via Cyprus where they made an unsuccessful attempt to settle, with the specific proviso by Order in Council (without which they would not start their journey) that they should not have to perform any military service. They started their settlement at and near Yorkton, Saskatchewan, and in 1909 some of them moved to British Columbia. How many there now are in Canada cannot be known with certainty because of their refusal to furnish vital statistics; there are probably about 20,000, more than half of whom live in British Columbia. Little is known about what happened to those of them who were left in Russia: the Soviet Encyclopaedia says that some of them became Orthodox and some Baptists.

They arrived in Canada without a leader, rather resembling a termitary without a queen, if that can be imagined, and without understanding the language or the laws of the country—they all still talk Russian, and not all of them speak English. The life was necessarily hard and they made it harder for themselves by finding religious objection to using money, to making private property of God's earth, to forcing animals to work for them, and even to raising stock. Several times some hundreds of them set out on a pilgrimage 'to meet Christ, to preach the Gospel, and to reach a warm country where there would be no Government, and where they would eat fruit from the trees'. This search for Cockayne was not prompted by laziness; apparently, industrious people that they were, they had to pray hard to be saved from the temptation which assailed them to work. During a pilgrimage in May 1903 the participants started taking off their clothes, especially when entering a town or settlement, to show that they were as simple as Adam and Eve; and this was the first, though by no means the last, time that this manoeuvre was seen in Canada. Verígin, who had arrived from exile in December 1902, discountenanced the pilgrimage, and indeed all extremes.

The Doukhobórs arrived in Canada with a grievance. They had thought, comprehensibly, that the Tsarist Government was evil, and by extension that all Governments were evil. Perhaps they

thought—though not all of them can have thought this, for there were some intelligent men among those who made a preliminary visit to Canada—that they were to be allowed to live without imposed government; that they would be able to live under their own government, or lack of it. Secondly, their ideas of property were ambiguous: one can see the idea of the Russian *mir*, the village community where the land was held in common and where the council of elders decided what land should be farmed by whom, with the religious belief to back it that private ownership was evil and led to war—one can see this idea struggling against the ideas of a country where property and wealth seemed to be the highest criteria of human success. Their movement had started as a rebellion against oppression, as they termed it, from outside, and depended on this and on strong spiritual leadership for its homogeneity. The history of the Doukhobórs in Canada is a story of the realization that it was no longer necessary to band together spiritually against oppression. This led, on the one hand, to a relaxation of the laws of austerity, to fraternization with non-Doukhobórs, and to prosperity, accompanied or not by departure from the group; and, on the other hand, to a tightening by the more extreme Doukhobórs of their rules and customs, in an attempt, in the name of spirituality and tradition, by attacks, verbal and physical, to prevent defection and to recall backsliders to their pristine austerity. This last procedure is carried on chiefly by the sub-sect called the Sons of Freedom, in the Kootenay region.

They have not all been able to decide yet whether they should live communally or as individuals, although the individualists have achieved far greater prosperity (this is not necessarily an attraction to the true Doukhobór: in fact he may even disapprove of it) and the community attempts have generally been failures. One grand attempt at community ownership was begun in 1926 under the name of the Christian Community of Universal Brotherhood Ltd, but this did not prosper; possibly through mismanagement, it got into difficulties in the 'thirties, its mortgages were foreclosed, and, again not without scandal, it came to nothing. There is one small community of about 100 people at Hilliers, on Vancouver Island, which is said to live communally, even husbands and wives being in common, though this last has been denied.

The aspects of the Doukhobórs' beliefs which have led them to give the governments (Provincial and Federal) most trouble have been their refusal to supply vital statistics and to comply with the

Education Acts; though it must be said now that there are many Doukhobórs, indeed the greater part of them, who do conform. It is not a case of 'He that complies against his will', for the only thing about which all the Doukhobórs are of their own opinion still is that they will not take active part in war; but many of them, particularly of the 'Orthodox', the Union of Spiritual Communities of Christ, which succeeded—spiritually, not financially—to the C.C.U.B. Ltd mentioned above, find that if they conform they prosper, and that they like prosperity. It is the unassimilable lump, those whom the newspapers call 'fanatics', who are the most interesting, and who give (and get) most trouble. Even by 1912 a Royal Commission was reporting that 'the Doukhobórs are desirable settlers from the standpoint of their personal character, farming skill, devotion to agriculture, and general industry. The investigation has failed to establish any valid objection to them, except their refusal to comply with the registration laws and the "Schools Act".' And ever since then the struggle against compulsory school-attendance has gone on. Whenever there are reports of houses being burnt, of railway lines being blown up, and of people parading naked, the reason will usually be found to be one of the following: protest against having to send children to school; protest against those who consent to send their children; protest against relaxation of the 'old laws of our faith'.

It all stems from an attempt to hold the sect together, by force if necessary. The reasoning is: education tends to break up the sect, showing another and possibly more desirable way of life; and education in English, and the registration of births, marriages, and deaths, is the thin end of the wedge for conscription. So fire is used, (*a*) as a symbolic purifier—to purge out the 'new ways'; (*b*) to punish those who have succumbed to their temptation; (*c*) as a protest against something either as vague as 'the coming of a Third World War' or as specific as the sentencing to hard labour of people who have taken part in a naked procession; and (*d*) in the burning of one's own property as a joyous personal sacrifice for no reason except that 'property is evil' and 'our people are becoming too worldly'.

Canada has had difficulty in dealing with these immigrants almost ever since they arrived. As well as private enterprise in the shape of 'vigilante' movements, and police raids, there was the segregation in 1932 of about 600 Doukhobórs, convicted of nudism, on Piers Island in the Gulf of Georgia (they were released in 1935);

and the imprisonment in 1950 of about 400 Doukhobór men at New Westminster. These last were placed in quarters which were inflammable—unwisely, in view of their notorious propensity for arson—and the quarters were burnt. The prisoners were transferred to the main prison, and one of the conditions for their release was that they should give a pledge of respect for Canadian laws: some of them steadfastly refused to give it. Economic loss has been high, to Doukhobórs and others, both from the actual burning of school houses, community buildings, and homes; from people staying away from work to guard their property; and from the general feeling of insecurity which their outbreaks engender. Suggestions have been made that the Sons of Freedom should be deported, but with memories of the expulsion of the Acadians from Nova Scotia in 1758 the Canadian Government has been unwilling to do this, and while the Sons of Freedom have expressed their readiness to emigrate—the Russian peasant has always been footloose—no country has yet been found willing to accept them. Another proposal has been to 'relocate' them elsewhere in Canada; but this would not solve the problem, unless it were possible to segregate them altogether, which seems undesirable, especially after the failure of the Piers Island experiment. The latest and most humane effort to deal with them was the setting up of a Doukhobór Research Committee, which worked under the auspices of the University of British Columbia, and published a long and competent report in 1952. One of its recommendations is that there should be a permanent Commission on Doukhobór Affairs, responsible to a Minister, appointed by the Lieutenant-Governor in Council.

The problem is more complicated than it is shown to be here. In their purest form the Doukhobórs rely on a theocratic leader; and it is possible that if they had one, a practical man like Peter Vassílyevich Verígin, and if he were in constant touch with such a Commission, much might be done to make it possible for the extreme Doukhobórs to continue to live in Canada without being segregated. But there is no such leader. John Verígin, great-grandson of Peter Vassílyevich, is the secretary of one sub-sect, the Union of Spiritual Communities of Christ (the other sub-sects are the Sons of Freedom, who date from 1902, the small community at Hilliers, and the Society of Independents, which has existed for about ten years), and he carries much less weight than did his grandfather and great-grandfather. There is a legend that in

1939, on his death-bed, Peter Petróvich referred to a son of his whom he had left behind in Russia, and who is said to have been exiled to Siberia in 1934 for opposing the Communist regime, and warned his followers against sending to Russia for him, saying: 'When the time is ripe, he will come, or send for you.' There is a tradition that the Doukhobórs will return to Russia before they finally find a country where they can settle in peace. The Quakers are looking for this man, but it is not known whether he is alive or dead. If his uncle were dead the way would be open for John Verígin to assume the leadership of the whole sect.

In December 1949 the Sons of Freedom made a public admission of their misdeeds—it had always been difficult to obtain evidence, for Doukhobórs will not inform against each other, even though they may belong to different sub-sects: 'we have no time to help the law'—and said that they repented and would never repeat them. Incidentally, they coupled this with an appeal to the leaders of the world 'to stop preparations day and night to destroy each other'. But pledges had been given before, and the authorities were sceptical. There was another outbreak in September 1953, when about 150 Doukhobórs were charged with nudism and contributing to juvenile delinquency. It was estimated then that the Doukhobórs had caused damage and incurred costs of $30 million in the past forty years.

Besides the invaluable Report of the Research Committee referred to above, much may be learned about the Doukhobórs from Aylmer Maude's *A Peculiar People* (London, Constable, 1905) which deals with the Doukhobórs up to the time of their arrival in Canada, and from *Slava Bohu: the Story of the Doukhobórs*, by J. F. C. Wright (Toronto, Nelson, 1940).

H. R. A. H.

Changes in Eastern Europe's Economic Planning

Emphasis on Agriculture?

THROUGHOUT the spring and summer of 1953—a period in which the political high-lights for the Communist world were the death of Stalin, the East German revolt of 17 June, and the disappearance of Lavrenti Beria—the Communist leaders in Russia, and even more in the satellite countries, have been openly stating the economic difficulties with which their regimes are beset. Simultaneous statements, almost identical exposés, have shown to the peoples of the Soviet bloc and to the rest of the world that the Stalinist economic system is facing grave problems.

More surprising than this was the admission that these problems were by no means new. They were the same dilemmas with which the economy of 'socialism in one country', and Communist economy itself, have been confronted from the first. The words 'consumers' and 'consumer-goods', soft-pedalled for so long, reappeared with the force of new slogans: the 'consumers', who are primarily the industrial workers and the intelligentsia, are to be given satisfaction, while 'consumer-goods', ranging from food to clothing, must be produced and delivered at great speed. Official attention was switched to the 'producers' of food and raw materials for the consumer-goods industry—in other words, the peasants.

Thus the problem of agriculture in the Communist world came once again into the foreground, bringing with it the still more fundamental question of the rate of development of industrialization and the practicability of concentrating on heavy industry. The essential formula of industrialization *cum* collectivization *cum* forced productivity was brought into question. The application of the theory upon which the economic Plans of the People's Democracies have been built is itself in doubt, the Plans entirely reversed. Whether this is but another tactical withdrawal, in order to appease the dissatisfied peoples, a new-style NEP for the whole Soviet bloc, or whether the economic plans of Eastern Europe are in fact collapsing under the consequences of their initial mistake, is a question which cannot as yet be answered. But it is important to see why and how this problem of the role of agriculture in Communist economic planning has been so dramatically revived at the present time.

STALINIST PLANS IN EASTERN EUROPE

In a study published in this journal four years ago, an attempt was made to deal with what seemed even then to be the underlying problem of the Eastern European Plans.[1] At that time the Communist planners were urging the need for rapid industrialization. Only the immediate building-up of heavy industry, they affirmed, could solve the two main problems with which these countries were faced: it alone could 'emancipate' them from the disadvantageous and permanent 'scissors-relationship' with the industrial West, and it could also absorb the agricultural overpopulation symptomatic of the maladjustment of these countries' economies.

The need for industrialization and its advantages from this dual point of view were already recognized, even before the Communists seized power, by most political and social experts in the Eastern European countries. But the objections they raised against the rapid industrialization proposed by the Communists centred around the means by which this end could be reached. In their view, lack of capital and of industrial plant formed the greatest impediment; and financial and technical capital could only be obtained from the West, particularly from the United States and the United Kingdom, since Germany at that time was still out of the running and Soviet Russia, herself industrially backward, was faced with her own problems of investment. Therefore, they argued, the two reasonable methods by which industrialization could be brought about were, first, to improve and increase agricultural production in order to buy from the West, importer of agricultural products, the necessary machines and plants; and secondly, to introduce the plan for industrialization only by gradual stages, starting with those industries for which the raw materials could be found within the country itself, and reaching the higher level of specialized heavy industries when the foundations had been well laid.

The study questioned whether Stalin's blueprint for the Russia of 1929 was applicable to the Czechoslovakia, Hungary, or Rumania of 1949. The investment policy outlined in the Plans not only appeared to be directed against agriculture but also seemed insufficient for industrialization;[2] moreover, from a social point of

[1] 'The Peasant in Eastern Europe's Economic Planning', in *The World Today*, August 1949.

[2] See table in *The World Today*, August 1949, p. 359.

view the Plans entailed coercive measures against the agricultural producers—in other words, against more than half the population of these overwhelmingly agrarian countries. The study therefore suggested that 'The result of the Comecon Plans taken as a whole might be that the new industries would not expand, or at least not adequately, the national income would not show the expected rise, while in the meantime the basis of agricultural productivity would have been damaged, if not destroyed'.

Further developments have resulted in the crumbling of the whole façade of the Plans. The first setback was that, after Soviet Russia forced the satellites to restrict their trade with the West, any hope of importing machinery from the Western industrial markets had to be given up. Another stumbling-block was the growing interference of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, the Russian-dominated regional organization which was supposed to co-ordinate and synchronize the various national plans. Projects regarded as of paramount importance by the national planners had to be abandoned at very short notice in order to concentrate upon new ones, unnecessary for the individual country itself, but dear to the Soviet planners either for far-fetched regional purposes or, more often and more simply, for the convenience of the Soviet Union.[1] Finally, by the summer of 1950 the intensive re-armament drive had jeopardized whatever remained of the initial plans.[2] Intensive production of raw materials, both industrial and agricultural, became the major concern of the Communist economists. Purges and prison sentences were the lot of those Communist leaders who held too firmly to the 'structural' aspect.

As for the countries and their peoples, the results of this new strain, added to the previous ones, soon became apparent. More acute shortage of consumer goods; faster inflationary spiral; higher norms of production; higher compulsory quotas for agricultural producers; more severe repressive measures in the pro-

[1] Typical of this kind of sudden change is the history of the construction of the Black Sea-Danube Canal, now officially abandoned. The project was not included in Rumania's first One-Year Plan, announced in January 1949, but was launched immediately afterwards in March 1949 as the 'greatest economic operation' undertaken 'on the initiative of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance'.

[2] 'In all Cominform countries, output plans were revised upwards with an increased emphasis on heavy industry, and one of the reasons given for the revisions was the need to secure much larger armaments production and the maintenance of larger forces'. U.N. *Economic Survey of Europe* 1951.

duction field; and, in each country, the introduction and increasing use of forced labour as the means for coercing the population and securing cheaper manpower—this was the pattern throughout Eastern Europe during the last two years of Stalin's reign. Yet, in spite of this, up to the first quarter of 1953 (the period in which Stalin's death was announced and the change in the Soviet administration took place) the general line of economic policy in the satellite States remained unchanged: the plans still aimed at the increase of industrial output at all costs. 'The economic plans and budgets of Eastern European countries published at the beginning of the year continued to reflect the concentration of resources upon producer goods output, as in previous years. . . A comparison of these originally planned increases in industrial output with the annual budgets shows a tendency for the increase in public expenditure to be larger than the planned expansion of the national product, a consequence of the spread of the government sector, or inflation, or both.'[1]

By September 1953 dramatic changes had taken place everywhere. The new leniency of Malenkov's promises, made immediately after Stalin's death, that the Soviet Government would try to improve the conditions of life of its citizens; the violent reaction of the Eastern Germans on 17 June 1953 towards the first experiment in relaxation effected by a Communist Government; the hurried self-indictment of the new Hungarian Government on 4 July, when it announced the complete reversal of its economic policy and put the blame for past failures on excessive collectivization and industrialization; the subsequent statements by Bierut on 21 July, by Gheorghiu-Dej on 23 August, by Viliam Siroky on 7 September, and by Valko Tchervenkov on 9 September, revealing some faults of the plans in their respective countries—all these culminated in Khrushchev's agricultural directive of 7 September which, taken in conjunction with that of Malenkov himself on 8 August, opened the trial of the Stalinist economic policy.

This does not necessarily mean that the causes, or for that matter the effects, of the changes in Soviet Russia are identical with those in the Eastern European countries. In Soviet Russia the main concern of the new Government is to gain popularity, at least among the managerial circles of the population, through immediate improvements in the supply of goods. In Eastern Europe, on the other hand, the Governments seem still to be concerned with

[1] *Economic Bulletin for Europe*, First Quarter, 1953, Geneva, July 1953.

avoiding a total breakdown of the economic machine, while at the same time maintaining at the requisite rhythm the production demanded by Soviet Russia for her own needs. In order to disentangle these two different trends, this examination of the revision of the Plans in Eastern Europe must first start with a cursory glance at the original developments inside Soviet Russia itself.

IS THERE A COMMUNIST ALTERNATIVE TO STALINISM?

For Malenkov, the policy of over-all industrialization decided upon in 1928 still seems to be fully justified in 1953. But the end for which it was originally intended has a slightly different slant from that which we have heard constantly repeated during the past quarter of a century which has witnessed the five Soviet Five-Year Plans. 'The Party,' he said on 8 August, 'has firmly and unswervingly implemented its line in the struggle against Trotskyists and Right-wing capitulators and traitors who opposed the construction of heavy industry and demanded the transfer of funds from heavy to light industry. Acceptance of these proposals would have meant the doom of our revolution, the doom of our country, for we would have found ourselves disarmed in the face of capitalist encirclement. This was the main reason for developing heavy industry, metallurgy, the fuel and power industries, and machinery construction.' In other words, the gigantic sacrifices of a whole generation of Russians were dictated largely by the immediate political consideration of defence.

Further, Malenkov, after pointing out that at present, eight years after the end of the war, heavy industry was employing about 70 per cent of all the industrial workers, gave it as his view that 'at the present time we can—and therefore we must—ensure a more rapid increase in the material and cultural levels of the life of the people'. To this end it was 'essential to increase considerably the investment of funds for the development of light industry, for the food industry, and for the development of agriculture'. Indeed, 'in order to ensure a drastic advance in the production of consumer-goods, we must first of all take care of the development and advancement of agriculture, which supplies the population with food and light industry with raw material'. 'Socialist agriculture has achieved great success', but it is impossible 'not to notice that the present-day level of agricultural production does not correspond to the increased technical equipment in agriculture,

to the potentialities inherent in the collective-farm regime'.[1] His conclusion was that a switch in production was necessary because 'the Soviet people are right to demand it from us . . . and we must answer this demand by action'. It was, he said, his unshaken conviction that the present structure and regime could carry out this new task; and by adjusting and smoothing the functioning of the Stalinist economic machine of 'socialism in one country', it would be shown that the machine could also solve new problems, and that the difficulties which might arise were not fundamental results of its own structural contradictions.

Yet if Malenkov drew this conclusion, it was left to Khrushchev to deal with the first premise of the underlying syllogism on which the whole new-style Economic Policy is based, and which Malenkov formulated in the sentence: 'We must first take care of agriculture, which supplies the population with food and light industry with raw materials.' The directive on agricultural development, adopted by the Soviet Communist Party's Central Committee on 7 September,[2] is the text which brings into the picture the most important dramatis persona of the crisis: the peasant; and the man who introduced it, N. S. Khrushchev. The directive asserts from the first that the 'level of agricultural production does not correspond entirely to the needs of a growing population and to the raw materials requirements of light industry'. It therefore sets a dual task: to see that in two or three years a considerable improvement is brought about in the food-supply of the population; and to assure to the peasants a higher standard of living.

The reasons given for the grave shortcomings of agriculture are fourfold. First comes the failure during the past twenty-eight years to 'ensure simultaneously a speedy rhythm of development both to heavy industry and to light industry and agriculture'. This conjures up the fundamental problem with which all backward countries are faced: the problem of how to use inadequate national capital and unskilled manpower for the purpose of industrialization without lowering below a decent minimum the standard of living of the people. Secondly, there has been a perpetual violation of the principle of the 'material interests of the workers in the

[1] He quoted livestock breeding as the most unsatisfactory branch, adding that in the past twenty years the output of production goods had increased by fifty-five times, while that of consumer goods had increased only by twelve times. Figures for State investment over that same period (in thousand million current rubles) were: heavy industry, 638,000; transport, 193,000; light industry, 72,000; agriculture, 94,000.

[2] *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy*, 18 September 1953.

development of production'. This raises the question whether it is possible to deprive the agricultural producer of his land and of the fruits of his labour without transforming him into an indifferent and stubborn tool of production. Thirdly, another principle to be violated has been the right of the collectivized peasant to possess his own limited smallholding; and the result has been 'a diminution in the number of cattle'. This is again a variation of the same question, that of the Russian peasant's willingness to work for the Government. Lastly, there were grave shortcomings in the mechanization of agriculture. 'Up to now no systematic plan for machinery has been created which could ensure the complete mechanization of agricultural work in the various parts of the country with their differing natural and economic conditions.' This refers to the regional differences in mechanization and the consequent discrepancies in output. But what it seems to mean in reality is that in spite of twenty-eight years of heavy industrialization, the industry is still incapable of producing enough agricultural machines for the intensification of agricultural production.

It is certainly too early to say just how practicable or even how genuine is the line of the new Russian Government on agricultural policy. It may well be that the main object of all these statements is to create abroad the impression of intensive concentration upon domestic problems and peace-time production. It is probable, too, that the new rulers, as yet uneasily seated in the chair of Stalin, want to start with a period of internal prosperity. Whether the 'toiling masses' will be able to share in this prosperity or whether, as Professor Mosely recently suggested,[1] the increase in consumer-goods will principally benefit the 'apparatus' which alone will be able to buy more and more expensive goods, is yet another question. But taken at their face value, as doctrinal problems, these statements reveal the same unsolved dilemma with which Communist economy has been faced from the first.

Stalin's formula for success lay in the unhesitating brutality with which he governed a country the size of a continent, economically under-developed, and with a people politically uneducated. It may be said that forced labour was the logical outcome of the Stalinist system, both politically, as a means of coercion, and economically, as a weapon of productivity. By the use of terror Stalin kept his society running regardless of the Communist

[1] 'The Kremlin's Foreign Policy since Stalin', by Philip E. Mosely, in *Foreign Affairs*, October 1953.

economic and social theory which it was supposed to embody. But at the same time it must not be forgotten that up to the present time Stalinism has been the only form in which Communist theory has been put into practice. It still remains to be seen whether the new Communist rulers for one reason or another—reasons of fear, opportunism, or common sense—can try to govern the country with less disregard for those they govern, exacting fewer sacrifices from them and providing them with a higher standard of living, without endangering the very foundations of such a regime. Can individual freedom be re-introduced, even temporarily and in part, into such a closely-knit edifice without disrupting it? In other words, can Communist economy take a form other than Stalinism?

Economic Leninism stopped at the 1921 NEP. Economic Malenkovism starts with the new-style 1953 NEP. Both versions of the New Economic Policies were evoked by the problem of adjusting Marxist Communism to the needs of an agrarian country. In both cases the spectre which haunts the Communist world is the peasant, indispensable to the production and supply of the whole society and yet the inevitable enemy of the whole structure and philosophy of the regime. From Tito's Yugoslavia (where the first attempt to relax collectivization was made) to Mao Tse-tung's China (where the 'original ideology' differs from European Communism especially on the role of the peasantry) and now to Malenkov's Russia, the peasant problem, stifled by Stalin, reappears again as intractable as at the beginning.

THE REVERSAL OF ECONOMIC POLICY IN EASTERN EUROPE AND ITS MEANING

Returning now to the Economic Plans in Eastern Europe, it is obvious that the Malenkov-Khrushchev line of thought has been adopted by the leaders of the People's Democracies. Self-criticism[1] and self-denunciation are even stronger in some cases, and are expressed with a characteristic lack of shame.

[1] The Prime Ministers of Eastern Germany, Hungary, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia were the most outspoken in this respect. M. Tchervenkov's speech on the anniversary of Bulgaria's liberation on 9 September 1953 was the least repentant of all. But in a letter in *Rabotniscesko Delo* (21 September 1953) the Bulgarian Premier confessed that 'our planning activities still show great shortcomings'. As for Poland, after a puzzling silence of several months, the 'new course' was endorsed recently when the Government announced that a special congress of the Polish United Workers (Communist) Party had been called for 16 January 1954 to discuss the revision of the economic Plan for its last two years (1954 and 1955) and the development of a special agricultural plan for those two years.

The structural problem of these economies is, in theory, still the conflict between industrialization and agricultural production, and the terms in which their spokesmen describe their present difficulties are similar to those of the Soviet directive on agriculture and of Malenkov's speeches. Yet the differences between Soviet Russia and the satellites appear so great, both in the actual situations described and the aims and targets proposed, as to suggest that the two problems are in reality entirely different.

What are these differences? They are legion; but in general they can be grouped under three main headings. First, differences in cause: while the announcement of a New Economic Policy in Soviet Russia coincided with the change of government and leadership, in the Eastern European countries it coincided with, or rather was heralded by, popular unrest and by signs of economic breakdown. Secondly, there are differences in emphasis and in the general presentation of the problem. The Russians are told that owing to, and following upon, a long and successful phase of industrialization, a new phase can now be opened in which the needs of agriculture and light industry can be fostered. But some Eastern European administrations have had to recognize that their industrialization plans have failed and had to be reduced or postponed before fulfilling even their first term, and that an interim economic policy must be introduced at once. Thirdly, while a summary study of the new Russian economic programme can lead one to assume that a relative improvement, for a shorter or a longer period, can be achieved and can reach a more or less limited part of the population, study of the new satellite economic programmes leads one to wonder how agricultural production can be increased and how more consumer goods can be manufactured. Paradoxically what can be detected in the satellites' figures is the aim of helping the import plan of Soviet Russia, thus leaving too little for their own domestic markets. These are differences in effects.

In the spring of 1953 the Communist Governments in Eastern Europe were forced to draw the bitter conclusion that they were faced with the active opposition of the main section of the population which they were supposed to represent and which they thought of as the backbone of the regime: the industrial workers. The vicious circle created by the high norms of production and the scarcity of necessities[1] exasperated the workers. Absenteeism and

[1] To finish the inside of a boring machine a Hungarian worker was allotted 108 hours in 1949, 58 hours in 1951, and 36 hours in June 1952. The norms

sporadic strikes had been noticeable for the last year or so, especially in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. But by May and June 1953 the situation was more serious, culminating in the events of 17 June in East Berlin but accompanied by a wave of unrest throughout Eastern Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Poland, and Rumania. It was because the workers began to strike and to demonstrate in the streets that the Governments decided that a change must be made. Yet the Zaisser experiment, the attempt to improve the supply of goods on the domestic market by providing farmers and retailers with incentives, ended in the hostile action of the German workers against privileges being granted to other sections of the population while the working class was neglected. The economic machine therefore seized up: the villages refused to send more food to the towns, and the factory workers refused to work unless they were provided with more and cheaper food and goods. The strikes, in their turn, definitely paralysed the execution of the Plans. Finally, when a further attempt at relaxation was made the two apparently hostile blocks of producers, the agricultural and the industrial, owing to whose opposition the economic activities of the Eastern German Government had been paralysed, united and on 17 June tried to get rid of the regime by a single political movement in towns and villages alike.

How far international events affect domestic politics in the Communist bloc, or, for that matter, how far events in one satellite country influence subsequent events in the others, must always be a moot point. But in the present instance it is possible to assess the effects of the Eastern German revolt, on the one hand, upon the internal and international policy of the Soviet Government—as witness the disappearance of Beria and the renewed refusals to discuss the German question. On the other hand, the satellite leaders' reactions between July and September have provided a perfect example of the merging of two different trends into one single political move. From their German colleagues they caught a sense of panic and of the imminence of their own economic disaster; but they wrapped this in the terminology and line of reasoning which was already being discussed in Moscow and which

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have been raised again since then. On the other hand, on the basis of figures published by F.A.O. for the consumption of textile fibres such as cotton, wool, and rayon for the years 1938 and 1949 to 1951—a method of comparing the standard of living in different countries—it appears that in the U.S.S.R., Bulgaria, Eastern Germany, and Rumania the total consumption of such goods per head of the population was lower than in 1938.

came into the open with the Malenkov-Khrushchev speeches. Communist official language usually has a double meaning. But in certain of the speeches of the satellite Premiers the self-criticism goes beyond this, and the second meaning can be taken as a defence of their administration against the imperious demands of their masters. When, for instance, Nagy says, 'In its economic policy the Government will observe the proverb: "Cut your coat according to your cloth". We have to note, and to state frankly before the whole country, that the objectives of the augmented Five-Year Plan are beyond our strength', or when Gheorghiu-Dej proclaims that 'the slogan of achieving the Five-Year Plan in four years was launched without sufficient study', these self-confessions take on a self-justifying note if one remembers that after 1949 all the Plans were correlated, adjusted, and stream-lined by the Russian-controlled Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.[1]

The official apologists, in recognizing the scale of the disaster, are also forced to admit that the standard of living has fallen since they came to power. Thus Nagy: 'The implementation of the Plan is greatly hampering the growth of the material foundations of the country's welfare and has recently resulted in a deteriorating standard of living'; and Gheorghiu-Dej: 'It resulted in an insufficient increase of the living standard of working people as compared with the general development of national economy.' Such an admission will not be found in the statements of the Russian leaders. But, too, the standard of living has risen in Soviet Russia as compared with the satellite countries since the Communists came to power.[2]

Finally, the satellite spokesmen can see no solution other than to renounce the ambitious plans of industrialization and to assign to themselves the humble task of restoring agricultural production at least to the pre-war (bourgeois) level, with or without collectivization. 'There is no justifiable reason for an exaggerated industrialization and a striving for self-sufficiency', said Nagy,

[1] Quotations from Nagy's speech of 4 July 1953 are taken from the official version in *Szabad Nep* (5 July 1953); Gheorghiu-Dej's speech of 23 August 1953 appeared in *Scanteia* of the same day.

[2] According to an investigation of the Bureau of Labour Statistics of the U.S. Department of Labour (*Labour Review*, July 1953), the average Soviet worker has to work 45 per cent longer in 1953 than he did in 1928 to buy the same weekly quantities of seven basic foodstuffs; but a Polish economist, Mr A. Zaubermann, has calculated that the index of real wages shows that the real wage of a Czechoslovak worker, as expressed in general purchases, is 89 per cent, that of a Polish worker 56 per cent, and that of a Hungarian 46 per cent of the real wage of a Soviet worker.

'—all the more so since Hungary does not possess the necessary raw materials. The Government regards it as one of its foremost duties to increase substantially agricultural investments, while cutting those in industry.' 'In order to improve the supply situation it is necessary to attain and exceed the pre-war agricultural level. But to do so the individual farms of the working peasants must be given more assistance than formerly,' is Gheorghiu-Dej's version. 'We have come to the conclusion,' said Siroky, the Czechoslovak Prime Minister, on 15 September 1953, 'that we can slow down the rhythm of development of the large projects in heavy industry. . . We shall reduce the rhythm of building up new plants.'[1]

But the greatest contrast between the Russian and the Eastern European attitude to their present economic problems is to be found in the way the 'new line' is put into practice. Little has been put into absolute figures or plain words. But from what has been said, and from comparative studies, four points can be fairly assumed.

(i) There will be no fundamental changes in the agricultural policy. Indeed, even in Rumania and Hungary, the two countries whose Communist rulers have confessed most openly the failure of their agricultural production, nothing of real importance seems to have been undertaken since the summer. In Rumania the measures taken up to now amount to some reductions in water and sewerage rates and in taxes; cancellations of produce-deliveries owed by producers from the 1952 harvest; improvement of veterinary services (generally speaking there is more propaganda stress on the improvement of livestock); and the transfer of 448,000 hectares of 'small and isolated plots' to collective farms and individual 'working peasants'. In Hungary, a resolution adopted by the Communist Party Central Committee on 31 October 1953 reveals that the decision taken by the Party and Government in July 'met open resistance in certain Party circles'—particularly on the part of the State Planning Office. 'An end must be made to this ideological vacillation', states the Resolution. These and many other signs show clearly the reluctance of the Communist Governments and Parties to embark upon an economic policy to which they are ideologically hostile.

[1] According to the Munich correspondent of the *Observer* (18 October 1953), more than half the furnaces of Hungary's new steel industry have been extinguished, while in Czechoslovakia the famous Huko smelting combine near Kosice has been completely abandoned.

(ii) Nor will there be any appreciable increase in the production of consumer-goods; on the contrary, a reduction of the total amount of consumer-goods for internal consumption can be noticed in some cases, as compared with the figures of the initial Plans. Here, for instance, are comparative figures for the new and old Rumanian Plans. The figure for shoes is the most striking, since it can more easily be compared with the population figure, which is 17½ million.

	(1955 *Target*)	
Commodity	*New Plan*	*Old Plan*
Cotton	250,000,000 sq. m.	266,500,000 sq. m.
Woollen cloth	32,500,000 sq. m.	39,400,000 sq. m.
Silk	19,000,000 sq. m.	41,000,000 sq. m.
Leather shoes	10,000,000 pairs	20,700,000 pairs

(iii) Most of the consumer goods produced will be exported to Soviet Russia. It is interesting to note that during this present year, in which the satellites are supposed to produce more consumer goods, the Soviet Government is said to have purchased abroad £300 million worth of food and consumer goods. *Izvestia*, explaining this considerable purchase, said that two-thirds of the imports for Soviet consumers this year would come from the Eastern European Popular Democracies.[1] One may even wonder whether the whole surplus of consumer goods for 1953–5 is not ordered by the Soviet Government (otherwise, one wonders, for instance, why the Rumanian internal market will get less consumer goods in spite of the increased production, and why the new Rumanian agricultural programme should stress so much the need for improving the livestock position, which had not fallen in Rumania, but had fallen in Soviet Russia). The part reserved for the satellites in the changed Plans appears to be merely the negative one of closing down their industrial and public projects.

(iv) What is being cut from the Plans are the long-term public-utility projects. But the production of raw materials, and especially of fuel, required by the Soviet Union is to be intensified.[2] Poland's coal production is to be raised from 85 to 88½ million metric tons, and her exports of coal to the Soviet Union are in-

[1] *New York Times*, 1 November 1953.

[2] The most important task is to ensure a large development of raw material for heavy industry. 'We must increase substantially the extraction of iron and iron ore', said the Czechoslovak Prime Minister, Siroky. 'As regards heavy industry, special attention must be paid to those branches which constitute a sure basis of raw materials' (Gheorghiu-Dej).

creased from 14 to 20 million tons[1], while in the new Rumanian Plan oil rises from 10 to 11 million tons and coal remains at 8·5 million. This intensified production without new machinery spells ruin for the respective industries. At the same time the projects for electrification and for navigability of the internal waterways, the Danube-Black Sea Canal, the Oder-Danube Canal, and so on, are being abandoned.

Some general conclusions can be drawn from this summary survey of the new aspects of the economic problems of the Communist bloc. The problem of the peasant class and of agricultural production has not yet been solved by any of these agrarian countries which have been forced into industrialization at speed—and this includes the U.S.S.R. But at the same time the special problem of the Eastern European countries dominated by Soviet Russia remains that of their relations with that Power, which, with or without Plans for the socialist transformation of their economies, continues to regard them as secondary quasi-colonial markets which must be adapted to fit her needs and requirements, whatever these may be.

G. I.

[1] 'Under the recent trade agreement for the year ending 28 February 1954, Sweden contracted to receive only 2·2 million tons of (Polish) coal. This compares with a figure of 3 million tons in the previous agreement which, incidentally, Poland did not complete in the stipulated time' (British Iron and Steel Federation, *Monthly Statistical Bulletin*, October 1953: 'Steel Developments in Poland'.) This is a remarkable example of how Russia's demands affect the satellites' Plans, for, as the study points out in its conclusion, 'The 1955 prospects for Poland, in steel, therefore seem to depend on her ability to obtain Swedish ore by offering coal cheaper than other European producers.'

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